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P. Nanda

In this dedication of the fifteenth volume of the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, Ved P. Nanda, director of the International Legal
Studies Program of the University of Denver College of Law and faculty
adviser to the Journal,outlines the past achievements of the International
Legal Studies Program with particular reference to future developments in
international law.

ARTICLES
THE STATUS OF COUNTERCLAIMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION INVOLVING A PRIVATE PARTY AND A
FOREIGN STATE

................ Bradley Larschan and Guive Mirfendereski

11

This article examines the sources and extent of general rules of international law governing counterclaims in judicial and arbitral proceedings. Initially, the article focuses on the practice regarding counterclaims before international courts. It also examines the permissibility of counterclaims
before international arbitral tribunals in interstate disputes and disputes
between private parties and states. The authors' evaluation leads them to
conclude that, although counterclaims are generally allowed unless specifically prohibited by courts and arbitral tribunals, as a matter of international jurisprudence and as expressed in conventions, the international law
rules concerning counterclaims are generally narrow. The article concludes
with an analysis of the practice of counterclaims in United States federal
courts as a possible source of analogy to international tribunals.
JUDGES IN AN UNJUST SOCIETY:
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA .........

Joe W. ("Chip") Pitts II

The thesis of this article is concerned with the two traditional models of
law and adjudication in America and the former Commonwealth countries,
positivism and natural law, and their inadequacies regarding the problem of
the moral judge in an immoral system. After discussing the features of the
South African legal system and the traditional approaches to adjudicating
within such a "wicked" legal system, the article compares the American experience of dealing with slavery to the South African experience of dealing
with apartheid. The conclusion proposes a new approach to law and adjudication which provides a better explanation for the way in which judges confronted with unjust law have nevertheless sought justice. Elements of this
new approach to law as "interpretation" will make it easier for such judges
to seek justice in the future.
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The U.S. currently faces the dilemma of trying to encourage U.S. exports
while at the same time there is concern for the reaction of allies and cosignatories to international agreements relating to tariffs, trade and taxes.
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Dedication to the Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy at
15-Challenges Ahead for International
Law and Policy
VED

P.

NANDA*

I.
As the manuscript for this issue of the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy is mailed to the printer, the Journal reaches another milestone. It is time for celebration, and equally important, it is
time for reflection. We need to take stock of what the Journal has accomplished and assess the nature of the challenges the Journal must meet in
the next fifteen years. By the time the Journal's editorial board meets to
plan its 30th volume we will have stepped into the next century.
This occasion is a landmark for all of us who are involved with the
Journal now and all who have contributed to its growth over the years. In
a fitting tribute to a prized friend of the College of Law, especially its
International Legal Studies Program and the Journal, the first issue of
Volume 15 is appropriately dedicated to Leonard v.B. Sutton, former
Chief Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge Sutton is an eminent jurist and a truly global thinker. A distinguished alumnus of the University of Denver College of Law, his involvement in international affairs dates back to 1935 when he was
awarded a fellowship in foreign trade in Stuttgart, Germany. His second
fellowship in 1937-38 in government administration from the National Institute of Public Affairs acquainted him with Indian affairs as he worked
for the U.S. Office of Indian Affairs in Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado
and South Dakota.
Judge Sutton served with distinction on the Colorado Supreme Court
for twelve years, from 1956 to 1968, and was its Chief Justice in 1960 and
1966. His illustrious career included serving as Chairman of the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in 1968-69 and Chairman of the Colorado Statute Revision Commission from 1963 to 1967. He is a university
lecturer and is the author of numerous scholarly publications.
His multifaceted activities in the international arena include holding
offices in the Inter-American Bar Association, the Mexican Academy of
International Law, International Bar Association, Institute of Judicial
Administration, and Washington Foreign Law Society where he served as
* Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of
Denver College of Law.
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President for 1970-71. He serves on the Institute of International Education as Honorary Trustee and has served for a number of years as a lawyer for the Mexican Consulate in Denver. The University of Denver is
privileged to have him provide leadership as Chairman of the Board of
Governors. Currently engaged in the practice of international law, Judge
Sutton also serves as an arbitrator. As a truly renaissance person, Judge
Sutton is a collector of fine arts, a world traveler and explorer, a mountain climber and a noted raconteur.
Judge Sutton has played a most prominent role in educating members of the legal profession in Colorado on international law issues. The
year before I came to the University of Denver College of Law in 1965,
Judge Sutton was responsible for designing an international law course
for the Colorado Bar. In conjunction with the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, he had persuaded the College of Law to appoint my predecessor, Stephen Gorove, in the early
1960s to teach international law and organizations. Since my joining the
faculty in 1965, I have found Judge Sutton to be a gracious and generous
friend of the College of Law and the international law program. He has
been a frequent lecturer at the College of Law, and with his advice and
assistance academic offerings at the College have grown from one course
in international law to over twenty courses and seminars in international
legal studies and the Program has taken a distinctive shape. Of special
note is the Leonard v.B. Sutton Prize in International Law which for over
a decade has been awarded by the College to a student each year for the
best scholarly paper submitted on an international law topic. Two years
ago he endowed the Sutton Award in International Law which provides a
$2,000 fellowship, making it possible for the college to select a student,
based upon a selection from these scholarly papers, to attend the Hague
Academy lectures each summer.
The International Legal Studies Program, especially the Journal,
and I personally owe a deep debt of gratitude to a cherished friend.
II.
Before I discuss the challenges for the Journal of InternationalLaw
and Policy for the next few years, it seems appropriate to provide a
proper context and hence, a status report on the International Legal
Studies Program. For the Journal, established as an integral part of the
Program, continues to perform that function, and as such, is most likely
to reflect the Program's persona.
The objective of the faculty in establishing the Program at the College in 1971 was to offer a cluster of courses for those students who
wished to concentrate their studies in the international legal studies area.
The following year's College of Law Bulletin stated that the program was
"designed to provide the student with an opportunity to pursue his interest in international law, international organizations, transnational busi-
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ness and related areas."'
The Program continues to expand both in depth and breadth. Five
years ago, marking the Tenth Anniversary of the Journal in 1981, I had
sketched a few notable features of the International Legal Studies Program, especially its academic component. 2 Since the publication of Volume 10 some very significant developments affecting the College of Law
and the Program have taken place. We have a new campus and attractive
facilities of which we are very proud. In July 1985 we also welcomed our
new Dean, Edward Dauer. It is noteworthy that Dean Dauer and all his
predecessors with whom I have worked over these years-Deans Robert
Yegge, who was instrumental in the establishment of the Program, and
Daniel Hoffman, and acting Deans Lawrence Tiffany and William Beaney-have been more than supportive; they have significantly contributed
in giving shape and direction to the Program and the Journal.
On the academic front,3 Space Law and an International Human
Rights Clinic have been added to the curriculum, and during the past
year, seminars were also taught in International Energy Law and International Aviation Law. In conjunction with the Graduate School of International Studies, selected law students have also worked with George Shepherd (our colleague at the GSIS) and me on special institutes on
international human rights, especially concerning problems and challenges in the third world, and on "Africa Watch," a special project on
human rights in Africa coordinated by Edward Hawley, editor of Africa
Today.
Student interest in the Program remains high. Between 15 and 20
percent of the entrants in each year's incoming class select the College

OF DENVER BULLETIN, COLLEGE OF LAW, 1972-74, at 14.
2. Nanda, Why Study InternationalLaw? A Decade of the InternationalLegal Studies Program at the University of Denver College of Law, 11 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 5
(1981).
3. The introductory statement on the academic part of the Program read:
The Program offers a broad range of courses in what have been traditionally described as public and private areas. To illustrate, in addition to the introductory international law course, seminars and courses are offered in comparative law, international organizations, international conflict management
and resolution, international protection of human rights, international regulation of the environment, and law of the sea. Also, in addition to international
economic law, and seminars in international business transactions-including
policies and institutions, international capital formation and securities regulations, licensing, and international business transactions in Latin America, with
special reference to Mexico-there are course offerings in immigration and nationality law, taxation of transnational enterprises, and international transportation law. Related courses are also available in admiralty and aviation law.
Independent study areas in the recent past have included space law, the law of
international agreements, international law and U.S. foreign policy, the law of
transnational enterprises, the law of the European Community, international
energy law, international resources law, and international labor law.
1. UNIVERSITY
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primarily because of the Program. Each year the introductory international law course is usually offered twice for day students and at least
once for evening students. During 1985-86, 124 students were enrolled in
the introductory course. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, James Wallace, attempts to schedule every course and seminar offered in the Program at least once in two years to allow all students to take courses of
their choice. In addition to the introductory international law course, 1012 courses and seminars have usually been offered each year.
In addition to the Sutton award each year to a student for study at
the Hague Academy, students in the Program and especially those working on the Journal will be eligible for scholarships in international law
which the College is in the process of establishing. Another significant
development is the establishment of the "International Fellows of the
Program," a project just getting underway at the initiation and under the
able leadership of Ralph Lake, former editor-in-chief of the Journal, and
his alumni committee. The group is earmarking its financial support to
enrich the Program by assisting the Journal and adding an alumni lecture series at the College.
Curriculum-related activities include a very active International Law
Society, which sponsors a wide variety of activities, often co-sponsoring
them with the Journal.The Society arranges a weekly lecture and panel
series, providing students with exposure to and an opportunity to participate in discussions on timely topics related to international law and policy. More recently, the Society has initiated and coordinated the activities
of several student groups on the law campus in sponsoring an international human rights awareness week each winter. The ILS has also been
responsible for hosting several successful regional Jessup International
Moot Court competitions, arranging an annual U.N. Day celebration, and
co-sponsoring annual and regional conferences of the American Society of
International Law and the Myres S. McDougal Distinguished lecture
series.
Apart from providing students at the College of Law with valuable
contacts with practitioners in international law and a forum for discussion of pertinent international legal and policy issues and concerns, the
Society also sponsors social events including an annual international dinner in the fall and an end-of-the year picnic in the spring.
The International Law Society performs a vital function in facilitating student involvement and participation in events and issues affected
by, and in turn influencing, norms and procedures of international law
and international law machinery. The Journal and the International Legal Studies Program, as well as the College of Law as a whole, are the
beneficiaries.
The College moot court team has had an enviable record in the Jessup International Moot Court competitions where twice in the last three
years the team has won the regionals to advance to the national competition in Washington, D.C., and two years ago was judged the third best in
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the nation.
Internships and externships in international law also continue to be
part of a vital program in clinical legal education at the College of Law.
In the last year in addition to internships with Denver-based corporations
engaged in transnational business, such as Manville and Samsonite, international banking departments, the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service
in Denver, and law firms with international practice, students have integrated their theoretical skills and their classroom work with research and
work in practical settings in Chile, Austria, England, Norway, Sweden
and France.
The annual planning session of the International Legal Studies Program provides the vehicle for a periodic appraisal of the program, including the Journal. The faculty and associates of the Program, including
leaders of the international law bar, editors of the Journal and officers of
the International Law Society, examine the curricular offerings and related activities-the Journal,the Society, the Jessup Moot Court competition, awards and scholarships, internships and externships, and placements. The group suggests changes needed to improve and strengthen the
program and the Journal. Many curriculum-related changes in the Program and changes affecting the Journal over the past several years can be
directly attributed to the counsel and advice of this planning group.
In addition to suggestions for further strengthening the curricular offerings in the program, the following issues have repeatedly surfaced in
the recent planning meetings. First, several faculty and associates have
recommended that a graduate program in international and comparative
law-either an LL.M. or M.C.L. program-be established. Second, it has
been often suggested that we should establish special institutes in international law to assist the practicing bar. Third, the desire has been expressed for the establishment of a research and publication arm of the
program, which would entail the funding of research fellowships and publication of occasional papers.
These and similar suggestions deserve serious consideration. A few of
the suggested projects have already been periodically undertaken, such as
co-sponsoring, with the Continuing Legal Education, institutes for practitioners, and undertaking publication of hardcover books. However, no
matter how essential or desirable an addition to the program is perceived
to be by those closely involved in the program, one primary element of
implementation obviously is the adequacy of resources. At this time we
do not possess the necessary prerequisites-full time faculty and adequate library resources-to implement these suggestions, especially undertaking immediate steps toward the establishment of a graduate degree
program..I do, however, believe that since the need is there, we can find
sufficient resources to make a modest beginning on many of these fronts
in the near future.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 15:1

III.
Throughout the years of its publication, the Journal,with the advice
of the planning group of the Program as well as its own advisory board,
has attempted to meet the challenge of providing its community of readers with a high quality publication by keeping several goals in close consideration. The goals which the Journal has undertaken to pursue are
also ones which we believe will serve us well in the years to come. These
goals do not readily lend themselves to a hierarchical order of values,
rather they are intended to serve a variety of complementary interests.
The Journal inaugurated its first issue with a dedication to Professor
Myres S. McDougal. It seems especially appropriate to recall three tributes to Professor McDougal, one by then-Dean, Robert Yegge, and the
others written by the founding editor-in-chief of the Journal, Jonathon
C.S. Cox, and myself. Dean Yegge wrote,
With his lifelong devotion to legal teaching and scholarship, his untiring efforts in promoting human dignity, and his impact upon international legal thought, "Mac" has rightly earned a warm and singularly
unique place among his colleagues-scholars, teachers, practitioners,
jurists-everywhere. Kudos, respect and gratitude go to him on his
sixty-fifth birthday, through these pages."
Cox's comments, "From a student's point of view," were:
We searched for a way to distinguish both ourselves and this publication from all others. It was only when we settled upon the idea of
dedicating this journal to a man of such awesome intellect and productivity that everything jelled. From that moment our direction and
purpose were fixed, and I can honestly say that the rest has been both
easy and rewarding. Our hope is to try to do his contribution to International Law justice with this contribution to him and his field.5
In my tribute to Professor McDougal, I had said:
The task of clarifying the problems of world public order and providing viable alternatives is a continuing one. Yet, within this ongoing
process Professor McDougal has had a distinct and unique impact,
challenging, directing and shaping international legal thought.6
The dedication to Professor McDougal is significant in a number of
ways. The most important of which being the Journal's commitment to
publishing pieces which further the extremely important linkage between
international law and international policy. To advance this goal, we continue to publish a number of articles which address international policy
concerns as well as jurisprudential issues. In an era of increased specialization within the study of international law, and where the number of
specialized international law journals is on the increase, we are proud to

4. Yegge, Foreword, 1 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y ii (1971).
5. Cox, From the Editors, 1 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y v (1971).
6. Nanda, Myres S. McDougal, 1 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 8 (1971).
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be able to publish articles which address the law-policy nexus in the international field. We are also honored that as a continuing tribute to
Myres S. McDougal (whose advice as a member of the Journal's advisory
board we prize highly), the Journal publishes addresses from the Myres
S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture in International Law and Policy,
which was established in 1977 as an annual lecture series at the College of
7
Law.
Another value which figures significantly in the Journal'spublication
goals is that of meeting the needs of practitioners of international law.
The Journal attempts to provide them with timely and useful analyses of
selected concepts and developments. Practitioners play a special role in
the further development of international law, and the Journal is keen to
respond to their needs by publishing articles of special interest to them.
Similarly, of special concern to the Journal is our desire to contribute to the shaping of international law for the future. The concerns articulated above figure uniquely in the Journal's effort to seek manuscripts for publication from those who are constantly pushing the
horizons of international law. We will continue to publish articles which
concern the "cutting edge" of current international legal developments.
Our aim is to keep the Journal readership abreast of the diversity of
thought and approach to international law scholarship in general, as well
as to particular international legal phenomena.
The Journal has attempted to accomplish its goals in several ways:
through the co-sponsorship of an annual regional conference of the American Society of International Law and the co-sponsorship of the Myres S.
McDougal Distinguished Lectureship series, and the publication of symposium issues on such topics as human rights, global climatic change, international terrorism, transnational business, and an upcoming issue on
refugees; faculty comments; and the recently introduced section on critical essays.
To illustrate, the Journal co-sponsored this year's international law
conference on "Refugees: Close the Door?-Response to Global Challenge," which was in part funded by the Colorado Endowment for the
Humanities and attracted over 275 registrants from throughout the region. Selected papers from the conference will be published in a symposium issue and eventually in a book.
Speakers included a former colleague at the College of Law and currently the Governor of Colorado, Richard Lamm; several leading experts
from academia, representing many disciplines and discussing various aspects of the refugee problem from the vantage point of their respective
disciplines, including Richard Falk who also delivered the Myres S. McDougal Distinguished Lecture; a historian of note, George Barany at the
7. The last two lectures published were Rubin, International Trade Realities: Are
There Rules of the Game?, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147 (1986); and Franck, U.S. Foreign Policy and the U.N., 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 159 (1986).
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University of Denver; two eminent theologians, Charles Milligan from the
Iliff School of Theology and Edward Hawley, Editor of Africa Today; several distinguished political scientists and international studies scholars,
including James Mittleman, Dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, Peter Koehn from the University of Montana, George Shepherd at the GSIS, and Angela Delli-Sante
from the University of New Mexico; and those from the law school world,
including Edward Dauer, Dean, University of Denver College of Law,
William M. Beaney, Paul Dempsey and I, also at the College of Law and
Daniel Magraw at the University of Colorado School of Law.
Speakers also included those actively involved in facing the challenges of providing asylum and sanctuary and helping to meet both the
short term and long term needs of refugees-Jim Haynes from the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees; Michael Anderson
from the Department of State and William Joyce from the Department of
Justice; Steven Cooper, Esq., from Minneapolis and Michael Altman, a
member of the Arizona State University law faculty, who represented the
sanctuary defendants in the Phoenix trial; attorneys active in assisting
refugees-Karen Parker from San Francisco, Lisa Brodyaga of the
Refugio del Rio Grande in Texas, and Carol Hildebrand, Shelley Dodge,
Ann Schmitt, and Cheryl Martinez from this region; Judge Jesse Sellers,
Immigration Judge, Denver; Ed LaPedis, Office of Refugee Settlement;
Laurie Bagan of the Colorado Refugee Service; Roberta Kern from the
Arvada Mennonite Church; Peter Van Arsdale of the Refugee Mental
Health group; Richard Castro, Denver Community Services and Human
Relations; Norman Rice, Seattle City Councilman and Ruth Purkaple
from the Colorado Council on International Organizations.
Similarly, the Journal published in a recent issue 8 a report of the
work product of the International Human Rights Clinic at the College,
which provided selected students an opportunity to sharpen their skills.
The work included: an amicus brief, in conjunction with the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of
Law, to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; preparation of two
studies for the International Human Rights Law Group; two projects for
the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; and a project to
assist the National Lawyers Committee for Soviet Jewry for filing with
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights a petition pursuant to
ECOSOC Resolution 1503. Other projects included briefs against deportation prepared on behalf of Haitian and Salvadoran refugees, and a brief
written for a prominent Denver defense lawyer representing anti-nuclear
demonstrators in Fort Collins, Colorado.
Projects for the current International Human Rights Clinic, which
will be reported in a future issue, include assisting those challenging the

8. See Nanda & Lipmann, A Report on the University of Denver's Institute of Human
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301 (1984).
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military court system in Chile, and seeking freedom from detention for
physicians and attorneys in Chile who have been charged with violations
of the Arms Control Law in that country; examining the allegations of
state terrorism against the government of Sri Lanka; challenging the
ongoing efforts to relocate Navajo Indians on Big Mountain; and analyzing the recent House Bill under which economic sanctions would be imposed on South Africa, with the focus on possible means of implementation and the probable impact of the Bill.
Finally, the Journal is committed to the publication of high-quality
student written pieces. These student-written pieces take the form of
notes, comments, and developments, and beginning with 15:2, the winning paper of the Leonard v.B. Sutton Award.
During the next few years the challenges for international law will be
formidable. To illustrate I will mention only a handful of timely questions: how can principled and effective constraints on the use of force in
the international arena be ensured? How can the mad race to build and
pile up deadly arsenals of both nuclear and conventional weapons be
halted? How can international economic law contribute toward an appraisal and modification of the existing economic and international structures and also help in the fashioning of new ones so as to allow equitable
access and participation in the international arena to all states and all
human beings? How can the prevalent state structure be made responsive
to meet the needs of individuals and groups within each state, as well as
to the existing and emerging regional and global challenges, such as transboundary pollution, and deep seabed and space exploration and exploitation? What kind of functional relationships between and among states,
international and regional intergovernmental organizations, multinational
enterprises and nongovernmental organizations should be maintained and
how should they be structured? How should the role of the individual be
further enhanced in the international arena? How can international
human rights law be made an effective instrument for the protection of
human rights?
In looking forward to its next fifteen years of publication, the Journal rededicates itself to addressing these questions which are critical for
human survival and in making a contribution toward the realization of
Professor McDougal's vision of establishing a world order based on
human dignity.

The Status of Counterclaims in
International Law, With Particular
Reference to International Arbitration
Involving a Private Party and a Foreign
State
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I.

INTRODUCTION

States generally make and receive counterclaims' when they wish to
settle sovereign accounts.2 Not all these accounts, or disputes, involve
some alleged wrong done by one State against another State. Most disputes between States arise out of one State's public acts (jure imperii)
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Dean Richard Huber of the Boston College Law School for his support in the research and
preparation of this article.
1. For the purpose of this commentary, the term "counterclaim" is taken to mean "[a]
claim presented by a defendant opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (5th ed. 1979), citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13. It is
recognized that a counterclaim is either an offensive or defensive plea. The former means
that the counterclaim is a cause of action and seeks affirmative relief, whereas the latter
seeks to defeat the plaintiff's cause of action and does not admit of affirmative relief to the
defendant. Id. It is also recognized that the terms "counterclaim," "set-off" and "recoupment" tend to be used interchangeably in municipal and international legal practice even
though some argue that each term has a distinct legal meaning. For a discussion of the
difference between a set-off (demande de compensation) and a counterclaim (demande
reconventionelle) before international arbitral tribunals, see, e.g., J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 178, note 2 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SIMPSON & Fox]. See
also 4 A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 896 (3d ed. 1967). According to Corbin, a counterclaim "mean[s] that the plaintiff has committed a breach of duty to the defendant. Each
party has done wrong; each is entitled to a remedy, although there must be an adjustment of
remedies." Id. A set-off is a "limited form of counter-claim, in ... which the adjustment of
remedies takes place by the mere process of subtraction." Id. Recoupment means "an adjustment of remedy, but without necessarily indicating that the plaintiff has done wrong so
that the defendant can establish a separate and independent claim to a remedy against the
plaintiff." Id.
2. See, e.g., 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 248-284 (1937) [hereinafter cited as 1 WHITEMAN].
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and private acts (jure gestiones)3 involving a national of another State.4
The settlement of a private party-foreign State dispute may be sought
through negotiation, litigation or arbitration.
An aggrieved private party's initial recourse is to seek redress in the
State which committed the wrong. Such recourse would include the exhaustion of both administrative and judicial remedies.5 If the injured private party still believes it has been denied justice in the State which committed the wrong, it may then ask the State of which it is a national to
espouse its claim at the inter-state level.' If the State of the aggrieved
private party agrees to espouse the claim,7 the dispute is raised to a
purely international level.
At the international level, the dispute may also be resolved through
negotiation, litigation or arbitration. The negotiated settlement of sovereign accounts, for example, either through diplomatic correspondence or
actual bargaining, provides a flexible mechanism, especially insofar as the
making and receiving of counterclaims are concerned. This stems from
the fact that negotiation does not prohibit States from making and receiving counterclaims unrelated to the original claim.' To this extent, it
may be argued convincingly that the customary international law governing the settlement of sovereign accounts in a non-litigious setting, as
evidenced by the practice of States, does not mandate that counterclaims
be related to the original claim.' These international law rules governing
counterclaims between States in non-litigious proceedings are fairly well

3. The classification of State acts into acts jure imperii and jure gestionis, for the benefit of American judicial proceedings involving a foreign Government, or agent or instrumentality thereof, was first made in a letter by Acting Legal Adviser to the State Department, Jack B. Tate, to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman, on May 19, 1952. For
the text of the "Tate Letter," see 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984 (1952). For an excellent discussion of the jure imperii-jure gestionis distinction, see Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientosy Transporter, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied 381 U.S.
934 (1965).
4. See generally 1 WHITEMAN, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 243, 244 (2d ed.
1976). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 206210 (1965)(hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT). See also Mummery, The Content of the
Duty to Exhaust Local JudicialRemedies, 58 Am. J.INT'L L. 389, 393-411 (1964). Exhaustion of local remedies is, for example, required by the recent series of Investment Guaranty
Agreements between the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, a U.S. Government
Agency, and foreign states. See, e.g., Investment Guaranty Agreement Between the United
States of America and Ecuador, art. 6(b).
6. For an excellent account of the procedure for submission of claims for espousal by
the United States government against a foreign government, see generally R. LILLICH &
CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION (1962).
7. See, e.g., Bagge, Intervention on the Ground of Damage Caused to Nationals, With
ParticularReference to Exhaustion of Local Remedies and the Rights of Shareholders, 34
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 162, 162-65 (1958).
8. See, e.g., 1 WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 248-84.
9. Id.
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established and are quite liberal.' 0
There is also ample evidence demonstrating the existence of well-defined rules of international law regarding the procedural admissibility of
counterclaims in State-to-State disputes before international courts and
arbitral tribunals. The procedural rules governing international judicial
and arbitral proceedings actually limit the jurisdiction of the forum to
consideration of counterclaims related to the original claim. This limitation on unrelated counterclaims is not inherent in the international legal
order; rather, it is founded on limitations to which States have consented,
either directly or indirectly, by international conventions or bilateral arbitral agreements.
This article will discuss the sources and extent of general rules of
international law'1 governing counterclaims in judicial and arbitral proceedings. Initially, the practice regarding counterclaims in the Permanent
Court of International Justice and its successor, the International Court
of Justice, is examined. The article then examines the permissibility of
counterclaims before international arbitral tribunals in State-to-State disputes and disputes between private parties and States. The argument is
made that regardless of the status of the party making or receiving the
counterclaim, counterclaims must conform to two broad criteria. First,
counterclaims must relate to the original claim. Thus, without a claim
there can be no counterclaim. Second, the amount of the counterclaim
cannot exceed the amount of the original claim. The article concludes
with an analysis of the practice of Federal courts in the United States
governing counterclaims. Counterclaims in cases involving the actual parties to a dispute have been allowed liberally in U.S. Federal courts. A far
more restrictive view has been taken of counterclaims against third party
assignees where the assignee is presenting the original claim. Particular
emphasis is placed on the treatment of these counterclaims in federal
courts as a possible source of analogy to international tribunals.12
II.

COUNTERCLAIMS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL COURTS

Two bodies have qualified as "World Courts": the Permanent Court
of International Justice (PCIJ), established under the Covenant of the
League of Nations, and its successor, the International Court of Justice
10. Id.
11. There are four generally accepted sources of international law. See Statute of the

International Court of Justice art. 38(1), which sets forth the sources of international law as
conventions, the practice of States (custom), general principles of international law, and in a
subsidiary capacity, the decisions of jurists (both municipal and international) and the opinion of scholars. Id. For a more detailed analysis of the sources of international law, see
generally PARRY, THE SOURCE AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).
12. For a discussion of the role of analogy in international law and the importation of
rules and principles of municipal law into international judicial and arbitral decisions, see
H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, wITH SPEcAL REFERENCES TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1927).
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(ICJ). Both tribunals were established on a permanent basis to consider
State-to-State disputes by the consent of States Party. The procedural
rules of the Permanent Court of International Justice and its successor,
the International Court of Justice, are illustrative of international limitations on counterclaims relating to the original claim.
A distinction must be drawn between what is purely a rule of counterclaim and that which might appear as one but which is, on closer inspection, a rule of procedure developed by the jurisprudence of the two
World Courts and various arbitral tribunals relative to "joinder of separate causes," "introduction of new claims" and/or "amendment of pleadings." This commentary will not deal with these latter issues."3
A.

Practice of the Permanent Court of International Justice

Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations provided for the
establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 4 Under
the auspices of the League's Council and Assembly, a Protocol was
opened for signature by Member States to establish the Statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. 5 This Statute entered into
force in September 1921.16 Article 30 of the Statute empowered the Court
to formulate its own rules of procedure.' 7 The original Rules of Court
were adopted in March 1922."8 Article 40 of the Rules provided for the
joining of counterclaims to the proceedings only "in so far as [they came]
within the jurisdiction of the Court.""' Although this would appear to
took the posistate a liberal rule concerning counterclaims, some judges
20
tion that counterclaims should not be allowed at all.

13. See generally, SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 1, at 179-183 (1959).
14. League of Nations Covenant art. 14. For a discussion of article 14, see M. HUDSON,
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: 1920-1942, 89-106 (1943) [hereinafter
cited as HUDSON].
15. Protocol of Signature Relating to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice Provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed
December 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 380.
16. HUDSON, supra note 14, at 119.
17. P.C.I.J. Statute art. 30. For a discussion of article 30, see HUDSON, supra note 14, at
254. For a lucid critique of the Court's construction of its jurisdiction so as to also extend to
the Polish counterclaim and a commentary about the reach of article 40 of the Rules of
Court, see Anzilotti, La Demande Reconventionelle en Procedure Internationale, 57 JouEtNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 857, 867-877 (1930). Anzilotti states that the Court's jurisdiction must be interpreted so as to extend only to counterclaims related to the principal object of the claim. Id. at 876.
18. P.C.I.J. Ser. D, Acts and Documents concerning the organization of the Court, § 7,
66 (1926).
19. Id. § 7, at 75. Article 40 provided, inter alia, that "[clounter-caseb shall contain: (1)
the affirmation or contestation of the facts stated in the case; (2) a statement of additional
facts, if any; (3) a statement of law; (4) conclusions based on the facts stated; these conclusions may include counterclaims, in so far as the latter come within the jurisdiction of the
Court; (5) a list of the documents in support; these documents shall be attached to the
counter-case."
20. See P.C.I.J. Ser. D, No. 2 (4th Add.) 261-63 (1936).
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The first case interpreting article 40 was the Chorzow Factory Case2
involving German Government claims against Poland over the expropriation of a factory in Upper Silesia. The Court held that to be procedurally
permissible, a counterclaim based upon article 40 must be "juridically
connected with the principal claim." 2 As the German claims met this
"relatedness" criterion, they were allowed but then were ultimately dis23
missed on the merits.
In 1936 the Court promulgated a revised set of Rules2 ' which narrowed and defined the scope of permissible counterclaims.2 5 Article 63 allowed the presentation of a counterclaim provided that it was (1)
presented in the submissions of the Counter-Memorial; (2) "directly connected with the subject of the application"; and, (3) "within the jurisdiction of the Court. ' 26 Article 63 also provided for the procedure to be followed for any claim which was not directly connected with the subject
matter of the original application. Such a claim, really an offensive counterclaim or cross-action, 27 was to be put forward by means of a separate
application, in which case it would "form the subject of distinct proceedings" or "be joined by the Court to the original proceedings." 2 The Court
was thus to be the sole determinor of whether a claim not directly connected to the original application was to be allowed as a counterclaim
related to the original claim. 0 Implicit in the Court's discretion, however,
was the limitation that in allowing a counterclaim, the Court could not
"assume a jurisdiction it would otherwise lack." 0

21. Case Concerning The Factory at Chorzow (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. Ser.
A, No. 17 (Judgment of Sept. 13, 1928).
22. Id. at 38.
23. Id. The Court refused to consider the applicant's motion to bar a submission for a
setoff by the respondent. Id. at 60-63, 64.
24. P.C.I.J. Ser. D, No. 1, 9, 28 (3rd Add. 1936) [hereinafter cited as 1936 Rules of the
Court].

25. I. SHIHATA, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TO DETERMINE ITS
OWN JURISDICTION 262-63 (1965).
26. Id. at 49. Article 63 provides that:
When proceedings have been instituted by means of an application, a counterclaim may be presented in the submission of the Counter-Memorial, provided
that such counterclaim is directly connected with the subject of the application
and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Any claim which is not
directly connected with the subject of the original application must be put forward by means of a separate application and may form the subject of distinct
proceedings or be joined by the Court to the original proceedings.

Id.
27. HUDSON, supra note 14, at 322. See also P.C.I.J. Ser.D, No. 2, at 111 (3rd Add.
1936); and, Harvard Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to
Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 453, 490 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Harvard
Research].
28. See 1936 Rules of the Court, supra note 24, at 49.
29. Id.

30. 1 G.

SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW

364 (1945).
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Practice of the International Court of Justice

Article 63's legacy survives and is codified in article 80 of the Rules
of the International Court of Justice,' which were adopted by the Court
in 1978. Article 93(1) of the United Nations Charter provides that all
Members of the U.N. are also parties to the Statute of the ICJ.32 Article
30 of the Court's Statute empowers the Court to establish its own procedural rules. 33 Exercising this prerogative, and based on the consent of
states implied through the constitutional chain of the U.N., 3" the Court
promulgated article 80 of its Rules on counterclaims.
Article 80 permits the presentation of a counterclaim if it is (1)
presented in the submission of the Counter-Memorial; (2) "directly connected with the subject matter of the claim of the other party;" and (3)
"within the jurisdiction of the Court."3 The remainder of article 80 deals
with the procedural permissibility of a counterclaim whose connection
with the subject matter of the application is . in doubt. In such a case,
article 80 provides that "[t]he Court shall, after hearing the parties, direct whether or not the question thus presented shall be joined to the
original proceedings." As with article 63 of the PCIJ's rules, the Court
reserves the right to determine whether a counterclaim unrelated to the
original application should be joined to the proceeding.36 If the Court
finds against the permissibility of a State's counterclaim, the counterclaimant State may file a separate application.
The only case in which the Court appears to have interpreted article
80 (actually article 63 of the Rules of Court adopted in 1946) is in the

31. DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 256-57 (S. Rosenne ed. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenne]. For the text of article 80, see infra note 35. The 1978 Rules
of the Court are the third set issued by the I.C.J. The first Rules of the Court were issued in
1946. Article 63 of the 1946 Rules took verbatim the counterclaim provisions of article 63 of
the P.C.I.J.'s 1936 Rules. For the text of article 63 of the 1946 Rules, see I.C.J. Ser. D, No. 1
Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court, Rules of Court 54, 74;
Rosenne, 177. The 1972 Rules of the Court again used precisely the same language on counterclaims as in article 63. See id. For a comparative list of provisions of the three sets of
Rules of the Court, see [1977-1978] I.C.J.Y.B. 113, 188 (1978).
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 93(1).
33. I.C.J. Statute art. 30.
34. Id.
35. Article 80 provides that:
1. A counterclaim may be presented provided that it is direclty connected
with the subject matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. A counterclaim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial of the party
presenting it, and shall appear as part of the submissions of that party.
3. In the event of doubts as to the connection between the question
presented by way of counter-claim and the subject matter of the claim of the
other party the Court shall, after hearing the parties, decide whether or not the
question thus presented shall be joined to the original proceedings.
Id. See also Rosenne, supra note 31, at 256-57.
36. Rosenne, supra note 31 at 257.
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Asylum Case.3 7 Colombia sought safe conduct from Peru for the Peruvian
politician Haya de la Torre, to whom the Colombian ambassador in Lima
had granted asylum in its embassy. Peru counterclaimed that notwithstanding its obligations, if any, to allow the safe conduct, the grant of
asylum was in violation of Colombia's treaty obligations.3" The Court, observing that "[tihe direct connexion being thus clearly established
....
,, permitted the counterclaim under article 63.
In both the PCIJ and the ICJ, the ultimate resolution of disputes
originally arising between a private party claimant and a respondent
State must clear two procedural hurdles. First, under article 34(1) of the
' 40
ICJ's Statute, "[o]nly States may be parties in cases before the Court.
This procedural hurdle is surmountable by the private party only if the
State of which it is a national chooses to espouse its national's claim and
thereby elevate the dispute to the inter-state level.' There is another
hurdle to overcome, however, for the successful submission of a private
party's claim to the Court: the exhaustion of local remedies.' 2
C.

Exhaustion of Local Remedies

The exhaustion of local remedies requirement is a basic principle of
international law.' 3 In the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case,"' the
Permanent Court of International Justice decided not to "entertain" the
Estonian claim because the Esimene Juurdeveo Raudteede Selts
Venemaal Company, the owners and concessionaires of the expropriated
railroad, had not exhausted local remedies available to it in Lithuania. 5
A similar situation arose in The Interhandel Case when Switzerland
made a claim for restitution of assets of one of its nationals,' 6 which had
been seized by the U. S. Government as enemy property during the Second World War. Rather than actively participate in the procedures available in the U. S. district courts, Switzerland took its claim to the ICJ.

37. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (Judgment).
38. Id. at 280.
39. Id. at 281.
40. I.C.J. Statute art. 34(1).
41. As Judge Moore states: "It is an elementary principle that, when a government officially intervenes on behalf of its citizens, it makes his claim its own. . ." The Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions Case, 1926 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 2, at 63 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Moore). See generally, STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 5, at 243-244; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 5, at § 212; Bagge, supra note 7, at 162-65.
42. See Mummery, supra note 5, at 389-96; Bagge, supra note 7, at 165-66.
43. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at 206; Finnish Shipowners (Finland v. Great
Britain), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1479 (1934); Ambatielos Claim (Greece v. Great Britain), 12
U.N.R.I.A.A. 82 (1956), 23 I.L.R. 106-40 (Lauterpacht ed. 1960); Interhandel Case (Switzerland v. United States), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Objections).
44. Panevezys Saldutiskis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), 1939 P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B,
No. 76.
45. Id. at 19, 21.
46. Interhandel Case, 1959 I.C.J. 6. The facts of this case are conveniently summarized
in 8 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 794-801 (1967).
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The ICJ refused to adjudicate the dispute because Interhandel, a Swiss
corporation, had failed to exhaust local remedies available to it in the
United States.47

D. Summary
The Permanent Court of International Justice formulated a rather

narrow interpretation of permissible counterclaims. 48 This interpretation

was adopted by the International Court of Justice, reinforcing the international legal status of the rule. Although substantial discretion is left to
the Court in deciding whether to join the counterclaim to the original
application, the procedural rules contemplate the permissibility of counterclaims directly related to the original claim. There is no evidence that
the Court has sought to enlarge this rather narrow rule.
III.

AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF COUNTERCLAIMS BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS

The history of modern international arbitration between States and

private parties is less than a century and a half old.49 As with counterclaims in international adjudication, the development of the procedural
rule relative to counterclaims in international arbitration stems from conventions and international common law.
Early in this century, Jackson Ralston observed that: "Ordinarily at
least, questions of set-off and counterclaim do not, and in the nature of
things cannot, arise before an international tribunal."' This statement
was no more wholly valid when made in 1926 than the assertion by
Anzilotti four years later: "Ii ne pouvait, evidemment, pas 6tre question
de demande reconventionelle dans la procedure internationale, tant que
la seule forme judicaire de solution des litiges entre Etats a tk
rarbitrage, au sens etroit du mot." 1 In fact, prior to Ralston and
Anzilotti, international arbitral tribunals had indeed considered the question of counterclaims as a matter of jurisprudential reasoning, independent of the provisions of the arbitral agreement (compromis).

47. Interhandel at 26-30.
48. See C. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL AREITRAL PROCEDURE 132 (1930).
49. See generally, T. BALCH, INTERNATIONAL COURTS OF ARBITRATION (1874), K. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946), W. DARBY, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (4th ed. 1904), D. MYERS, ARBITRATION IN THE AMERICAS (1932), J. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1910), and J. RALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS To LOCARNO (1929).

50. J.

RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS § 376, 211

(1926).

51. Anzilotti, La Demande Reconventionelle en Procedure Internationale,57 JOURNAL
857 (1930) ("A counterclaim cannot be part of an international
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Earlier Cases

One of the earliest cases considering counterclaims by an arbitral tribunal was in 1898 in South African Republic v. La Compagnie FrancoBelge du Chemin de Fer du Nord.2 The South African Republic brought
suit to compel the appointment of a new trustee for certain funds deposited in England in connection with the building of a railroad for which
the respondent Belgian corporation had a concession. The respondent
counterclaimed, alleging various breaches by the Plaintiff-Government of
the terms of the concession, the writing of a libelous letter by the plaintiff's agent, and the injustice and bad faith of the plaintiff in instituting
proceedings in the Transvaal courts to avoid the concession. In rejecting
the counterclaim, Justice North agreed with the decision by Lord
Langdale, Master of the Rolls, in the early case of Charles Duke of
Brunswick v. The King of Hanover" in holding that, although a counterclaim might be made if related to the subject matter of the suit, under
the United Kingdom's interpretation of international law a counterclaim
could not be made for matters "entirely outside of and independent of
the subject matter of the present action."" The British interpretation of
international law was that counterclaims were permissible only if they related to the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim.
B.

The Carthage and Manouba Cases

The issue of counterclaims was also addressed in 1913 by a tribunal
organized under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration 5 to
arbitrate the Carthage and Manouba cases. This pair of cases stemmed
from the seizure and detention of two French vessels by Italy in 1912
during the Turko-Italian war over Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In the Carthage
case," the Tribunal held that the Italian navy violated international law
by capturing and temporarily detaining the French mail steamer "Carthage".5 7 The Tribunal awarded France 160,000 francs for the loss and
damage to private parties.58 The Tribunal considered but ultimately dismissed the Italian counterclaim for 2,075.25 frantps to cover the expense
incurred by the seizure of the steamer.5 9

52. South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord
[1898] L.R. Ch. 190.
53. Charles Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 6 Bevan 1, 37, 38 [1844].
54. South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord
[1898] L.R. Ch. 190.
55. For a discussion of the Permanent Court of Arbitration see infra text accompanying
notes 115-122, 132-141.
56. The Carthage Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of
May 6, 1913, reprinted in J. B. ScoTT, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916).

57. Id. at 336.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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In the Manouba case,60 the Tribunal decided that the Italian navy
violated international law by capturing the French steamer "Manouba"
and directing its convoy to Cagliari.6 France was awarded 4,000 francs as
compensation for the loss and damage sustained by its nationals.6 2 The
Tribunal held, however, that once at Cagliari, the Italian navy could arrest twenty-nine Ottoman passengers on board."3 The Tribunal, therefore,
allowed the Italian counterclaim for the expenses incurred in guarding
the "Manouba" at Cagliari," and ordered that the amount of the counterclaim be deducted from the 4,000 francs awarded to France."5 It is worth
noting that the two compromis establishing the Tribunal were silent on
the issue of counterclaims.66
C.

Post-World War I Tribunals

In spite of these precedents, Ralston chose to base his aforementioned observation, relative to the place of counterclaims in international
arbitration, on the circumstances surrounding the Del Rio Case"7 . In that
case, when Mexico presented its claims against Venezuela to the Mexican-Venezuelan Claims Commission in 1903, an exchange of notes between the parties rather than a single private claim presented by Mexico
was deemed necessary to authorize the Commission to take jurisdiction of
any counterclaim which might be presented by Venezuela.68
Most significantly, what may have contributed to the observations by
Ralston and Anzilotti appears to have been the fact that the Rules of
Procedure of three tribunals (the Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunals) established pursuant to article 304 of the Treaty of Versailles 6 between Germany and three of the Allied Powers (Britain, Belgium and Poland) explicitly prohibited the consideration of counterclaims (demande
reconventionelle) by the Tribunals." Yet, in this context there were also

60. The Manouba Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of

May 6, 1912, reprinted in J. B. SCOTT, THE

HAGUE COURT REPORTS

330 (2d. ser. 1916).

61. Id. at 350-51.
62. Id. at 351.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 345-46.
65. Id. at 351.
66. See Compromis of Arbitration Relative to the Question Raised by the Capture and
Temporary Detention of the French Mail Steamer "Carthage," signed in Paris, March 6,
1912 (France and Italy), in ScoTr, supra note 56, at 336-38; Compromis of Arbitration relative to the Question raised by the Capture and Temporary Detention of the French Mail
Steamer, "Manouba", signed in Paris, March 6, 1912 (France and Italy), in SCOTT, id., at
351-53.
67. Del Rio Case (Mexico v. Venezuela), Ven. Arb. of 1903, at 879 (1903).
68. RALSTON, supra note 50, at § 376, 211.
69. 3 REDMOND, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS 3477 (1923).
70. For example, article 13 of the Anglo-German Mixed Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb.
Mixtes 109 (1921-1922), at 111, provides: "Should the Respondent desire to make a claim
against the Claimant, he must do so by a separate claim, and not by a counterclaim, but the
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tribunals whose rules of procedure provided for admission of counterclaims. 7 1 In other instances, the rules of procedure of a few tribunals were
72
silent on the issue of counterclaims.
What has gone unmentioned by Ralston and Anzilotti is that despite
the procedural rule prohibiting the admission of counterclaims, the
Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal succeeded, in effect, in admitting
counterclaims under the procedurally permissible concept of requete introductive d'instance (i.e., request for separate cause application), which
73
the Tribunal could join to the original proceedings.
Two cases illustrate this point. In Installations maritimes de Bruges
v. Hamburg Amerika Linie,74 the plaintiff sought 126,000 francs in damages arising out of the defendant's non-payment of sums owed to the
plaintiff.7 5 The defendant, in the person of its branch in Anvers, counterclaimed for more than 66,000 francs in damages arising out of a collision
between two steamers and a seawall at the port of Zeebruge, administered
by the plaintiff.7 s Since the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal did not
permit counterclaims,7 7 the defendant filed its twin counterclaims by way
of requete introductive d'instance.7' The Tribunal held that the two

Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, hear both claims at the same hearing." Id. Similarly, article 29
of the Belgo-German Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 33 (1921-1922), at
36-37, provides: "Les demandes reconventionelles ne sont pas admises. Toute demande du
defendeur contre le demandeur doit etre formee par une requete introductive d'instance. Le
Tribunal purra adonner quel les causes soient jointes ou qu'elles soint plaidees dans la
meme audience." Id. A similar wording appears in article 28 of the German-Polish Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 687, 691 (1921-1922).
71. For example, article 27 of Anglo-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib.
Arb. Mixtes 622, 626-627 (1921-1922) states: "Where the defendant raises a counterclaim it
shall have the same effect as a separate claim and the Tribunal may pronounce a final judgment in the same cause both on the original and on the cross-claim. If, however, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, such counterclaim cannot be conveniently disposed of with the
claim, the Tribunal may order that no further proceedings thereon be allowed until its delivery as a separate claim in a new cause." Id. A similar language is contained in article 27 of
Anglo-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 639, 643 (1921-1922).
72. See, e.g., Greco-Austrian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 672
(1921-1922); Austria-Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes Mixed Arbitral Tribunal
Rules, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 698 (1921-1922).
73. See supra note 70.
74. Installations maritimes de Bruges v. Hamburg-Amerika Linie (Belgium v. Germany), 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 877 (1921-1922)
75. Id. at 877.
76. Id.
77. Article 29 of the Rules of the Belgo-German Arbitral Tribunal, 1 Trib. Arb. Mixtes
33, 36-37 (1921-1922) provides: "Les demandes reconventionelles ne sont pas admisees.
Toute demande du defendeur contre le demandeur doit etre formee par une requete introductive d'instance. Le Tribunal pourra ordonner que les causes soient jointes ou qu'elles
soient plaidees dans la meme audience." Id.
78. Supra note 74, at 877. There does not seem to be an adequate translation for the
term "requete introductive d'instance." As it is used in article 2 of the rules of the Tribunal,
id., the term asks the defendant to bring its action against the plaintiff by way of requesting
for the introduction of such an action at the start of the proceedings. In this respect the
formulation of this part of article 2 resembles article 63 of the Rules of the Permanent
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counterclaims "[arose] out of the same fact as the claim" and, therefore,
it ordered the actions to be joined. 9
Similarly, in Peeters, von Haute et Duyver v. Trommer et Gruber,8"
the Belgo-German Tribunal was requested to admit a counterclaim which
its rules prohibited it from admitting.8 1 The case involved the performance of a contract between the Belgian and German parties, whereby the
Belgian plaintiff sold to the German defendant nine carpets, which the
defendant lost while transporting them to Germany. Additionally, the defendant was to make lithographite stones for the plaintiff.2 The plaintiff
demanded the purchase price of the carpets as yet unpaid by the defendant. The defendant counterclaimed in the amount of the cost of making
the printing slabs.8 " The Tribunal admitted the counterclaim, stating that
it was not a counterclaim (demande reconventionelle) within the meaning
of article 29, but rather it was a demande de compensation (set-off)
based on one claim born from the same case.8 4 Accordingly, the Tribunal
deducted the amount of the counterclaim from the award made for the
plaintiff.8 5
The Anglo-German Tribunal has also admitted counterclaims in a
number of cases, even though article 13 of the Rules of the Tribunal prohibited the respondent from making a claim against the claimant by way
of a counterclaim.8 In The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld,87 the Tribunal held in an interlocutory decision that a claim for unliquidated damages could be set up as a ground for the reduction of a
debt if it arose out of the same transaction and its ascertainment was
merely a matter of calculation. 8
An opposite result was reached in Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd. v.
Verkaufe Vereinigung fuer Stickstoffsdunger G.m.b.H.,8 9 where the German debtors were not allowed to counterclaim against a British firm for
certain legal expenses incurred when the debtors were sued by their German customers. The counterclaim was based on the allegation that the

Court of International Justice (see supra notes 24-28 and corresponding text), in which it is
provided that an offensive counterclaim (or cross action) be put forward by means of a
separate application, which, according to the decision of the Court, it could have joined to
the original proceedings.
79. Supra note 74, at 877.
80. Peeters, van Haute et Duyver v. Trommer et Gruber (Belgium v. Germany), 2 Trib.
Arb. Mixtes 384 (1922-1923).
81. See supra note 70.
82. Supra note 80, at 391-394.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 394.
85. Id. at 394-395.
86. See supra note 70.
87. The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld (Great Britain v. Germany), 4
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205 (1924-1925).
88. Id. at 207-208.
89. Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd. v. Verkaufe Vereinigung fuer Stickstoffsdunger G.m.b.H.
(Great Britain v. Germany), 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 648 (1926).
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German debtors were not able to deliver the material for which they had
made contracts when the British creditors failed to deliver lime nitrogen
to the debtors. The Tribunal held that the debtors were not allowed to
set-off their purchases of lime nitrogen from a Norwegian company belonging to the creditors which were made so that they could comply with
their contracts with German purchasers. 90 Further, the debtors were not
allowed to make a counterclaim for damages for breach of contract when
the creditors failed to deliver the specified quantity of lime nitrogen during the war, since their obligation was extinguished by the outbreak of
the War (under article 299 of the Treaty of Versailles) and did not arise
out of the deliveries at issue in the creditor's claim."1 The debtors were
allowed to counterclaim for the amount of a penalty incurred by the creditors as a result of a breach of the agreement before the outbreak of the
war.

92

In Ernest Epstein v. German Government,93 the Tribunal held in an
interlocutory decision that the claimant was entitled to recover the proceeds of the sale of its pictures that had been sold by the compulsory
administrator, together with the proceeds of pictures sold before the administrator was appointed, less certain deductions, including payments
made by the administrator for taxes on the claimant's behalf and at its
request, but not for debts of the firm of which the claimant was a
partner."
In The Vandyck PrintersLtd. v. Moderner Kunst-Belag G.m.b.H.,"
the Tribunal ruled that the debtor's claim for unliquidated damages, arising out of an entirely different transaction, could not form the basis of a
counterclaim against a creditor's claim under article 296 of the Treaty of
Versailles." In Morgan and Co. v. W.H. Chaplin and Co. Ltd., 7 the Tribunal reached a similar result and held that a counterclaim for unliquidated damages arising from a separate transaction could not be set up as
98
a counterclaim under the Treaty of Versailles.
Finally, in The Beeley Wood Steel Co., Ltd. v. Franz and Massmann,99 a British seller brought a claim against German buyers, Franz
and Massmann, for the balance of the price of steel stipulated to the Ger-

90. Id. at 655.
91. Id. at 656.
92. Id. at 656-657.
93. Ernest Epstein v. German Government (Great Britain v. Germany), 6 Trib. Arb.
Mixtes 19 (1926-1927).
94. Id. at 20-21.
95. The Vandyck Printers Ltd. v. Moderner Kunst-Belag G.m.b.H. (Great Britain v.
Germany), 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 33 (1926-1927).
96. Id. at 33-34.
97. Morgan & Co. v. W.H. Chaplin & Co. Ltd. (Great Britain v. Germany), 6 Trib. Arb.
Mixtes 43 (1926-1927).
98. Id. at 43-44.
99. The Beeley Wood Steel Co. Ltd. v. Franz and Massmann (Great Britain v. Germany), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289 (1928-1929).
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man buyers during the years 1911-1913. The German buyers presented a
counterclaim for damages due to imperfections in the steel. In an interim
decision, the Tribunal held that a counterclaim, though not liquidated,
could be set up against another claim if it arose out of the same contract
or transaction. The set-off was allowed on the ground that "each of the
connection is for this purorders formed part of a series which by10' their
0
pose to be considered one transaction.'
D. Recent Cases
The most recent decisions concerning the international legal status of
counterclaims have come from the arbitral tribunal at The Hague which
was established in 1981 to settle certain financial matters between the
United States and Iran.' 0' The agreement establishing the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal sets forth the principle that claims can be made
only by private parties against the foreign government, or an entity
thereof, and that counterclaims may be brought only if they "arise . . .
out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitutes the
subject matter of [the] claim."' 1 2 This principle was found to be dispositive in a recent decision of the Tribunal, T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran.103
T.C.S.B., Inc., a Maryland corporation, was given a 51 month contract as a consulting engineer beginning in May 1975 to supervise construction of a large housing project to be built near Shiraz, Iran. T.C.S.B.
brought four separate claims against Iran for breach of contract totalling

100. Id. at 291.
101. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 2, signed and entered
into force Jan. 19, 1981 (Algeria, Iran & United States), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981), 1
Iran-U.S. Claim Trib. Rep. 9 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Claims Settlement Declaration].
102. Id. art. 2(1). In the Case Concerning Jurisdiction of the Tribunal With Respect To
Claims By The Islamic Republic of Iran Against Nationals of the United States of America,
decision of Dec. 21, 1981, 1 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 101 (1983), the Full Tribunal held
that "a right of counter claim is normal for a respondent, but it is admitted only in response
to a claim and it does not mean, by analogy, that each State is allowed to submit claims
against nationals of the other State. It means, a contrario, just the opposite." Id. at 103. In
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Government of Iran, decision of May 13, 1983, 2 IRANU.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. 322 (Interlocutory Award) (1984), the tribunal observed that the
Claims Settlement Declaration counterclaim provision in article 2(1), supra note 88, "suggests that 'contract,' 'transaction' and 'occurrence' are alternative" as they are "in the disjunctive." 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. at 324. The Tribunal went on to note that "if a
claim is based solely on a contract, a counterclaim must arise from the same contract to be
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Similarly, if a claim is for an occurrence, such as a
taking of property, then a counterclaim would have to arise out of that same occurrence."
Id. The Tribunal specifically reserved interpreting the latitude for counterclaims under the
transactional provision. Id. In American Bell International, however, the tribunal enunciated a narrow transactional standard. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
103. T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber
2, at 23-24.
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nearly $4.5 million. Iran filed several counterclaims, one of which alleged
that, inter alia, T.C.S.B. failed to pay certain social security taxes. The
Tribunal dismissed the counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction.'" In a
straight forward application of the rules of the compromis, the Tribunal
observed that "a distinction must be made . . . between legal relationships arising out of the application of the law to a situation in which either party individually finds itself and the contractual relationship between the parties to the contract inter se."' 0 T.C.S.B. was awarded
slightly over $1 million. 0 6
7
the
In American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran,""
Tribunal considered the permissibility of a number of counterclaims. In
May 1975, American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T) was chosen by the
Iranian Government to oversee the modernization of civilian and military
communications throughout Iran. AT&T and Iran's Government entered
into an initial three and one half month agreement to organize the project. In order to perform the project, AT&T created, with the consent of
Iran, a wholly-owned subsidiary, American Bell International (ABI). Subsequently, ABI entered into two long-term contracts with the Government of Iran to provide consulting services. ABI brought a claim against
Iran for $63.8 million for its services, equipment and other expenses
under these two contracts. Iran filed seven counterclaims exceeding $285
million against ABI and its parent, AT&T, for a variety of alleged contractual breaches and violations of Iranian law. In an interlocutory award,
the Tribunal held that Iran could not counterclaim against AT&T and
was "barred from asserting any counterclaims against any person or entity other than [the] claimant itself . . ."108 Iran asserted in the alternative that if it could not maintain a counterclaim against AT&T, it could
nevertheless counterclaim against ABI under the original contract with
AT&T. The Tribunal agreed with the Iranian position, finding "that the
linkage between all three contracts must be considered sufficiently strong
so as to make them form one single 'transaction' . . ."'09 The Tribunal
observed that ABI was the successor to AT&T under the original contract
and, as such, was liable for a breach of the contract.11

104. Id. at 24.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. American Bell International, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case
No. 48, Chamber 3, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. (1984).
108. Id. at 15.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. However, in Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Government of Iran, decision
of May 13, 1983, 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 322 (Interlocutory Award 1984), the tribunal rejected an Iranian contention that it could couterclaim against Owens-Corning for alleged actions by the French Government-owned company Saint Gobain Pont a Mousson and
its licensing subsidiary, Sodefive. Owens-Coming and Saint Gorbain had entered into a
cross-licensing agreement with Glass Wool Co. of Iran. When Owens-Corning filed a claim
for royalties, Glass Wool counterclaimed for acts and omissions by Saint Gorbain on the
theory that Owens-Corning was the French guarantor or, alternatively, that Saint Govain
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Summary

This brief historical sketch illustrates the significant role which international arbitral tribunals, particularly those established in the aftermath
of World War I between the Allied Powers (not including the United
States) and Germany, have played in the development and refinement of
the concept of counterclaims in international law. The rules relative to
counterclaims in international arbitration-which had gone unnoticed by
Ralston and Anzilotti in the nascent stage of its emergence some five and
a half decades ago-have advanced to such a degree that the state of the
law is no longer confined to the broad rule allowing admission of counterclaims so long as they are related to the original claim."' The progressive
development and refinement by international tribunals of the rules governing counterclaims has been such that it now permits distinctions between a counterclaim (demande reconventionele) and set-off (demande
de compensation),"2 a distinction which until 1923 had been confined to
municipal systems based on Roman Law." s Equally remarkable is the increased incorporation into international law of a refinement of the concept of counterclaims beyond those arising merely out of and relating to
the original claim to include "counterclaims arising out of the same con' 4
tract, transaction or occurrence." "

IV.

PERMISSIBILITY OF COUNTERCLAIMS AS CODIFIED BY INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRAL CONVENTIONS, RULES, AND INSTITUTIONS

In the preceding sections, it was shown that international courts and
arbitral tribunals, by their decisions and in accordance with their rules of
procedure, have contributed to the emergence and development of international law rules governing counterclaims. Attempts at the codification
of counterclaim rules by international arbitral conventions, model rules,
and institutions have also played a role in the evolution of the rules governing counterclaims. This section is divided into two parts. First, it will

was Owens-Cornings's agent. 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tim. REP. at 323-24. The Tribunal held
that Owens-Corning had entered into separate, albeit related, countracts with Glass Wool.
Id. at 325-26.
111. See also, 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 240, n. 1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.
1955).
112. See, e.g., Article 19 of Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) [issued at the ninth session of the Commission's
work on 12 April-7 May 1976, Doc. No. A/31/17]. Article 19(3) states: "the respondent may
make a counter-claim arising out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the
same contract for the purpose of a set-off." Id. Presently, Article 19 as well as the remainder
of UNCITRAL rules, some modified and some in whole, form the Arbitration Rules governing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, Final
Tribunal Rules of Procedure, May 3, 1983, in 2 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tsm. REP. 405, 423-424
(1983).
113. SIMPSON & Fox, supra note 1, at 178.
114. This enumeration is contained in Article 2(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 102, which established the Iran-U.S. claims Tribunal.
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examine the codification of counterclaim rules by international arbitral
conventions, model rules and institutions for the exclusive purpose of applying them to arbitral proceedings involving states (i.e., codification of
counterclaim rules in public international arbitral codes). This section
will then discuss codification of counterclaim rules by international arbitral conventions, model rules and institutions for the exclusive and/or
primary purpose of applying them to arbitral proceedings in which at
least one of the parties is a private actor (i.e., codification of counterclaim
rules in private international arbitral codes).
A.

Counterclaims in Public InternationalArbitral Codes
1. The Permanent Court of InternationalArbitration

One year after the decision in the South African Republic case, 11 5 the
cause of international arbitration in general was furthered by the conclusion of the Hague Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the 1899 Hague Convention)."1 ' This convention established the
Permanent Court of International Arbitration." 7 In 1907, the Second
Hague Convention on Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (the
1907 Hague Convention)" 8 extended the life of the Permanent Court of
International Arbitration and adopted a revised and expanded set of procedural rules for the court. " This, as well as the earlier set of procedural
rules, made no mention of counterclaims. This omission appears to have
stemmed from the fact that the Permanent Court of International Arbitration was intended to be neither permanent nor a court. 2 ' It was,
rather, to be an administrative organ to which States could resort to create an arbitral tribunal whose composition, procedure, and jurisdiction
were to be defined and set out by the disputant States in an arbitral
agreement or compromis.1" It was therefore natural that the 1899 and
1907 rules made no mention of counterclaims; the issue was intended to
be left to the compromis or the jurisprudence of the duly constituted tribunal on a case-by-case, tribunal-by-tribunal basis. The very first instance in which a tribunal organized under the auspices of the Permanent
Court of International Arbitration addressed a counterclaims issue was in

115. South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin du Chemin de
Fer du Nord [1898 L.R. Ch. 190. Discussed supra in text accompanying notes 52-54.
116. Convention for the Peaceful Adjustment of International Differences, concluded
at The Hague on July 29, 1899, reprintedin 1 AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 107 (1907) [hereinafter
cited as the 1899 Hague Convention).
117. Id. art. 20.
118. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, concluded at The Hague on October 18, 1907, reprinted in 2 Am. J. INT'L. L. StPr. 43 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as the 1907 Hague Convention].
119. Id. art. 14
120. See HUDSON, supra note 14, at 1-7.
121. See articles 24, 31-32 of the 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 117, and articles
52-53, 73 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 119. See also HUDsoN, supra note 14, at
1-7.
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the Carthage and Manouba cases, for which the compromis were silent
on the issue of counterclaims.""2
2.

InternationalCentral American Tribunal (1923)

In 1923, a decade after the decisions in the Carthage and Manouba
cases, five Central American countries entered into a convention (the
Central American Convention) for the establishment of the International
Central American Tribunal.12 3 This Convention adopted, in very large
measure, the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention, 124 which had extended
the life of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Unlike the 1907 Hague
Convention, however, the Central American Convention cannot be said to
have been silent on the matter of counterclaims. The Convention appears
to have addressed the issue of counterclaims when it provided that in an
action by one Government against another, "[c]laims or disputes which
do not necessarily follow from the principal action, or which do not involve a dispute over the rights of third parties ... shall not be accepted
as incidental questions. '126 The Central American Convention thus contemplated a rather narrow approach to counterclaims between States.
3. The United Nations International Law Commission Model
Rules on Arbitral Procedure (1958)
In 1958, the United Nations International Law Commission published its Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure.1 26 Article 19 of the Rules
provided that "[ijn the absence of any agreement to the contrary implied
by the undertaking to arbitrate or contained in the compromis, the tribunal shall decide on any ancillary claims which it considers to be inseparable from the subject-matter of the dispute and necessary for its final settlement. 11 7 According to the preamble of the Model Rules, this article as
well as the rest of the provisions apply to disputes between States. 28 The
preamble also indicates that the Model Rules do not apply to a particular
arbitration unless they are accepted by the parties to the arbitration.' 29
The application of article 19 relative to counterclaims therefore seems to

122. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
123. Convention for the Establishment of an International Central American Tribunal,
Feb. 7, 1923 (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica), reprinted in
17 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPP. 83 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Central American Convention].
124. Id. art. XIX(1). Article XIX, "Rules of Arbitral Procedure," provides by virtue of
its paragraph 1 for the incorporation of articles 63-84 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra
note 118.
125. Central American Convention, supra note 123, at Annex B. The Rules of Procedure referred to in paragraph 2 of Article XIX of the Convention for the Establishment of
an International Central American Tribunal, art. XIX, Id. at 98.
126. Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, 2 Y.B.INT'L L.COMM'N 83 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as U.N.M.R.A.PJ.
127. Id. at 85.
128. Paragraph 1, Preamble to U.N.M.R.A.P. Id. at 83.
129. Id.
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be dependent in the first instance on agreement between the parties to
accept the Model Rules as governing the arbitral proceedings. Even then,
when the Parties have agreed to the application of the Model Rules as a
whole, the applicability of article 19 may still be denied by virtue of a
special agreement between the Parties. Such a special agreement can be
implied or made explicit in and by the compromis.3 0 However, should
the Parties be silent as to the applicability of article 19, the Tribunal is
empowered to consider counterclaims. " 1
B.

Counterclaims in Private InternationalArbitral Codes

Credit for the progressive development of rules pertaining to counterclaims in international arbitration must go to international arbitral
codes whose purview is not restricted to disputes arising solely between
States. These instruments are ones under which at least one Party is a
non-State actor.
1. Permanent Court of International Arbitration's Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Between Two Parties of Which Only One is a State (1962)
Until 1935, the Permanent Court of International Arbitration (PCIA)
continued to lend its good offices for the settlement of disputes between
States, a role explicitly delegated to it by article 15 of the 1899 Hague
Convention and repeated in article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention. " "
The Permanent Court of International Arbitration broke with this tradition in 1935. During an arbitration between the Chinese Government and
the Radio Corporation of America, the umpire, Professor von Hamel,
asked the Administrative Council of the Permanent Court of International Arbitration to make available to the Tribunal the services of the
staff of the Permanent Court. " " In circumventing the apparent intent of
article 15 of the 1899 Hague Convention and article 37 of the 1907 Hague
Convention, the Council and the International Bureau of the Permanent
Court accepted the umpire's request. They interpreted the provisions of
articles 26 and 47 of the 1899 and 1907 Conventions as authorizing the
Bureau to place its premises and staff at the disposal of the Contracting

130. Article 19 of the U.N.M.R.A.P. provides: "In the absence of any agreement to the
contrary implied by the undertaking to arbitrate or contained in the compromis, the tribunal shall decide on any ancillary claims which it considers to be inseparable from the subject-matter of the dispute and necessary for itsfinal settlement." See U.N.M.R.A.P., supra
note 126, at 85 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. See art. 15 of the 1899 Hague Convention, supra note 116; art. 37 of the 1907
Hague Convention, supra note 118. Article 37 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note
117, at 57 stipulates: "L'arbitrage international a pour objet le reglement de litiges entre les
Etats par lesJuges de leur choix et sur Ia base du respect du droit."
133. Permanent Court of Abitration, Circular Note of the Secretary-General, March 3,
1960, reprinted in 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 933, 937 (1960) [hereinafter cited as P.C.A. Circular
Note].
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Powers for the use of any special arbitral board,'3 4 without stipulating
expressly that such services be rendered only in cases involving an arbitration between States. 185 While contrary to the apparent intent of the
1899 and 1907 Conventions, the decision must be applauded as an attempt by the PCIA to keep pace with the nature and increasing number
of commercial arbitrations.
Several years later, the Permanent Court's International Bureau announced its readiness to place its premises and staff at the disposal of a
Contracting Power for the pacific settlement of international disputes,
even if one Party was not a State.'5s In 1960, the PCIA took yet another
step forward in offering itself as a forum to which disputes between "a
private person or a foreign commercial corporation" and a sovereign State
may be referred without necessitating the espousal of the private party's
claim by its own State.1 3 7 The Secretary General of the Administrative
Council accordingly circulated a letter for consideration by the Contracting Powers to the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, stating the
Permanent Court's readiness to serve as a forum for the settlement of
disputes between a private party and a foreign State.'"
Subsequently, in February 1962, the Permanent Court's International Bureau published a set of Rules of Arbitration for the settlement of
international disputes between a private party and a foreign State.'3 ' Article 11 of the Rules relating to counterclaims stated that "[tihe respondent may introduce a counterclaim against the claimant, provided that
this counterclaim be directly connected with the subject-matter of the request. The Tribunal, constituted in order to decide on the principal
claim, shall likewise decide on the counterclaim." 40 The application of
this provision is dependent in the first instance on the agreement (compromis) of the Parties to accept the Rules as governing the arbitral pro-

134. Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 118, at 67 (corresponding to
article 26 of the 1899 Hague Convention) provided, inter alia: "Le Bureau est autoris6 a
mettre ses locaux et son organisation a la disposition des Puissance Contractantes pour le
fonctionnement de toute jurisdiction speciale d'arbitrage."
135. See P.C.A. Circular Note, supra note 133, at 937.
136. In 1937, for example, the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration formally authorized the American Arbitration Association to publish the fact that
the Bureau was ready to place its premises and its staff at the disposal of the Contracting
Power for the pacific settlement of international disputes, even if one Party was not a State.
In turn, the American Arbitration Association informed its membership of the Bureau's decision and recommended to the membership the text of an arbitral clause adopting this
approach, approved by the Bureau, to be inserted in the future in contracts with foreign
States. Id. at 937-38.
137. Id. at 937.
138. Id.
139. Rules of Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes between Two Parties of which only One is a State (Bureau International de la Cour
Permanente d'Arbitrage, February 1962), reprintedin 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 500 (1963) [hereinafter cited as P.C.A./RAC].
140. Id. at 503.
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ceedings. Even then, however, the parties are allowed to exempt the proceedings from the application of the rule relative to counterclaims. Article
10 of the Permanent Court's Rules clearly provides that any procedural
rule, including article 11 on counterclaims, applies only when there is an
absence of agreement of the parties to the contrary. 4' At any rate, under
the heading "procedure", article 11 of the Permanent Court's Rules represents the first attempt at the "codification" of an international law rule
of counterclaims in cases involving a private party and a foreign State.
2. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States (1965)42
Article 46 of this Convention provides for the treatment of counterclaims and states:
Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal shall, if requested
by a party, determine only incidental or additional claims as counterclaims arising directly out of the subject matter of the dispute provided that they are within the scope of the consent of the parties and
are otherwise within the jurisdiction of the [International Center for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes]."'
This provision was applied in Benvenuti et Bonfant S.R.L. v. Peoples Republic of the Congo,14 4 where a panel of arbitrators under the auspices of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes found that the Government of the Congo presented permissible
counterclaims. The claimant had entered into a joint venture agreement
with the Congolese Government in 1973 for the manufacture of plastic
bottles and the construction and operation of a mineral water bottling
plant. The equity shares were 40% and 60%, respectively. The claimant
later invoked the arbitration provision of its investment agreement,
claiming that the respondent Government had promulgated laws rendering the continued operation of the joint venture uneconomic and amounting, in effect, to "creeping" expropriation. The respondent Government
counterclaimed, alleging (1) non-payment of import duties, (2) reporting
inflated raw materials costs, (3) defects in the construction of the manufacturing facility, (4) design faults in the facility and (5) "moral damages. 14 5 The tribunal held "that the counterclaim[s] relate[d] directly to

141. Article 10 of the P.C.A./RAC provides: "Unless agreed upon to the contrary by the
parties, the rules of procedure contained in the following articles shall be applicable." See
P.C.A./RAC, supra note 139, at 502.
142. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, entered into force October 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. No. 159 [hereinafter cited as ICSID Convention].
143. Id. at 188.
144. Benvenuti et Bonfant S.R.L. v. People's Republic of the Congo, International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Arbitration Tribunal, Award of Aug. 8,
1980, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982).
145. Id. at paragraph 4.101, at 762-63.
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the subject matter of the dispute" and that they therefore were properly
14 6
within the jurisdiction of the panel.
3.

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976)

Issued in 1976, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law Arbitration Rules " " codifies the procedural permissibility of
counterclaims in international arbitrations. Article 19(3) provides:
In his statement of defence, or at a later stage in the arbitral proceedings if the arbitral tribunal decides that the delay was justified under
the circumstances, the respondent may make a counter-claim arising
out of the same contract or rely on a claim arising out of the same for

the purpose of a set-off.

148

Again, however, it should be observed that the counterclaim or set-off
contemplated is a rather narrow one.
4.

Other InternationalArbitral Codes

In addition to the instruments enumerated above, it should also be
noted that there are a large number of conventions and codes that have
been promulgated by various international bodies concerned with the furtherance of international commercial arbitrations. It is not the focus of
this commentary to offer a survey of counterclaim rules set out in such
instruments,1 4 9 and therefore we refer to just two such instruments as examples. Article 5 of the Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration (1975) permits the defendant to make a counterclaim.15 0 Similarly, article 26 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the
Arbitration Courts at the Chamber of Commerce of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance Countries " provides for the submission of
152
counterclaims by the respondent.
C.

Summary
It can be seen that based on both treaty and the practice of interna-

146. Id. at paragraph 4.101, p. 763.
147. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) [issued at the 9th session of the Commission's work on 12 April-7 May, 1976,
Doc. No. A/31/17], reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, (C. Schmitthoff
ed. 1975).
148. Id.
149. For an excellent anthology of documents pertaining to international arbitrations,
see INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 147. This source is periodically
updated to reflect developments in the field.
150. Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, in force
as of June 1, 1975. Reprinted in id., part IV, D8.

151. Id.
152. The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Arbitration Courts at the Chambers of
Commerce of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance Countries, done in Moscow, Feb.
26, 1974. Reprinted in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 147 at 250.
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tional arbitral tribunals (and acquiesced in by States), counterclaims,
where not prohibited, are permissible. Where counterclaims are left unmentioned in arbitral agreements, they are allowed by tribunals as a matter of general international jurisprudence.
V.

SUBSTANCE OF COUNTERCLAIM RULES

In the previous sections of this commentary, the emergence, progressive development and ultimate acceptance under international law of
counterclaims in international arbitration was outlined. While these preceding sections dealt primarily with the procedural admissibility of counterclaims, the present discussion will focus on the substantive rules governing counterclaims in international arbitration. Specifically, three areas
will be explored: (1) the development of the "relatedness" criterion; (2)
the fate of counterclaims in the event of dismissal, procedurally or on the
merits, of a claim; and (3) the rule governing counterclaims in excess of
the original claim itself.
A.

The Relatedness Criterion

Several general principles of international law relating to counterclaims emerge from the conventions, rules of procedure and decisions of
international courts and arbitral tribunals. First, in the realm of international adjudication between States, counterclaims are permitted insofar
as they relate to the subject of the original claim or come within the jurisdiction of the Court. This conclusion is based on both international con15 4
ventions' 5 and case law, as acquiesced in by States.
Second, in the area of international arbitration, in disputes between
States or a State and a private party, tribunals permit counterclaims related to the original claim, unless the parties agree to the contrary in the
compromis. This is illustrated by the model rules for international arbitration, 55 various conventions, " 0 the compromis' 7 and the discretionary
practice of international arbitral tribunals. 5

153. See, e.g., art. 296 of the Treaty of Versailles, supra note 69, which the tribunal
found dispositive in the case of counterclaims unrelated to the original claim in The
Vandyck Printers Ltd. v. Modeaner Kunst-Belag G.m.b.H. (Great Britain v. Germany), 6
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 33 (1926-1927). See also art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of the Permanent Court
of International Justice, supra note 24, and art. 63 of the Rules of the International Court of
Justice, set forth in supra note 26.
154. See, e.g., Chorzow Factory Case, (Germany v. Poland), 1928 P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 17
at 38 (Judgment of Sept. 13, 1928).
155. See, e.g., article 19, U.N.M.R.A.P., supra note 126.
156. See, e.g., art. 11, P.C.A./RAC, supra note 139; art. 46, ICSID Convention, supra
note 142; Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 101.
157. See, e.g., art. 2(1), Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 102.
158. See, e.g., South African Republican v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de
Fer du Nord, [1898] L. R. Ch. 190; The Carthage Case, (France v. Italy), Permanent Court

of Arbitration, Award of May 6, 1913, reprinted in J. B. Scorr,

THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS

330 (2d. Ser. 1916); The Manouba Case, (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration,
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Third, despite the various contexts in which counterclaim provisions
have been formulated, arbitral tribunals have interpreted the related-tothe-original-claim criterion with remarkable unanimity, basing their position invariably on the compromis which established each tribunal. 5 9
Finally, in international arbitration, a procedurally correct counterclaim, that is, one which is deemed by the tribunal to be related to the
original claim or which comes within its jurisdiction, is permitted regardless of the status of the party originating the counterclaim. The counterclaim may originate from (1) a private party counter-claimant against a
private party claimant;' 60 (2) a private party counter-claimant against a
claimant State; 6 ' (3) a counter-claimant State against a private party
1 63
claimant; 2 or (4) a counter-claimant State against a claimant State.
This symmetry relating to the limits placed upon the counterclaim arises
from the presumption that the parties are considered by the tribunal to
be equal before it and the law,' 64 and that injustice would result if counterclaims were not to be considered as potentially admissible.
Thus, there exist general rules of international law governing counterclaims in international judicial and arbitral proceedings. These rules
provide that a counterclaim is permissible only when it arises out of the
same subject matter as that involved in the principal claim.

Award of May 6, 1912, reprinted in J. B. ScoTT, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. Ser.
1916); The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld (Great Britain v. Germany), 4
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205 (1924-1925); The Beeley Wood Steel Co., Ltd. v. Franz & Massmann
(Great Britain v. Germany), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289 (1928-1929).
159. See cases cited in supra note 158.
160. See, e.g., The Empire Transport Co., Ltd. v. Bd. Blumenfeld (Great Britain v.
Germany), 4 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205 (1924-1925); Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd. v. Verkaufe Vereiningung fuer Stickstoffsdunger G.m.b.H. (Great Britain v. Germany), 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes
648 (1926); The Beeley Wood Steel Co. Ltd. v. Franz & Massmann (Great Britain v. Germany), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289 (1928-1929) Morgan & Co. v. W.H. Chaplin & Co. Ltd.
(Great Britain v. Germany), 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 43 (1926-1927). See also, T.C.S.B., Inc. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber 2, at 23-24.
161. See, e.g., The Empire Transport Co., Ltd., 4 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 205; Nitrogen Fertilizers Ltd., 5 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 648; Morgan & Co., 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 43; The Beeley
Wood Steel Co. Ltd.; 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 289.
162. See, e.g., South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de
Fer du Nord, supra note 52.
163. See, e.g., Ernest Epstein v. German Government (Great Britain v. Germany), 6
Trib. Arb. Mixtes 19 (1926-1927); Benvenuti et Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo,
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Arbitration Tribunal,
Award of Aug. 8, 1980, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 740 (1982); T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber 2, at 23-24; American Bell International,
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case No. 48, Chamber 3, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS
Tam. REP. (1984).
164 See, e.g., Charles Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 6 Bevan 1, 37, 38
[1844]; The Carthage Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of May
6, 1913, reprintedin J. B. Scott, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916); The Manouba Case (France v. Italy), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of May 6, 1912, reprinted in J. B. Scort, THE HAGUE COURT REPORTS 330 (2d. ser. 1916).
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B. Dismissed Claims and Counterclaims
The basic question raised here is: What procedure, if any, is available
to the counterclaiming party to pursue a counterclaim which has been
disallowed by the arbitral tribunal on the ground of not relating to the
original claim or not coming within the jurisdiction of the tribunal? Insofar as the procedure of the World Court is concerned, the prosecution of a
dismissed counterclaim in international adjudication is straightforward,
and is effected by means of an application to the Court for a new action.
Article 63 of the 1936 Rules of the PCIJ' 6 5 and articles 63 of the 1946 and
80 of the 1978 Rules of the International Court of Justice s6 provide that
a State's dismissed counterclaim may form the subject-matter of a separate application (claim). In both cases, the Court reserved the right to
treat the counterclaim separately or to join it to the original proceedings.' 6 7 Although procedurally permissible, no case before the World
Court has been discovered where a respondent State has undertaken to

institute a separate application containing the subject matter of an already dismissed counterclaim.
In the realm of international arbitration, however, the rules governing counterclaims are silent as to the future of a dismissed or impermissible counterclaim.I' s An interesting permutation arose in T.C.S.B.,'69
where the plaintiff's fourth claim against the Government of Iran was dismissed. Iran nevertheless pressed a related counterclaim. The compromis
was silent on the issue of whether a counterclaim may exist independently of the original claim. The Tribunal held that since it had dismissed the claim, the counterclaim "must also be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction."' 70
The T.C.S.B. panel did not indicate which rule of international law it
applied in dismissing the counterclaim related to the original claim. It
appears that the panel construed its own jurisdiction and power to determine what the pertinent rule of international law is or should be. The
rule "no claim, therefore no counterclaim" is one which may prove to be
an invaluable tactical weapon in the hands of a claimant faced with the
prospects of a troublesome counterclaim.
165. See supra note 24.
166. See supra notes 26, 30.
167. Id. See supra notes 24, 26, 30.
168. See, e.g., U.N.M.R.A.P., supra note 126; P.C.A./RAC, supra note 139; ICSID Convention, supra note 142.
169. T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber
2, at 23-24.
170. Id. at 24. The Tribunal stated: "The [respondent] has . . . counterclaimed for
damages arising from TCSB's alleged failure to perform its contractual obligations under
the. . . contract. Since the Full Tribunal has dismissed the claimant's claim based on the
... contract ....
the counterclaim . . .must also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction."
Id. Accord Reliance Group Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., Iran-U.S. Claims Trib., decision
of Dec. 9, 1982, Case No. 90, Chamber 2, 1 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 284, 285 (Award)
(1983).
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The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal recently was presented with a request
by Continental Illinois National Bank to withdraw its claim against Iran,
thereby depriving the Tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain Iran's counterclaims, which had not as yet been filed by the defendant.1 71 As of the time
of this writing, the Tribunal had not rendered a decision with respect to
the plaintiff's request and the fate of Iran's counterclaims.
C.

Counterclaims in Excess of the Original Claim

One difficult problem in the international law governing counterclaims is whether an otherwise permissible counterclaim may exceed the
amount of the original claim. There is no doubt that a counterclaim may
72
be less than or equal to the amount awarded for the original claim,'
barring any provision of the compromis to the contrary. However, the situation where the counterclaim exceeds the original claim is analagous to
the case where the original claim is dismissed or withdrawn; 17 3 that is, the
original claim is legally "wiped out" by virtue of the award for the counterclaim and the excess of the counterclaim has an independent legal existence. There is a paucity of cases and literature on this issue.1'7 There
appears to be no international judicial or arbitral case where the forum
has granted an award for a counterclaim exceeding the claim itself. The
issue was raised recently, however, in American Bell International.7 5
As discussed above, American Bell brought a $63.8 million claim
before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal for its services, equipment and
other expenses arising out of the performance of two contracts in Iran.
Iran filed seven counterclaims exceeding $285 million against the plaintiff
and its parent, American Telephone & Telegraph, for a variety of alleged
contractual breaches and violations of Iranian law. The Tribunal held in
an interlocutory award that Iran could not counterclaim against AT&T
but that it could counterclaim against ABI, AT&T's successor in interest,

171. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, Case No. 252, Chamber 3, Order of Oct. 21, 1982, 1 IRAN-U.S.
CLAIMS Tim. REP. 232 (1983). For a discussion of the international rules governing the withdrawal of a claim where a counterclaim has not been filed. See id. (dissenting opinion of
Judge Mosk, at 232-233).
172. See Dickinson, Waiver of State Immunity, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 555, 556
(1925) and sources cited therein.
173. This is not a settled area of international law. For instance, in Gould Marketing,
Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense of Iran, decision of July 27, 1983, Case No. 49, Chamber 2, 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tuis. Rap. 147 (interlocutory award) (1984), the claimant objected
to the Ministry of Defense's $40 million counterclaim, which was far in excess of its $5
million original claim, as an affirmative award against it, in violation of the Claims Settlement Declaration supra note 101. 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TIaB. REP. at 151. The Tribunal rejected this theory stating that there is "no support for [the claimant's contention that the
jurisdictional bar on direct claims comprehends a bar on affirmative counterclaims." Id. at
152. For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 177-185 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
175. American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case No.

48, Chamber 3, 3 IRAN-U.S.

CLAIMS

Tais. REP. (1984).
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for breach of contract.' 7 No decision has yet been made on the merits of
Iran's counterclaims or on the procedural admissibility of the $221.1 million excess between the original claim and the counterclaim.
Similarly, in Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense,'1 7 a claim was filed for $5 million relating to various alleged
breaches of contract for the delivery and maintenance of radio equipment. The Defense Ministry filed a counterclaim for over $40 million. 7 8s
The claimant objected "to the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the counterclaim to the extent it sought relief in excess of the amount claimed on the
theory that the Tribunal lacks power to issue affirmative awards against
United States nationals."' 79 The Tribunal rejected the claimant's objection to subject matter jurisdiction in an interlocutory award as the claim
fell "within the requirements" of article 2(1) of the Declaration of Algiers,
"even if it exceeds the amount of the claim."' 0
In the final award, the Tribunal dismissed the counterclaims on the
merits.' 8 ' In an unexpected move, however, the Tribunal ordered the
claimant to pay $3.6 million to the Defense Ministry. The award was for
repayment of sums paid in advance under the contracts but never performed by the claimant. The Tribunal applied California law (as specified
in the contracts) "to equitably allocate" the costs of the contract as far as
it was performed."8 2 The Tribunal applied equitable principles as a matter of American municipal law to make an affirmative award in favor of
Iran while dismissing counterclaims which amounted to separate claims.
Thus, the award did not involve the issue of counterclaims in excess of
the original claim.
This holding at first seems to cast doubt on the proposition that arbitral tribunals do not grant awards on counterclaims in excess of the original claim. There are two distinctions, however, which may serve to explain the Tribunal's actions. First, the claimant may have made a tactical
error by characterizing the amount of the counterclaim in excess of the
original claim as an "affirmative award. . . against United States nationals" 183 and, therefore, outside of the Tribunal's jurisdiction.'" The Tribu-

176. Id. at 17.
177. Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defense, Case No. 49, Chamber 2, 3
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. 147.
178. Id. at 151-52.
179. Id. at 151. Under the construction given to art. 2(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration in the Case Concerning the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal with Respect to Claims by
the Islamic Republic of Iran Against Nationals of the United States of America, supra note
102, the Tribunal held that it has "no jurisdiction over claims" filed by the Government of
Iran against nationals of the United States. IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS Tam. REP. at 101. Thus, Iran
may appear only as a respondent before the Tribunal.
180. 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS ThIs. REP. at 151.
181. Id. at 151.
182. Id.
183. See supra note 173.
184. 3 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. at 152.
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nal correctly observed in response that its jurisdiction rests on article 2(1)
of the Declaration of Algiers, as the "counterclaims arise directly out of
the contract which constitutes the subject matter of [the] claim. '" 5 Perhaps the better approach would have been to focus on the claim and to
argue that the original claim ceases to exist under international law once
the counterclaim exceeds the original claim. Thus, under the reasoning of
the Tribunal's holding in T.C.S.B.,' 6e without a claim there can be no
counterclaim.
The second alternative is for the Tribunal to consider the merits of
the counterclaim, but to restrict any award on the counterclaim to the
actual award, if any, made on the original claim. This would be a practical approach and yet one which adheres to the principle of no counterclaim in excess of the original claim. Because of the unsettled nature of
the issue, however, analogy to municipal legal principles may be helpful.
VI.

U.S. LAW AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF ANALOGY

Limited discussion of the legal status of counterclaims which exceed
the amount of the original claim can be found in United States municipal
law.1 8s However, international tribunals may be able to draw the necessary legal principles from municipal law which can be applied by analogy
in the international context. It is not uncommon for international tribunals to look to municipal law for a legal principle which might be incorporated into the proceedings of an international dispute. For instance, in
The Island of Palmas Case,188 between the United States and The
Netherlands, the sole arbitrator referred to the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States to sustain the view that prescription founded
189
on length of time constitutes a valid and incontestable title to territory.
The analogy to municipal law, however, should be undertaken with
some care. In the Case of the S.S. "Lotus,"""0 the Permanent Court of
International Justice observed that "the courts of many countries" 9 ' allowed limited extraterritorial application of municipal criminal law. In

185. Id.
186. See T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140,
Chamber 2, at 23-24.
187. In American judicial practice the issue of counterclaims in excess of the original
claim repeatedly has been held to limit the amount of the counterclaim up to the amount of
the original claim. See infra notes 247-258 and accompanying text.
188. The Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. The Netherlands), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of April 4, 1928, 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 831.
189. Id. at 840. The arbitrator observed: It may suffice to quote among several nondissimilar decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States of America that in the case
of the State of Indiana v. State of Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890), where the precedent of
the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 45 U.S. [4 How.] 591, 639 (1846), is supported by
quotations from Vattel and Wheaton, who both admitted prescriptions founded on length of
time as a valid and incontestable title. Id.
190. [1927] P.C.I.J. Ser. A/B, No. 9/10 (France v. Turkey).
191. Id. at 23.
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that case, both France and Turkey cited numerous municipal court decisions to support conflicting legal principles on the extraterritorial extension of municipal criminal law. The Court concluded that "[w]ithout
pausing to consider the value to be attributed to the judgments of municipal courts in connection with the establishment of the existence of a rule
of international law, it will suffice to observe that the decisions quoted
sometimes support one view and sometimes the other. '" ' Thus, reference
by an international court or arbitral tribunal to a municipal law analogy
should be in an area where there is general agreement.
This would seem to have been the case in the Trail Smelter Arbitration,' s between the United States and Canada, that involved large
amounts of pollutants crossing the border between Canada and the
United States and despoiling certain farms in the state of Washington.
The arbitrators referred, inter alia, to the decision of the United States
Supreme Court on the issue of interstate riparian pollution in order to
ascertain a general principle of law applicable by analogy to cases involving international air pollution. 94
A.

The Relatedness Criterion

The rule in the United States federal courts and in most states
within the United States" is that a defendant may assert a counterclaim
if it arises out of the same contract from which the plaintiff's rights
flow." e6 This approach was adopted in section 9-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and has received wide acceptance in the U.S." 97 The
UCC provides that the plaintiff's rights are subject to a counterclaim if
the subject matter of the counterclaim arises from the original claim between the plaintiff and defendant."8s The UCC bars counterclaims ex-

192. Id. at 28.
193. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), Canada-United State Trail Smelter Arb.
Trib., decision of 1941, reprinted in 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1938.
194. Id. at 1963-65. Among the cases cited with approval by the Tribunal were Kansas
v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1906); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. and Ducktown
Sulphur, Cooper and Iron Co., Ltd., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); New York v. New Jersey and Paaic
Valley Sewerage Commissioners, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
195. The right to counterclaim is based on statute and varies by jurisdiction. S. WILLISTON & G. THOMPSON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON'S TREATISES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
432 (Rev. ed. 1938) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
196. 4 CORBIN, supra note 1, at 896. Cf. Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(permitting liberal joinder of counterclaims).
197. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 18-19 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO].
198. See Uniform Commercial Code § 9-318. See also, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS,
which provides:
§ 336. Defenses Against an Assignee.
(1) By an assignment the assignee acquired a right against the obligor only to
the extent that the obligor is under a duty to the assignor;
(2) The right of an assignee is subject to any defense or claim of the obligor
which accrues before the obligor receives notification of the assignment, but
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ceeding the damages awarded in the original claim.' 99 With regard to
claims involving a foreign sovereign, 00 U.S. federal case law allows a
plaintiff to press a claim on its merits while barring a foreign respondent
Government from maintaining a counterclaim unrelated to the applicant's claim, and barring an American defendant from raising counter20 1
claims unrelated to the applicant-Government's claim.
The modern American municipal position can be traced to three
British cases which established the principle that only counterclaims
stemming from the "same transaction" may be asserted against a foreign
sovereign plaintiff.20 2 In High Commissioner for India v. Gosh, °3 the Indian High Commissioner and the Indian Government brought suit to collect a debt. The defendant counterclaimed for damages stemming from
an alleged slander. The British court held that by bringing the suit on the
debt the plaintiffs had submitted to the court's jurisdiction only on this
action, including any reasonable counterclaim connected to the claim. It
dismissed the counterclaim 201 on the ground that it was unrelated to the

not to defenses or claims which accrue thereafter.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981).
199. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 197, at 17-18. Further, the award for counterclaims may not exceed the judgment granted for the original claim. See, e.g., Republic of
China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 105 F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952); Hungarian People's Republic v.
Cecil Associates, Inc., 118 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (discussed infra at notes 252-253).
200. The issue of sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine have become hopelessly interwined with the American municipal law rules governing counterclaims. See generally Looper, Counterclaims Against a Foreign Sovereign Plaintiff, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 647
(1956). This was evident in National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361
(1955), discussed infra at notes 213-216, where the Court stated:
The short of the matter is that we are not dealing with an attempt to bring a
recognized foreign government into one of our courts as a defendant and subject it to the rule of law to which a non-governmental obligor must bow. We
have a foreign government invoking our law but resisting a claim against it
which fairly would curtail its recovery ....
It becomes vital, therefore, to examine the extent to which considerations which led this court to bar a suit
against a sovereign in The Schooner Exchange are applicable here to foreclose
a court from determining. . .whether the Republic of China's claim against the
National City Bank would be unjustly enforced by disregarding legitimate
claims against the Republic of China.
Id. at 361-62. This rule was recently restated in First National City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 459 U.S. 942, 103 S. Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed.2d 198 (1983). See also
RESTATEMENT,

supra note 5, at 70.

201. See, e.g., Looper, supra note 200.
202. See generally Strousberg v. Republic of Costa Rica, 44 L.T.R. (N.S.) 199 (C.A.
1881); South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge de Chemin de Fer du Nord,
[18981 1 Ch. 190, discussed supra at notes 37-39; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics v.
Belaiew, 42 T.L.R. 21 (K.B. Div. 1925). See also Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover, 6
Beav. 68, discussed supra at notes 54-55. For an early American formulation of the rule
regarding counterclaims, see Justice Washington's circuit opinion in King of Spain v. Oliver,
14 F. Cas. 572 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 78130).
203. [19591 3 All. E.R. 659; 3 W.L.R. 811.
204. Id.
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It appears that the reciprocal rule, that a foreign State respondent
may bring a counterclaim relating to the original claim or transaction
against a private party plaintiff, seems to have emerged as a matter of
equity.206 The rule governing counterclaims against a foreign sovereign
claimant was expressed in article 5 of the Harvard Research on the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 2o which provides that:
"[a] complainant State, by instituting a proceeding in a court of another
State, submits to the jurisdiction of that court in respect of a direct counterclaim . . .arising out of the facts or transactions upon which a complainant's claim is based."20 8
The trend in U.S. municipal courts has been to broaden slightly the
"same transaction" rule of the older British cases into the modern "same
claim" rule.209 This change appears to have resulted from the growing
complexity of international business transactions and a recognition that
equity would not be served by narrowly interpreting permissible counterclaims. This trend towards liberalization was evident in United States v.
National City Bank of New York, 1 in which the federal Government, as
assignee of the Soviet Government under the Litvinov Assignment,
brought suit for funds held by National City Bank.2" The respondent
bank counterclaimed for delinquent Russian Government treasury notes.
The Second Circuit found for the bank, stating that the same transaction
could include an ongoing course of dealings related to the subject matter
of the claim. 2 2
This trend in the federal courts peaked in 1955 with the Supreme
Court's decision in National City Bank of New York v. Republic of
China. 1 13 This case involved a claim for $200,000 held on account in New
York for the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Administration, an agency of the

205. Id.
206. This appears to be the practice in federal courts, despite the permissiveness of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b).
207. Harvard Research, supra note 27, at 451.
208. Id. at 508.
209. Looper, supra note 200, at 649; see also the cases cited in supra note 202.
210. 83 F. 2d 236, 237 (2d Cir. 1936).
211. The funds, amounting to $115,000, were deposited in December 1917 with Bankers Trust Co. of New York. A dispute arose as to the proper payee of the funds. To protect
itself, Bankers Trust deposited the funds with National City Bank. The Russian Government brought suit in 1925 to compel the release of the funds then held by National City
Bank. National City Bank counterclaimed for certain defaulted Russian treasury notes. The
district court allowed the counterclaim and the bank prevailed. The Russian Government
appealed but, before the case was decided, the United States Government became the assignee of the claim on November 16, 1933 under the Litvinov Assignment. The federal government then brought suit against National City Bank. Id. at 237.
212. The court stated that "[c]laims arising out of the same transaction may be set-off
against the sovereign. The same transaction does not necessarily mean occurring at the same
time." 83 F.2d at 239.
213. 108 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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Chinese Government. National City Bank counterclaimed for $1.6 million
on the claimant's defaulted treasury notes. The district court, applying
the "same transaction" standard, dismissed the counterclaims because
they were not based on the subject matter of the suit.2"4 The Second Circuit affirmed, 21 ' although the bank indicated its willingness to use the
counterclaims only to the extent of the judgment awarded to the respondent and to not seek affirmative relief. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that "the limitation of 'based on the subject matter' is too indetoo capricious, to mark the bounds of the
terminate, indeed
21 6
limitations.
Similarly, the Banco Nacional de Cuba v. The First National City
Bank of New York case2 1 1 may be said to have broadened the criterion as
to what constitutes a counterclaim related to the original claim. Initially,
an action was brought by Banco Nacional de Cuba, the financial agency
of the Cuban Government, to recover funds held by the First National
City Bank of New York (Citibank), comprising $1,810,880.51. This sum
represented the excess realized on the sale of certain collateral held by
Citibank as security for a loan to a corporation owned by the Cuban Government. Also involved was $33,812.93 in accounts maintained by Cuban
banks at Citibank. The defendant filed a counterclaim to set-off against
the proceeds an amount up to the value of its Cuban properties expropriated by the Cuban Government.
The plaintiff sought to bar the defendant's counterclaim by invoking
the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state. The district court
dismissed the plaintiff's defense against the counterclaim. Judge Bryan
reasoned that Citibank was entitled to set-off against the plaintiff's claim
and to recover the excess funds as compensation for the seized Citibank
218
branches in Cuba.
The Second Circuit reversed, 21 9 with Chief Judge Lumbard observing
that by its counterclaim, Citibank was seeking in effect "something more"

214. Id. at 767.
215. Republic of China et.al. v. National City Bank of New York, 208 F.2d 627 (2d
Cir. 1953).
216. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. at 364. The Court
continued:
There is great diversity among courts on what is and what is not a claim
"based on the subject matter of the suit" or "growing out of the same transaction." No doubt the present counterclaims cannot fairly be deemend to be related to the Railway Agency's deposit of funds except insofar as the transactions between the Republic of China and the petitioner may be regarded as
aspects of a continuous business relationship. The point is that the ultimate
thrust of the consideration of fair dealing which allows a setoff or counterclaim
based on the same subject matter reaches the present situation.
Id. at 364-65.
217. 270 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
218. Id.
219. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. The First National City Bank of New York, 431 F.2d
394 (2d. Cir. 1970).
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than just a dollar-for-dollar relief on the loan transaction.2 2 The court
held that Citibank should not have been allowed to recover on its counterclaim for its expropriated Cuban properties. 2 ' On appeal, the Supreme
Court remanded the case without opinion for consideration in light of a
brief filed by the Department of State.2 2 On remand, the Second Circuit
2 23
affirmed its original decision.
The State Department intervention, known as the Stevenson letter,
stated inter alia that (1) the act of state doctrine need not be applied
when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or set-off, and (2)
the amount of relief sought is limited to the amount of the foreign State's
claim.224 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit declined to find in Citibank's
favor by allowing it to set-off Banco Nacional's claim against its confis25
cated Cuban properties.
Citibank again appealed and this time the Supreme Court reversed
the Second Circuit. 2 6 Justice Douglas' concurring opinion illustrates the
liberal interpretation accorded the "same transaction" rule. He observed
that:
[i]t would also offend our sensibilities if Cuba could collect the amount
owed on liquidation of the collateral for the loan and not be required to
account for any setoff. To allow recovery without more would permit
Cuba to have her cake and eat it too. Fair dealing requires allowance of
the setoff to the amount of the claim on which this suit is brought.22
Some commentators have lauded Republic of China2 2 8 as sounding
the death knell for a narrow interpretation of the "same transaction" rule
and signaling the shift to a broader "same claim" standard. 2 9 Looper argues that Republic of China eliminated the principle that counterclaims
in federal courts must be tied to the original claim. 8 0 In one of the Cuban
Cigar cases, 2 1 the Second Circuit observed that, "[t]he counterclaim

220. 431 F.2d 394, 404 (2d. Cir. 1970).
221. Id.
222. 400 U.S. at 1019.
223. 442 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1971).
224. Id. at 536. The "Stevenson Letter" stipulated, inter alia, that "the act of state
doctrine need not be applied when it is raised to bar adjudication of a counter claim or setoff," and that the amount of relief to be granted is limited to the amount of the foreign
state's claim." For the full text of the "Stevenson Letter," see 10 I.L.M. 89 (1971).
225. Id. at 533-34.
226. First National City Bank of New York v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1971).
227. Id. at 772.
228. 348 U.S. 356.
229. See, e.g., Looper, supra note 200.
230. Id. at 650-51.
231. On September 15th,. 1960 the Cuban Government expropriated the business and
assets of the five leading manufacturers of high grade Havana cigars and placed interventors
in charge of these enterprises. The interventors, acting on behalf of the Cuban Government,
continued to manufacture and export the cigars to the U.S. under trademarks belonging to
the confiscated firms. The three importers (Faber, Coe, & Gregg; Alfred Dunhill of London;
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here, unlike that in First National City Bank, arises out of a course of
dealing with respect to the same parties or their successors. Indeed, the
equities here balance much more heavily in favor of the importers than in
the First National City Bank case where the counterclaim arose out of a
wholly unrelated factual context."2 ' It is thus evident that federal courts
may abandon the "same transaction" rule in favor of a somewhat broader
"same claim" standard when equity is perceived as requiring it. Looper's
criticism, however, cannot stand in the light of this interpretation. Republic of China and its progeny stand for nothing more than a recognition that international business transactions are complicated (both by
their nature and the politics which are inevitably involved), and that equity requires that federal courts examine the context in which claims and
counterclaims arise." 3' This was recently demonstrated by the Second
Circuit in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank.2 3 4 Banco
Nacional brought suit to recover $9,794,000 from Chase Manhattan for
funds on deposit with Chase as collateral at the time of the Cuban revolution. ' 35 Chase Manhattan did not dispute the validity of Banco Nacional's
claims. Rather, Chase asserted two sets of counterclaims: first, in its own
right, the bank sought damages for the expropriation of its four Cuban
branches and, second, as trustee for certain U.S. railroad interests, whose
leased equipment was nationalized.2 36 The court held that Chase could
maintain its first set of counterclaims because they were closely enough

and Saks & Co.) accepted and retained the cigars shipped by the interventors but did not
pay the interventors for most of the cigars received after September 15th. The majority of
shareholders of the five firms had fled to the United States. They initiated nine actions in
the U.S. district court against the various importers seeking (1) to enjoin the defendants
from infringing plaintiffs' U.S. trademarks or paying anyone for products so marked; (2) to
obtain an accounting, damages and any money found to be owing to plaintiffs; and (3) to
recover the purchase price of cigars bearing trademarks shipped from their factories in
Cuba. Upon commencement of the actions, the interventors brought an action to enjoin
prosecution of the actions and to substitute the interventors' counsel for the original plaintiffs' counsel. Thus began a prolonged three-way battle between the owners, interventors
and importers. Among the many issues raised in the Cuban Cigar Cases was the question of
counterclaims and set-offs relative to monies paid by the parties for pre- and post-intervention shipments. See F. Palacio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966);
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Menendez v. Saks
& Co., 485 F.2d. 1355 (2d Cir. 1973); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 96
S.Ct. (1976).
232. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1373-74.
233. See supra note 216.
234. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
235. Id. at 879.
236. Banco Nacional argued that the act of state doctrine barred the court from adjudicating the courterclaim. The district court held that under First National City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1971), the act of state doctrine did not bar the
counterclaim. See also National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, where the
Court ruled that when a foreign sovereign asserts a claim in a U.S. court, "the consideration
of fair dealing" bars the state from asserting a defense of sovereign immunity to defeat a
setoff or counterclaim. Id. at 365. This was recently reaffirmed in First National City Bank
v. Banco Para el Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
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related to the plaintiff's original claim in that they arose out of Chase's
course of dealings with Banco Nacional. Chase was barred from asserting
the second set of counterclaims as trustee. The court noted that "a defendant may counterclaim only in the capacity in which he has been
sued. 2 37 Since the counterclaims on behalf of the railroad interests were
presented by the bank as trustee, they rightfully were rejected as independent claims.2 38
A similar result was reached in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co. 23 9 Banco Nacional brought suit to recover certain sums it had deposited with Chemical Bank in New York. Banco Nacional also sought to recover sums deposited by private Cuban banks with
the Chemical Bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and Irving Trust
Co.; Banco Nacional claimed to be the successor in interest to the private
banks, which were nationalized by the Cuban Government.
The defendant banks counterclaimed on the ground that the Cuban
Electric Company, a Florida corporation nationalized by the Cuban Government in 1960, owed them sums in excess of Banco Nacional's claims
and for which it stood liable as the Cuban Government's alter ego.
The Second Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the
justiciability of the counterclaims. It indicated, however, that it would bar
the counterclaims against Banco Nacional for the sum deposited with
Chemical Bank in its own name as Banco Nacional was shown not to have
played a role in the nationalization of Cuban Electric. 4 0 The court found,
however, that since Banco Nacional represented the Cuban Government,
which owned the funds on deposit from the now-nationalized Cuban
banks, the counterclaims would be allowed.241
The rule emerging from the practice of federal courts with respect to
assignees is that counterclaims will be allowed only if they relate to the
original claim. The equitable shift away from the "same transaction"
standard to a broader "same claim" rule should not be overly emphasized. The "same transaction" standard has withstood the test of time,
while the "same claim" rule is invoked only when equity knocks at the
court's door.

237. 658 F.2d at 886.
238. Id. The Court also took the opportunity to formulate a "phenomenological rule"
to determine whether claims should be barred by the act of state doctrine:
[W]here (1) the Executive Branch has provided a Bernstein letter advising the
courts that it believe [sic] act of state doctrine need not be applied, (2) there is
no showing that an adjudication of the claim will interfere with delicate foreign
relations, and (3) the claim against the foreign sovereign is asserted by way of
counterclaim and does not exceed the value of the sovereign's claim, adjudication of the counterclaim for expropriation of the defendant's property is not
barred by the act of state doctrine.
Id. at 884. Thus, Chase was permitted to maintain its first set of counterclaims.
239. 658 F.2d 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
240. Id. at 910.
241. Id. at 910-11.

DEN. J. INT'L

B.

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 15:1

Counterclaims Without an Original Claim

As noted in the discussion above of T.C.S.B., the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal dismissed Iran's related counterclaim for want of jurisdiction
because the panel had dismissed the plaintiff's original claim.242 This position is in accord with federal law, which holds that without a claim
there can be no counterclaim.24 3 In First National Bank of Boston (International) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,2 4 4 the Second Circuit -allowed the
respondent Banco Nacional to maintain a counterclaim against an assignee based on a right of action against the assignor. Boston's whollyowned subsidiary, BBI, was Boston's assignee and successor in interest.2"
On appeal, BBI's claims were dismissed; nevertheless, Banco Nacional attempted to pursue its counterclaim. The court held that since no claims
were allowed, the counterclaims must be dismissed. 2 "
C.

Counterclaims in Excess of the Original Claim

As discussed earlier in American Bell International, 247 the U.S.-Iran
Claims Tribunal was confronted with seven counterclaims by Iran which
exceeded by some $122 million the amount of the original claim. An interlocutory award has been made in the case; 2 "1 however, no decision has
been reached as to the permissibility of the counterclaims, including the
issue of whether a counterclaim in excess of the original claim would be
allowed. The rule in federal courts is that the amount of the counterclaim
against a State by a private party may not exceed the original claim or
the judgment awarded on the original claim.2 4 9 If the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal follows precedent based on U.S. law, it should refuse to permit
Iran's counterclaim insofar as it exceeds ABI's original claim.
In Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 2 50 the respondent filed counterclaims in excess of the Chinese Government's original claim. The district court held that the plaintiff was subject to counterclaims "to the
extent that it affords recoupment against ... [the plaintiff], but not beyond the point where affirmative relief is to be granted. ' 251 Similarly, in
HungarianPeople's Republic v. Cecil Associates, Inc.,252 a federal district

242. T.C.S.B., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, March 16, 1984, Case No. 140, Chamber
2, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. (1984).

243. See supra note 170.
244. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston (International) v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 685 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1981).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. American Bell International v. Islamic Republic of Iran, June 11, 1984, Case No.
48, Chamber 3, IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIB. REP. (1984).
248. Id. at 15.
249. See, e.g., United States v. National City Bank of New York, 83 F.2d at 237;
Looper, supra note 200, at 652.
250. 105 F. Supp. 411 (D.D.C. 1952).
251. Id. at 412.
252. 118 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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court held that a counterclaim for damages in excess of the plaintiff Government's claim for return of a $9,000 security deposit was not permissithe
ble. The court held that the respondent's counterclaim was limited 2to
53
extent of the award to the plaintiff and thus was purely defensive.
This federal rule governing the extent of the award on a counterclaim
was recently applied to a foreign State counterclaimant. In First National
Bank of Boston,254 the Second Circuit allowed Banco Nacional to counterclaim against Boston's assignee, BBI, but "limited to the amount of
the assignee's recovery. "255 In Menendez v. Saks & Co., 25 6 involving
Cuba's expropriation of five leading manufacturers of Havana cigars, the
Second Circuit interpreted First National City Bank as holding that
counterclaims could be asserted against claimant-interventors up to the
but reversed the district court's award in
amount of the original claim,2 5257
8
excess of the original claim.
D.

Summary

Should an international tribunal, especially one to which the United
States is a Party, seek an analogy to principles of American municipal law
in cases involving counterclaims between a private party and a foreign
sovereign, it will find that (1) the defendant's counterclaim must relate to
the original claim; (2) without a claim there can be no counterclaim; and,
(3) the counterclaim may not exceed in amount the original claim or the
judgment awarded.
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has demonstrated that the international law rules regarding counterclaims are generally rather narrow and require that a counterclaim be related in some direct and tangible way to the original claim.
This is certainly true in the international judicial arena, where the rules
and decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the
International Court of Justice require a direct connection between a
counterclaim and the original claim. Similarly, in international arbitration between States and between a State and a private party, the conventions establishing the arbitral tribunals universally provide for a narrow
interpretation of permissible counterclaims.
On a substantive level, the following principles may be seen as governing counterclaims in international arbitrations involving States or a
State and a foreign private party. First, a counterclaim is permitted only
if it relates to the original claim, contract or transaction. Second, a coun-

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 958.
658 F.2d 895.
Id. at 902.
485 F.2d 1355.
Id. at 1374.
Id.
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terclaim cannot exist independently of the original claim and therefore
should the latter be disallowed (procedurally) or dismissed on the merits
(substantively), the counterclaim also must be rendered inadmissible
(procedurally) or non-justiciable (on the merits), for want of jurisdiction
of the tribunal. The same reasoning applies to counterclaims should the
claim be withdrawn before a counterclaim is filed. Third, a counterclaim
in excess of the original claim, although admissible, cannot be awarded,
for it will be, in the amount of the excess, tantamount to an affirmative
award.
Similarly, the rules and decisions of the tribunals, where the convention or compromis is silent, have generally admitted counterclaims where
there is a direct link between the counterclaim and claim. Finally, it was
shown that in U.S. federal courts, especially in cases involving third party
assignees as successors in interest to a claim against a foreign sovereign,
only counterclaims directly related to the original claim are allowed. The
only exception to the "same transaction" rule developed by the federal
courts is the "same claim" standard applied in cases involving an action
between a foreign sovereign and private parties. This latter standard
stems from equitable considerations and is invoked when an unduly narrow interpretation of permissible counterclaims would appear unjust.

Judges in an Unjust Society: The Case of
South Africa
JOE W. ("CHIP") PITTS II*
INTRODUCTION

What should a judge do when confronted with the problem of applying unjust law? Grant Gilmore noted some of the options that the judge
has:
He can resign his judgeship. Or he can offer himself as a candidate for impeachment by saying: I regard this law as immoral and
refuse to enforce it in my court. Or he can evade the issue by seizing
on minor technical lapses (usually procedural) and dismissing the
case. Or he can enforce the law, with death in his heart-because it is
the law, duly established by the constituted authorities, and because,
as a judge, he has no other choice.'
The recurring dilemma is not merely an abstract problem of jurisprudence, though it is occasionally broached as such.2 It is also a practical
and immediate problem for judges, lawyers, legal officials, and (to some
degree) everyone else, particularly in legal systems like that of South Africa. As Dante observed, "the charge of complicity does not discriminate:
the hottest places in hell are reserved for those who, in a period of moral
crisis, do nothing."
3
Although it has been called "the most unjust society in the world,"
one could debate whether South Africa's legal system is unjust. The
widely perceived tension between law and morality in that country leads
* Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Texas; B.A. 1982 Tulane University; J.D. 1985 Stanford University. The author would like to thank Bryan Garner, of Carrington, Coleman, and Professor Thomas Grey of the Stanford Law School for
their generous comments on this article.
1. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 37-38 (1977).
2. See, e.g.., the Hart-Fuller exchange on law and morality- Hart, Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals, 71 H~Av. L. Rzv. 593, at 614-629 (1958); Fuller, Positivism
and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HAiv. L. REv. 630, 659 (1958). See
also, the Hand-Frank exchange on the role of courts in wicked societies: L. Hand, The
Contribution of an Independent Judiciaryto Civilization, in THE SPIRIT oF LIEmwry, 164
(1953) (a society so riven that the spirit of moderation isgone, no court can save); Frank,
Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CH. L. REV. 667, 697-8 (1957) (courts
should do what they can). A recent formulaic description of the Critical Legal Studies movement has noted its tendency to characterize U.S. law as fundamentally unjust and an instrument of repression. TIME, Nov. 18, 1985, at 87. See, e.g., Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049 (1978).
3. Barry, Injustice as Reciprocity, in JUSTcE at 75 (E. Kamenka & A. Soon Tay eds.
1979).
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one to ask the larger question of whether an unjust law is, in a sense, no
law at all. Anti-egalitarian elements in some formulaic descriptions of justice might actually accord with South Africa's system: Anaximander's
stress on the importance of reconciling opposites in strife' does not preclude the possibility of one opposite dominating the reconciliation. Aristotle's "distributive justice" based on social status may tolerate insensitivity to those at the bottom of the social ladder. Justinian's concept of
"giving everyone his due" may be perverted if rights "due" are narrowly
defined. And Plato's vision of each person performing an appropriate social function can easily lead to complacency about inherent inequality.
Not surprisingly then, current thinkers tend to emphasize the concept of
"equality" as an essential component of justice.6 No effort is made in this
article to define justice or morality. Although undefined, they will serve
for the purposes of this article as somewhat utopian standards by which
man-made, often unjust laws, may be judged. In keeping with jurisprudential tradition on this subject, I merely assume that the man-made laws
of South Africa are largely unjust.'
Part I of this article contains an overview of South Africa's legal system: its common law, legislation, adherence to parliamentary sovereignty,
and lack of judicial review. A comment on the nature and role of South
Africa's courts concludes this section. In Part II, the positivist and natural-law models of law and adjudication are considered for the (ultimately
inadequate) light they shed on the theoretical problem of the judge in an
unjust system. Part III describes how these theoretical inadequacies affected the judicial responses of America under slavery and twentieth-century South Africa under apartheid. The conclusion ventures some
thoughts toward a new theory of law and adjudication as interpretation.
This new approach could frame a more appropriate role for judges who
encounter unjust law, whether in South Africa or elsewhere.

I.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

South Africa is a fascinating, if appalling society. The country
presents an incomparable laboratory for study of jurisprudential issues
because of the extremity of its social (largely racial) problems, and the
extremely divergent perspectives on those problems. The sociol order
both reflects and is shaped by the legal order: apartheid is appalling because it is the only institutionalized system of legal racial discrimination
in the world. To the extent that revolution is a real possibility, the health
and legitimacy of the legal system are implicated at the core. It has often

4. 1 PHILOSOPHIC CLASSICS 8 (W. Kaufmann 2d ed. 1968).
5. See, e.g., Dworkin, Why Liberals Should Believe in Equality, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Feb.

3, 1983, at 32; What Liberalism Isn't, N.Y. REV. BOOKS; June 20, 1983, at 47; What is
Equality? (Pts. 1 & 2), 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 283, 314 (1981); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 73-74 (1971).
6. E.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 326-7, 343 (1977) (though South Africa
and Nazi Germany are examples, the idea of a wicked legal system is assumed).
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been often said that the common law of South Africa recognizes most
basic individual liberties and the concept of equality before the law. Yet
the plethora of repressive and racially discriminatory statutes in South
Africa calls into question the viability of liberal precedent and tradition.
In practice, courts are extremely circumscribed by parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review. These features have resulted in a legal system
with a very poor image, especially among South African blacks. The following is a brief overview of the South African legal system.

A.

Common Law

The common law of South Africa is predominantly Roman-Dutch law
transplanted from Holland in 1652 when the settlers of the Dutch East
India Company arrived at the Cape of Good Hope. British rule (especially
from 1806) resulted in substantial influence, if not direct imposition, if
English common law. Not only were the courts and the English law of
criminal evidence and procedure introduced in 1827-1834, but also the
mandatory training of advocates in England combined with the appointment of English judges to yield constant recourse to English precedent
and modes of legal thought. Thus, Hahlo and Kahn have written that the
old "two layer cake" of Roman-Dutch law has now acquired a "third
layer," English law. 7 While English common law has a tremendous historic "status" component, the tradition of formal (especially procedural)
equality before the law has always been potent. In theory, therefore,
South African judges could appeal to a precedent like Somerset's Cases
as compelling persuasive authority. The thrust of Lord Mansfield's 1722
holding, which freed the Virginia slave Somerset who deserted his master
in England, was that slavery was odious and against natural law. After
the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948, legal sentiment for a purification of South African law gradually built up, culminating in Appellate
Division Chief Justice L.C. Steyn's repudiation of "unjustified reliance"
on English sources.' Unfortunately, the largely Afrikaans "purists" were
notoriously insensitive to civil liberties. 0 Greater sensitivity has normally
been shown by a group of largely English lawyers who see a veritable
charter of human rights at the core of Roman-Dutch law. Lawyers and
academics like Anthony Mathews, John Dugard, and Sydney Kentridge,
for example, clearly see liberal rules, principles, and canons of construction in the Roman-Dutch common law. At times, perhaps, their enthusiasm has approached overstatement. 1' Yet, these distinguished and pas7. H.R.

HAHLO

& E.

KAHN, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS BACKGROUND,

584 (1968).
8. Lofft, 1 Lofft's Rep. 1; 20 Howell's State Trials 1; 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (1722).
9. See, e.g., Regal v. African Superslate (Pty.) Ltd., 1963 (1) S.A. 102 (A); Trust Bank
van Afrika Bpk. v. Eksteen, 1964 (3) S.A. 402 (A).
10. Blerk, The Irony of Labels, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 365, 377 (1982).
11. E.g., "The South African common law is color blind... [c]onsequently courts have
not discriminated between white and black in the allocation of civil rights." J. DUGARD,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER, 71-2, 382-3, 393 (1978) (hereinafter
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sionately committed lawyers are under no illusions about the repressive
character of South Africa's legal system; they merely place the blame on
statutes in derogation of the common law. They have thus adopted the
"liberal" model of South African common law for clearly reformist
reasons.
Nevertheless, an issue-partly empirical, partly theoretical-remains
as to the nature of South African common law. Can it be optimistically
characterized as containing liberal principles? Or does the tincture of realism force one to see the heart of darkness in the tradition? As will become evident, the issue is crucial both to the characterization of the legal
order as just or unjust and to consideration of the appropriate judicial
response. Even after the empirical question is answered by recognition
that South African common law is a mixed bag of "progressive" and "regressive" decisions, the judge is faced with the theoretical question of the
scope for creativity and law-making in interpretation of the common law.
B. Legislation
In contemporary South Africa, the significance of the debate regarding the liberality of the common law fades in light of the many repressive
and racially discriminatory statutes in derogation of the common law. Today, there are so many discriminatory statutes on the books that it would
be misleading to ignore the fact that South African law is primarily directed against blacks. It has not always been quite so bad: reforms under
British rule elevated the ideal of "the rule of law" and the notion of at
least formal equality before the law. "Coloreds" were recognized as formally equal in 1828, and all slaves were freed in 1834. These liberalizations were largely responsible for the "Great Trek" of Afrikaaners inland
from the Cape in 1835-1837. Yet black Africans have never really been
seen as persons with full civil and political rights, and other blacks (including coloreds and Indians) 12 have only been seen thus far as secondclass citizens at best. The following account of the highlights of apartheid
legislation does not aim at the comprehensiveness and specificity attempted elsewhere,'8 but briefly introduces some of the main statutes relied on by the government.

cited as DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS); see also, A.S. MATHEWS, LAW, ORDER AND LIBERTY IN
SOUTH AFRICA (1972); Mathews & Albino, The Permanenceof the Temporary - An Exami-

nation of the 90- and 180- Day Detention Laws, 83 S. AFR.L.J. 16, 37-8 (1966); Kentridge,
The Theories and Realities of the Protection of Human Rights Under South African Law,
56 TUL. L. REv. 227, 229-31 (1981); Hahlo & Maisels, The Rule of Law in South Africa, 52
VA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1966); Centlivres, The South African Constitution and the Rule of Law,
1956 BUrrERWORTH'S S. AFR. L. REV. 3, at 12.
12. "Blacks" throughout most of this paper will be used in this expansive sense urged

by those fighting for equal civil rights in South Africa. When a more restrictive reference is
needed, black Africans will be referred to as such.
13. Most admirably in DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 53-201; Landis, South
African Apartheid Legislation, 71 YALE L.J. 437 (1961).
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1.

Before 1948

Before 1948, when the Nationalists came to power, a number of statutes reflected the racist attitudes that fed the stepped-up campaign of the
Nationalists to separate the races in 1948.' 4 Among these early segregation laws was the Immorality Act.' 5 This statute allowed the government
to intervene in the most personal areas of life by prohibiting interracial
intercourse. Section 16 of the expanded 1957 version of this Act was repealed by the Nationalists in 1985, along with the Prohibition of Mixed
Marriages Act of 1949.16 The repeal of these Acts had been expected for
some time, both because of the difficult and sordid investigation needed
for enforcement and the recognition that black women are much more in
need of protection from white men than are white women from black
men. Thus, the Badenhorst Select Committee of 1984 decided that repeal
of the anachronistic laws could allow the South African government some
relief from international pressure without threatening the remaining legislative structure of apartheid.
Other pre-1948 restrictive laws were the "pass laws" which governed
the movement of Africans within South Africa, and laws reserving jobs
for whites and prohibiting blacks from joining recognized trade unions.
These two areas, influx control and labor law, are two chief areas of legislative activity by the Nationalists. The Bantu Land Act 27 of 1913 and
the Bantu Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 set aside approximately 87
percent of the country's most desirable territory for whites, leaving 13
percent of the most arid and undesirable land for Africans. This grossly
inequitable distribution is exacerbated by the fact that the population
ratio of whites and blacks is almost inversely proportional to the amounts
of land received through these early Acts: the 23 million blacks make up
about 75 percent of the country's population.
2. Post-1948
Since 1948, the process of racial discrimination has intensified and
been systematized and institutionalized by the Nationalists. The cornerstone Population Registration Act 30 of 1950 requires classification and
registration of the entire South African population on the basis of race.
Every person must fit into one of four racial categories: White, Indian,
Colored, or African. The "separate but equal" approach that was rejected
in the United States by Brown v. Board of Education17 was ironically

14. These laws are fully described in Suzman, Race Classificationand Definition in the
Legislation of the Unions of South Africa, 1960 ACTA JURIDICA 339.
15. Act 5 of 1927.

16. The Immorality Act of 1927 was expanded by Act 23 of 1957; the Prohibition of
Mixed Marriages Act was Act 55 of 1949. Repeal of these two Acts was announced by South
African Home Affairs Minister F.W. de Klerk on April 15, 1985, effective as of June 1, 1985.
See also, New York Times, Tues., April 16, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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taken a step further by the South African government at the same time
Brown was being argued. Under the Reservation of Separate Amenities
Act of 19538 the implicit contemplation of blacks as separate but unequal was explicitly recognized in the realm of public facilities. Though
much petty apartheid has been eliminated, much persists in the provision
of separate restrooms, train cars, entrances, and so on. Separate and inferior educational facilities have existed for blacks since the Extension of
University Education Act.' 9
Influx control was tightened up under the Group Areas Act 20 and the
Urban Areas Act,21 which together classified geographic and living areas
as white or non-white. These Acts allowed ownership and occupation in
certain areas only by designated racial groups. The pass laws governing
movement between racial areas were consolidated and expanded under
the inaptly named Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents
Act. 2 Despite the recent repeal of the pass laws, the legislative requirement that Africans apply for new identity documents means that the vast
majority of Africans must continue to carry the much-hated reference
books that identify them by name and race, where they have worked,
what taxes they have paid, and whether they have permission to be in the
white areas.
Influx control legislation also formed the basis for the government's
denationalization strategy, which involves giving the "homelands" set
aside by the early Land Acts mentioned above gradual "independence" as
separate sovereign states. This Kafkaesque political fantasy of the South
African government has not been shared by the other nations of the
world, none of whom have extended recognition to the fictionally "independent" states thus created. But the real impact of the government's
fantasy is severe. Because the government has been striving until recently
toward creation of a "white" South Africa without a single black African
citizen, 8 the security of Africans (who have been considered aliens in the
land of their birth) has been fragile indeed. The result has been the tragedy of state-ordered forced removals of blacks from white areas to the
homelands, where jobs and housing are usually unavailable and starvation
24
is rampant.

18. Act 49 of 1953. On October 1, 1986, President P.W. Botha confirmed the longawaited intent to repeal this anachronistic legislation. See, Wall St. J., Oct. 8, 1986, at 32,

col. 3.
19. Act 45 of 1959.
20. Act 41 of 1950, consolidated through Act 77 of 1957 and Act 36 of 1966.
21. Act 25 of 1945, § 10 inserted by § 27 of the Black Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952.
The government announced repeal of the Urban Areas Act, the pass laws and related influx
control legislation in April, 1986, effective as of July 1, 1986. The Abolition of Influx Control
Act 73 of 1986.
22. Act 67 of 1952.
23. Dr. C.P. Mulder, then Minister of Information, stated this government goal in
House of Assembly Debates, col. 579 (Feb. 7, 1978).
24. For an overview of the whole process, see Dugard, South Africa's "Independent"
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Labor law was not immune from Nationalist legislative activity, and
job reservation for whites was expanded as a total prohibition on the
right of Africans to strike was imposed.25 A tension between labor law and
influx control has existed historically, primarily because whites want
blacks in white areas when cheap labor is needed, but not when management purposes are not being served.2 6Those conflicting demends persist
today, despite the formal repeal of much of the influx control legislation.
Security legislation is so arbitrary and repressive that it is frequently
cited as illustrating the erosion or collapse of the rule of law in South
Africa. 7 As discrimination intensified after 1948, so did black resistance
and then further repression. This cycle of repression was initially justified
by cold war rhetoric invoking fears of a communist onslaught, and the
early statutes in conception and application associated black liberation
movements with communism. The Suppression of Communism Act,2 now
known as the Internal Security Act, was originally directed at communist
subversion. Because the Act included within the definition of communism
any doctrine "which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change, ' 29 the Act was vigorously enforced against
noncommunist black and white activists.
In 1976, the legitimacy of proceedings against even anticommunist
subversives was recognized by amending the name of the Act and extending its coverage to any organizations or individuals who "endanger
the security of the state. '3 0 The Internal Security Act allows severe intrusions on freedoms of speech, movement, assembly, and association, usually without any recourse to judicial review. Moreover, the recent trend is
for the sphere of unchecked executive discretion in the security area to
increase rather than decrease. The current version of the Act allows detention without trial and "banning" of persons deemed to be security
risks.8"
Following the Sharpville massacre of 1960, security legislation was
introduced that banned the chief black liberation organizations (the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress), and declared a

Homelands: An Exercise in Denationalization,10 DEN. J. INT'L. L. & POL'Y 11 (1980).
25. E.g., Black Building Workers Act 27 of 1951; Industrial Conciliation Act 28 of 1956,
77 (job reservation); Black Labor (settlement of disputes) Act 48 of 1953 (prohibition on
strikes).
26. See Budlender, Incorporationand Exclusion: Recent Development in Labor Law
and Influx Control, S. AFR. J. HuM. RTs. 3 (1985).
27. Suzman, South Africa and the Rule of Law, 85 S. APR. L.J. 261 (1968); Mathews,
The South African Judiciary and the Security System, 1 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTs. 199, 200
(1985). For an excellent overview of security legislation in general, see DUGARD, HUMAN
RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 146-365.
28. Act 44 of 1950.
29. Id. at § 1.
30. Internal Security Amendment Act 79 of 1976, inserting § 2(2)(A) of Act 44 of 1950.
31. The Internal Security Act 74 of 1982, §§ 18-29.
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state of emergency. 2 The South African government's reaction to the
most recent spate of unrest has also included declarations of states of
emergency."3 After attempts to amend other security laws, the government finally introduced the sweeping detention-without-trial provisions
of The Terrorism Act.3 4 This Act allows a person to be indefinitely detained in solitary confinement, without trial, for purposes of interrogation. Courts are denied ability to review the validity of the detention.35
3.

Recent Reforms

Much attention has been given to recent "reforms" of the South African government. These include the 1979 amendments to South African
labor law resulting from the recommendations of the Wiehan Commission,3 6 the recent pronouncements accepting the permanency of urban
blacks and the "restoration of South Africian citizenship", the new constitution adopted in 1984, and the repeal of the Prohibition of Political
Interference Act,37 the Mixed Marriage Act, s and section sixteen of the
Immorality Act and the pass laws." The government also has committees
"examining" other discriminatory legislation to determine whether repeal
or "adaptation" is possible or necessary.
The 1979 amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act 40 did open
a new era in South African labor law by allowing the registration of black
unions and an industrial court with an equitable jurisdiction to consider
unfair labor practices. Yet strikes are still "extremely circumscribed,"
meetings and picket lines are outlawed, and union leaders are often detained or banned.4 1 Recent legislation, in fact, has expanded the ability of
the state to proceed against the emergent unions by prohibiting their
ability to affiliate or assist political parties, or to "influence" members
regarding political positions. 4' The recently formed Congress of South Af-

32. Unlawful Organizations Act 34 of 1960.
33. E.g., N. Y. Times, July 21, 1985, at 1, col. 6; N. Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1985, at 1, col. 3;
The latest state of emergency was imposed on June 12, 1986, by Proclamation R. 109 on
President Botha.
34. Section 6 of Act 83 of 1967.
35. Id. at 6 (5).
36. Commission of Inquiry into Labor Legislation, RP 47 (1979).
37. Act of 1968; repeal announced May 25, 1985. N. Y. Times, May 26, 1985, § 1, pt. 1,
at 3, col. 4.
38. Act 55 of 1949; repeal announced May 25, 1985. N. Y. Times, May 26, 1985, § 1, pt.
1, at 3, col. 4.
39. Act 5 of 1927, expanded by Act 23 of 1957; repeal of 16 announced April 15, 1985.
N. Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1985, at 1, col. 6. On repeal of the pass laws, see supra note 21.
40. Act 94 of 1979.
41. Gould, Black Unions in South Africa: Labor Law Reform and Apartheid, 17 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 99, 147 (1981).

42. Labor Relations Amendment Act 57 of 1981, § 8(6) and § (7), read with §
4(5)(a)(iii). See also, The Labor Relations Amendment Act 81 of 1984, § 3, inserting § 31(a)
in the principal act, and providing for non-enforcement of union-employer agreements
which do not follow the requirements of the old legislation.
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rican Trade Unions (COSATU) is thus risking prosecution for its strong
political stands. The decisions of the industrial court, though initially
greeted with enthusiasm, took a more restrictive turn in 1984-85. 4 1 In
light of the recent unrest in South Africa, which is inevitably tied to labor
and economic grievances of urban blacks, one can only conclude that the
Wiehan strategy of transferring industrial unrest from the streets and
shop floors to the formal statutory dispute-resolution machinery has
failed.
Reform of influx control laws was considered in the Riekert report of
4
1979, 44 and the Act itself was repealed with the pass laws in 1986. 5
Amendments to the Urban Areas Act were made in July 1985. Yet the
new hope for reform which emerged in late 1985 and early 1986 when
President Botha announced that the policy of stripping black Africans of
South African citizenship would be discontinued has been dashed by the
form of the legislation providing for issuance of new identity documents
and "restoring" South African citizenship. 4' The new "identity documents" will serve many of the same purposes as the old "reference
books," and will not be issued unless an application is made. Similiarly,
citizenship will be restored only to those who go through the cumbersome
process of administrative application, a process effectively unavailable to
those who are ignorant of their right to apply. Although difficult to understand, the Restoration of Citizenship Act seems to apply only to "urban" blacks - those "lawfully and permanently resident" in the "white"
South Africa that remains after certain homelands were granted independent state status. The meaning of "permanent residence" in the Act is
unclear, but seems to refer to the control concept of the new-repealed
Urban Areas Act. This indicates that the government has simply instituted a new sort of influx control, with passports taking the place of
passes.' 7 Significantly, the legislative structure of homelands as "separate
states," which developed from influx control concepts of "separate areas,"
remains a core principle of apartheid.48 Riekerts recommendations have

43. See, e.g., Nat'l Union of Mineworkers & Others v. Driefontein Consolidated, Ltd., 5
INDUS. L.J. 107 (1984) (worker-protective test governing status quo orders rejected); Vetsak
v. Peter Ngobeni and Others, 5 INDus. L.J. 205 (1984) (contractual theory allows mass dismissal and discriminatory selective reinstatement).
44. P. J. Riekert, Commission of Inquiry into Legislation Affecting the Utilization of
Manpower, RP 47 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Riekert Report).
45. Section 10 of Act 25 of 1945 (amendments decreasing the time period that foreign
workers must remain in urban areas to qualify for residence rights, from 15 years to 10
years, and allowing residence in multiple towns to meet the requirements); effective July 3,
1985; Acat repealed in its entirety on July 1, 1986. See supra note 21.
46. See Identification Act of 1986, and the Restoration of South Africian Citizenship
Act of 1986.
47. Budlender, Influx Contorl in the Western Cape: From Pass Laws to Passports
(Aug. 21, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file at the Denver Journalof InternationalLaw
& Policy.)
48. N. Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1985, at A6, col. 3. Four homelands: the Transkei; Bophuthatswana; Venda; and the Ciskei have taken independence, with Kwa Ndebele was expected to
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led to restrictions on migrant workers, including those from the supposedly "independent" homelands. Increased fines on employers found to
employ illegal migrants have resulted in thousands of newly unemployed
migrants, with repercussions extending to the migrant laborers' dependents in the homelands.
The new Constitution adopted by South Africa in 1984 is in keeping
with the shift in ideology from baaskap (white domination) to separate
development. The new Constitution accepts Indians and coloreds as worthy of representation in racially segregated houses of Parliament, but African blacks are still wholly excluded from national political participation.
They do not possess the right to vote or any other form of representation.
Even the coloreds and Indians have only illusory power, for they are a
minority in "white" South Africa, and their consideration of matters is
subject to the discretion of the Executive State President. Today the Executive State President has vastly expanded powers, and the white house
of Parliament retains a veto over legislation passed by the other two
houses. Cosmetic reforms and anti-discriminatory rhetoric may be tolerated in "white" South Africa, because Indians and coloreds are seen as a
new, co-opted black middle class. In short, because the government's
terms of reference have changed, the labor reforms and legislative repeals
are utterly meaningless for the black majority of South Africa. Such "reforms" merely give the Nationalists an opportunity to gain a public relations advantage while bringing some of the most overtly discriminating
legislation in line with current realities."9 The essential legislative structure of apartheid, justified on grounds of separate development, remains
intact.
C.

ParliamentarySovereignty

The repressive legislation of apartheid exists because the South African Parliament, as in England, is supreme. Also as in England, party discipline is strong, so the Nationalists have little trouble implementing
their legislative program. Parliamentary sovereignty on the BlackstoneDicey English model dates back to British occupation of the Cape in
1806. It was the form of government in the Republic of South Africa (the
Transvaal), and has been rather uncritically accepted since South Africa
became a Union in 1910. Federalism, which might have resulted in increased protection for human rights, was rejected. When South Africa became a formal "Republic" in 1961, the Westminster style of parliamentary sovereignty continued to give great play to the powers of a strong
cabinet. At the time the American Constitution was drafted, the idea of a
fundamental law binding Parliament was potent. But Dugard has written
do so in 1986; but popular protest led the legislative assembly to vote in late August, 1986,
to delay independence indefinitely.
49. As Rep. Stephen Solarz wrote in a recent New York Times editorial, whites see the
changes as cosmic, but blacks feel they are merely cosmetic. N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at
A31, col. 1.
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that by the time "of English influence on South African law, the concept
of parliamentary sovereignty was unchallenged wherever the Union Jack
flew. South African lawyers and politicians grew up under a totally
differ50
ent English tradition from that of their American counterparts.
The South African version of parliamentary sovereignty differs not
only from the American form of government; it also drastically differs
from its British parent. Unlike the British emphasis on the notion of the
rule of law, with its values of equality before the law and freedom from
arbitrary government action, any idea in South Africa of a Parliament
bound by law has evaporated. 5' The basic premise of representation in a
democratically elected legislature is denied. There is no effective legal opposition in South Africa. Additionally, the concept of Parliament as existing to protect common-law rights against encroachment by the executive is foreign to South Africa. The result is "a poor imitation of
Westminster," a sovereign Parliament stripped "of all conventional restraints founded upon the historically based destiny and representative
composition of its English counterpart." 2 Dugard concludes that loyalty
to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, "more than any other legal
factor, brought about the debasement of the South Africa legal system.""
The new tricameral Parliament does not change matters. One party,
the Nationalist party, continues to monopolize effective power. The Executive State president has vastly expanded powers, including the power to
determine which matters Parliament's houses will consider. The State
President also has final say over whether he wants the advice of the President's Council, made up from Parliament's members, at all.
I Naturally, a sovereign Parliament that considers itself above the law
has little patience for an institution like judicial review. Challenges to the
restrictive legislation sketched above become difficult at best, as Judge
Didcott of Durban has remarked: "Parliament has the power to pass the
statutes it likes, and there is nothing the courts can do about that. The
result is law. But that is not always the same thing as justice. The only
way that Parliament can ever make legislation just is by making just
legislation.""
D.

The TraditionalLack of Judicial Review

fcp]Parliamentary (and increasingly, executive) sovereignty thus implies
a very limited scope for judicial review in South Africa. Again, it was not
always this way; South African judges were overwhelmingly selected from

50.

DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 16.
51. Van der Vyver, ParliamentarySovereignty, Fundamental Freedoms and a Bill of
Rights, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 557, 572 (1982) (citing the constitutional crisis over the colored vote
in the 1950's as evidence that Parliament assumed it was above the law).
52. Id. at 558.

53.

DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS,

supra note 11, at 36.

54. In re Dube, 1979(3) S. A. 820, 821 (N); See also, S. v. Adams, 1979(4) S.A. 793, 801
(T)(King, J.).
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advocates who had been trained in England, so they were at least aware
8
of Bonham's Case,5
containing the dictum in which Chief Justice Edward Coke asserted the right to judicial review. But Bonham's Case had
even less success in South Africa than it did in England.
In the constitutional crisis of 1897, Chief Justice Kotze in the Orange
Free State asserted a right of judicial review. President Kruger (of
Krugeraand and Kruger Park fame) reacted by pushing through legislation denying any such right. Kotze was dismissed from office. Swearing in
the successor Chief Justice (Gregorowski), Kruger said that "the testing
right is a principle of the Devil." 6 Kruger's statement reverberates
throughout contemporary South Africa; a relatively impotent judiciary
can be granted some independence at no risk to the supremacy of a powerful and unrepresentative legislature.
Yet South African judges did not give up. A second constitutional
crisis in the 1950's was tied to the most substantial object of protection of
judicial review: the constitutionally entrenched 5 7 colored right to vote. In
the original compromise that resulted in the Union of South Africa's four
provinces (the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, and the Orange Free State), the
Cape was allowed to retain its qualified franchise for coloreds. The Nationalists passed the Separate Representation of Voters Act in 1951 to
remove the colored right to vote. But the entrenched section 35 of the
Constitution required the procedure of a two-thirds vote of both houses
sitting together to remove the entrenched right. Exercising a form of judicial review, the Appellate Division in Harris v. Minister of the Interior"
struck down the Act because the constitutional procedure had not been
followed. The court thus overruled Ndlawana v. Hofmeyr, which had upheld parliamentary sovereignty.59 Parliament responded with the "High
Court of Parliament" Act which provided for legislative review of any
judicial decision purporting to invalidate an act of Parliament. That Act
was invalidated in Minister of the Interior v. Harris,60 on the grounds
that the high court was really no court at all, but a sham for Parliament
itself.
The battle was not over yet. Parliament responded with a court
packing plan that would have been the envy of Roosevelt. Under the Appellate Division Quorum Act,61 eleven judges were substituted for the previously existing five when an act of Parliament was in issue. The Senate
Act,62 which followed, almost doubled the size of the Senate and changed

55. Bonham v. Atkins, 8 Co. Rep. 1136, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (1610).
56. DUGARD, HumAN RIGrrs, supra note 11, at 24.
57. An "entrenched" provision of the South African Constitution is one that requires a
two-thirds vote of Parliament to be disregarded.
58. 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.).
59. 1937 A.D. 229.
60. 1952 (4) S.A. 769 (A.D.).
61. Act 27 of 1955.
62. Act 53 of 1955.
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the mode of electing senators to favor the Nationalist party. This legislative plan was upheld by the newly renovated Appellate Division on the
grounds that neither Act, considered alone, was invalid. Mr. Justice 0. D.
Schreiner was the sole dissenter, noting the improper and unconstitutional purpose and effect of the legislation. The South Africa Act Amendment Act6 s was then passed by a two-thirds majority, to give retrospective
validity to legislative denial of the vote to Cape coloreds.This Act also
expressly denied the power of judicial review over the validity of acts of
Parliament (except over the entrenched provisions guaranteeing equality
of the two official languages, English and Afrikaans), a provision that was
repeated in the constitution of 1961.4 The new Constitution of 1983 has a
comparable provision which provides for review, "subject to" an intricate
set of cross- and cross-cross-referenced provisions that give only vitiated
review. The Constitution further provides that, except for that limited
review, "no court of law shall be competent to inquire into or pronounce
upon the validity of an Act of Parliament." 5 The limited review allowed
divisions of the Supreme Court relates to whether the state President has
complied with certain procedures in deciding whether a specific matter is
a general affair or an "own" affair of one of the represented population
groups.66 This is a weak review of what is a weak requirement of formal
consultation with Parliament before certifying matters. Moreover, the
legislative history of the new Constitution indicates that expanded powers of judicial review were not intended by the government. 67 Thus, the
lack of an explicit reference to any entrenched clauses of the new Constitution may be read by analogy to the 1961 Constitution as limiting review
to the entrenched amendment procedures (two-thirds of each house) required for derogating the equality of the two official languages," or to the
less entrenched and less stringent amendment procedures (a simple ma69
jority vote of each house) for many other provisions.
A strong argument clearly exists, however, for an expansive reading
of the new Constitution to allow review even of nonentrenched provisions.
The omission of the previous reference to entrenched sections may be
read with the general grant of review to trump any restrictive reading
suggested by legislative history. The issue would then arise whether the
power of review would be limited (as before) to procedural sections or
would go to substantive provisions. And, unfortunately, the tough issue of
the proper external staridards for reviewing the constitutionality of legislation would also inevitably arise.

63. Act 9 of 1956.
64. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CONST. Act 32 of 1961, § 59 (2) (no judicial review);
§ 108 (language rights).
65. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CONST. Act 110 of 1983, 34 § 34(2).
66. Id. at § 18, referring to subsections 17(2) and 16(1).
67. House of Assembly Debates, Aug. 29 - Sept. 2, 1983, cols. 12891, 12892.
68. Act 110 of 1983, § 99(2), referring to § 89.
69. Id. at § 99 (3). These provisions notably include many clauses affecting the powers
of the State President and the Houses of Parliament, as well as the franchise.
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The problem of standards is particularly acute in a country with no
bill of rights, a Constitution viewed primarily as a mere tool for structuring government, and a history of repressive legislation. Positive law has
granted few rights to those most in need of rights, and natural-law standards of justice, morality, or general reasonableness have never been successfully invoked for substantive, as opposed to procedural, protection.
Other standards for quasi-natural-law review, such as humanitarian values, consensus, policy, "the rule of law," utilitarianism, or international
law values are possibilities, but only possibilities. These will be discussed
in more detail in Part II below. Suffice it to say that all sides agree on the
characterization of South African courts as positivistic.
The materials for asserting a new and expanded right of judicial review thus exist, and should be used by the South African courts. Otherwise, the judiciary will be limited to the weak power of inherent commonlaw review of subordinate legislation and administrative action. This type
of review does not extend to consideration of the substantive merits of
legislation. Subordinate legislation includes the ordinances, regulations
and the like issued by local government organizations with delegated authority from Parliament. The limited review on certain grounds over administrative actions is primarily to determine whether regular procedural
requirements, such as impartiality, proper attention applied to the matter, and at least a good-faith effort at fairness, have been met. Yet even
unreasonableness per se is not regarded as an irregularity. Only "grossly
unreasonable" decisions amounting to a "recognized irregularity" warrant
court intervention. Until the recent decision in Everett v. Minister of
the Interior,7 it was assumed that an opportunity to be heard had to be
granted. Limited use of the statutory presumption in favor of liberty has,
72
however, been employed to good effect, if only rarely.
Thus, the scope for judicial review had traditionally been circumscribed by rigid parliamentary sovereignty. The situation is not improved
by jurisdiction-curtailing measures" such as that under the Prohibition of
Interdicts Act,74 which prohibits interdicts against banishment from a
white area pending resolution of an attack on such an order; the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act," which ousts court jurisdiction to review
the validity of reservations; and the Terrorism Act,76 which effectively excludes court review of any matter other than the rare "illegal" police in-

70. Nat'l Transport Comm. v. Chetty's Motor Transport, 1972 (3) S.A. 727, 735, 727
(A.D.); Goldberg and Others v. Minister of Persons, 1979 (1) S.A. 14 (A.D.) at 38.
71. 1981 (2) C.P.D. B 1 453.
72. See, Dadoo Ltd. v. Krugersdorp Mun. Council, 1920 A.D. 530, 552.
73. On the American experience with jurisdiction stripping measures, see Gunther,
Congressional Power to CurtailFederal Court Jurisdiction:An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 26 STAN. L. REv. 895 (1984).
74. Act 64 of 1956 (prohibiting issuance of interdicts in the influx control area).
75. Act 49 of 1953, expected to be repealed in 1987.; See also supra note 18.
76. Act 83 of 1967, § 6(5). See also the exclusion of court review of bannings and detentions under the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982, § 29.
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terrogation that comes to light. The limited common-law power of reviewing delegated authority to determine whether it is unreasonable per se or
ultra vires is not very helpful. And even a court that successfully grasps
the opportunity under the new Constitution to assert an expanded power
of judicial review will not be able to reach injustices perpetrated against
the majority of African blacks, who have not been legally considered citizens of South Africa subject to South African legislation. The deportation
of these denationalized aliens, is, of course, excluded from judicial
review.7 7
E.

The Courts in South Africa

The lack of a bill of rights, coupled with the relative lack of judicial
review, makes it all the more important that the South African judiciary
be independent from the other branches of government. South African
courts have been glowingly applauded on all sides for their unassailable
independence. 8 Yet increasing criticism of the judiciary has cautiously
called that independence into question. The caution springs from the
strategical consideration that the myth of independence has a liberal effect: the courts in South Africa are, after all, the only legal institution in
which black Africans have anything approaching effective political power.
Thus, memories of the courageous stand of the Appellate Division in the
constitutional crisis of the 1950's linger and the fiction of political neutrality is maintained, to preserve the "best chance" that blacks have. Underlying much of the new criticism is the perception that the myth of an
independent judiciary legitimates the unjust legal order by indicating
that the legal system provides free and equal individuals access to
courts. 79 Respect for the system is misplaced, for only whites are really
considered free and equal under South African law. The illusion of a flexible and just procedural system that occasionally does justice obscures the
substantive lack of justice in most cases.
Increasingly, the South African press notes the grossly disparate sentencing in cases involving blacks and whites. Lawyers and academics like
Sydney Kentridge and John Dugard write of the occasional sensitivity to
human rights, but conclude that the courts have at best a mixed record in
race and security cases. 80 Aloofness in race relations, says Dugard, is "but
one of the many judicial myths of South Africa."8 "

77. Admission of Persons to the Republic Regulation Act 59 of 1972, § 45.
78. See, e.g., Hahlo & Maisels, supra note 11, at 10-12; Final Rep't of the Constit.
Comm. of the Pres. Council on the Adaptation of Constitutional Structures in South Africa,
P.C. 4 (1984), at 115-117 (hereinafter Final Rep't).
79. See generally, J. HABERMAs, LEGITIMATION CRISIS, Pt. 3 (1973).
80. See Kentridge, supra note 11 at 231; Kentridge, The Pathology of a Legal System:
CriminalJustice in South Africa 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 603, 615 (1980); Kentridge, Telling the
Truth About Law, 99 S. AFR. L.J. 648, 649 (1982); DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11 at
387.
81. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 324.
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Why is this so? The primary reason must be that the judges are exclusively and uniformly white, and thus inevitably subject to all of the
contradictory fears and prejudices of white South Africa. In addition,
though, judges have been (and will continue to be under the new Constitution)8s appointed by the Executive President. Proposals for a multiracial appointments commission were considered, but rejected by the constitutional committee. Appointments are traditionally from the senior
members of the bar (advocates as opposed to attorneys). Political considerations nonetheless play a huge role, and the security of tenure granted
the judges, who need not retire until age 70, and none of whom has ever
been impeached by Parliamentary request under the applicable procedure,8 3 yields only a tenuous form of independence. Under the new Constitution as under the old, judicial security can be repealed by ordinary
legislative process. Most judges support the Nationalist Party. The government can, moreover, afford to appoint more liberal judges because of
the jurisdiction-stripping measures and limited judicial review that have
governed since the 1950's. Judges politically opposed to the8 Nationalists
4
also tend in practice to get politically uncontroversial cases.
The Supreme Court of South Africa is made up of the Appellate Division, which is the highest court in the land, and seven provincial divisions ranging from three to twenty-nine judges.85 There are also magistrates courts, which deal with the vast majority of apartheid-related civil
cases, but especially with criminal cases. Magistrates are often civil servants without a legal education who also exercise administrative functions. The somewhat unrepresentative decisions of judges are the focus of
this article, however, because a right of appeal exists to the Supreme
Court, and the reported decisions of judges are much more reflective of
both the tougher social problems and the official attitudes of the legal
system than unreported magistrates' decisions.
For most judges in South Africa, then, the fact that they are part of
the system gives rise to no moral dilemma. The few judges who do feel a
moral dilemma in applying the unjust laws of apartheid arguably experience a feeling that should not have arisen, precisely because they are part
of the system and could not expect much real independence when they
were appointed. The fact that the judge accepted an obligation under
oath to apply the law and customs of South Africa compounds the sense
of obligation." The acceptance of such an obligation, however, does not
preclude the possibility that a person accepting a judicial appointment

82. REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CONST. Act 110 of 1983, § 10(1).
83. Id. at § 10(7).
84. E.g., Kentridge, Telling the Truth About Law, supra note 80 at 649, 653 .
85. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983, § 68.
86. The Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 § 10(2)(a) (Judge's oath "to administer justice
to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, and, as the circumstances of any particular case may require, in accordance with the law and customs of the Republic of South
Africa").
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has a genuine desire to do justice to all persons alike - also part of the
oath - in accordance with law. Although it is almost inconceivable that
anyone would submerge strong reformist desires enough to become the
sort of establishment figure considered for a judicial appointment, it is
conceivable that a judge who becomes part of the judicial system will see
more, perhaps be repulsed at some tasks, and grasp the need for confronting the problem of unjust law. Not all the judges who awaken to the
moral dilemma will have undergone a moral conversion, but such conversions may be prompted by increased awareness of government policy, or a
particularly heinous example of forceful repression, or a piece of legislation. Whether the moral dilemma arises gradually through increased sensitivity or suddenly through a reaction to a jurisdiction-stripping measure
or other specific law that drives home the sense of injustice, the judge will
seek ways to reconcile his perceived moral obligation with his judicial obligations to those who appointed him and those who seek justice in his
court. 87 The following Part discusses the dominant theories of law and
adjudication available in South Africa and elsewhere for that purpose.
II.

THEORIES OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION

Various theories of the nature of law have attempted to clarify the
relationship between law and morality and the implications of the particular theory of law for a theory of adjudication. Jurisprudence has only
tangentially raised the problem of judges in unjust societies in the course
of discussing how to handle hard cases, in which no clear law applies, as
opposed to easy cases, in which legal answers are readily available. This is
in part because legal theory concerns itself with the normal legal system,
in which most laws are considered essentially just. But in either category,
hard or easy cases, the dilemma of the moral judge may assert itself.
Neither of the traditional models of law and judicial obligation positivist and natural law - seems to enthusiastically embrace the reality
of the judicial function: the law-making, creative role that judges inevitably play. The ambivalence of both the positive and natural-law schools
about the law-making function of judges reflects an understandable fearof nonaccountable judges making law in free-wheeling fashion. But constraints such as precedent, legal theory, self-respect and popular tolerance
always exist in any society, and we have seen that in South Africa the
constraints are particularly severe. The South African government wants
to avoid "political" judicial review such as that in the United States. It is
almost absurd to speak of the central problem of judicial review (nonaccountable judges) when the society is characterized by drastically attenuated judicial review and a repressive sovereign Parliament totally unac-

87. The apparently sexist use of "his" in this and the following discussion is adopted
not only for facility of style but because there are no female judges in South Africa. The
society is almost as sexist as it is racist. What Paul Brest has said of American judges is
especially true of South African judges: they are "mostly white, male, professional, and relatively wealthy." Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REv. 765, 771 (1982).
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countable to the majority of the population.
The positivist model of law has come to be associated with a mechanistic view of the judicial process, as and even the natural-law model may
lead to a mechanistic notion of the judicial role as merely 'declaring' the
law (although the law so declared usually hovers rather mysteriously
above or deep within the fabric of positive law). On the other hand, many
positivists have recognized the role of judicial legislation in "hard cases,"
and the association of natural law with divine law, morality, or justice
leads to the conclusion that a judicial appeal to natural law is more creative than simple application of positive law.
A.

Positivism

The dominant legal theory in most of the world today, and especially
in South Africa, is positivism. 9 The foremost contemporary positivist is
H.L.A. Hart. 90 Hart has isolated three distinctive strands of positivism
originally set out by the utilitarians Bentham and Austin. First is the
insistence on the separation of law and morals. Second is the need for a
purely analytical study of legal concepts. Third is the imperative theory
of law as rules (Hart) or a command (Austin). 1
Human fallibility and the limited purview of law make it counterintuitive today to assume that there is a necessary connection between law
and justice. Hart first clarifies the misconception that the positivists endorse complacency about existing law. Positivists need not deny the relevance of morality to the development of the legal system and specific
laws, nor deny the impact of law in shaping moral attitudes. Bentham, for
example, was a zealous reformer.92 Clearer thought is promoted, Hart
says, by remembering Austin's formula that "[t]he existence of law is one
thing; its merit or demerit is another." ' He concludes that there is no
necessary moral minimum content that a rule of law must satisfy in order
to be a law, beyond certain "fundamental" rules required for there to be a
point in having other rules (for example, those against free violence, and
for minimum guarantees of property). 94 Hart believes with Bentham that
a law may be a bad law and thus raise a dilemma of personal obedience,
95
but it is still a law.

88. D. LLOYD,

THE IDEA OF LAW, 261-62 (1970).
89. South Africa has repeatedly been described as possessing an extremely positivistic
legal order. See, e.g., Final Rep't, supra note 78 at 125; DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note

11, at 378; Dugard, The Judicial Process, Positivism & Civil Liberty, 88 S. APR. L.J. 181
(1971); McWhinney, Race Relations and the Courts in the Union of South Africa, 32 CAN.
B. REv. 44, 45 (1954); Mathews, supra note 27, at 207.
90. See, Hart, supra note 2; H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPt OF LAW (1961). Another influential modern positivist is Dennis Lloyd, supra note 88.
91. Hart, supra note 2, at 601.
92. Id. at 595.
93. Id. at 596.
94. Id. at 623.
95. Id. at 620. Dennis Lloyd has noted that in anomolous situations where power super-
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The positivist theory of adjudication that follows from the idea of
law as rules distinct from morality would not be characterized by Hart as
a "mechanical" process of "finding" law.96 The judicial process is seen as
somewhat scientific research of the rules laid down by the legislature or
common law precedent. (The secular empirical metaphysics underlying
positivism come into play here.) Judges apply these rules even if harsh.
This ideal of "applying rules" is what has led to a vulgarization of positivism as mechanical. But because there can never be rules comprehensive
enough to cover every fact situation, judges inevitably engage in law-making. Judges fill in the gaps and interstitially "legislate" where there is no
clear rule or where the "open texture" inherent in vague and ambiguous
general language leaves room for discretionary interpretation. 97 Moral
conceptions of what law ought to be do play a part when the judge makes
choices in the penumbras of hard cases. The Legal Realists' insights that
courts often turn to their own values and predispositions are relevant and
accurate on this point.98 Those values, policies or predispositions, however, are not "law." Justice Holmes, a positivist who adhered to the law/
morality distinction99 and significantly influenced Realism, summarized
the position: "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar
00
to molecular motions.'
One problem with advising the moral judge in South Africa to seek
guidance in the positivist model is that the judges' motions are, at best,
molecular. Considering the special potency of positivism in a system of
strong parliamentary sovereignty, the motions might be practically confined to the sub-molecular realm. Judges in South Africa cling to the vulgar version of positivism that deprecates making law. Even if judges are
granted limited ability to effect interstitial relief, much of the vast legislative apparatus of apartheid is invulnerable from attack. And with South
Africa's form of parliamentary sovereignty, there are fewer gaps to be
closed and a greater risk that parliament will overturn an exercise of liberal discretion between gaps.
The nature and role of the discretion to be exercised by the judge in
hard cases is also important. Dugard, Mathews, Kentridge, and other liberal South African lawyers stress an expansive concept of strong discretion in which "the judicial function is essentially an exercise in choice."' 1

sedes law, the realities of power must be considered in determining legal validity. LLOYD,
supra note 88, at 182-3.
96. Hart explicitly rejects the mechanical view and agrees with Austin's characterization of this view as a "childish fiction." See supra note 2, at 609, n. 34, 610.
97. Id. at 608-615; see also HART, supra note 90. Dworkin describes the model in much
the same way. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 81-82.
98. Hart, supra note 2, at 605-608.
99. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
100. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1916)(dictum).
101. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 303; see also Mathews, supra note 27,
at 208.
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They do not deny the severe constraints that exist in the South African
context, but urge judges to interpret those constraints in light of liberal
legal principles, which oppose these constraints. This expansive power of
interpretation will enable the judge to see the spaces between the rules as
quite large indeed. To put it another way, one might imagine that this
group of liberal lawyers would, perhaps properly, see fewer cases governed
by "settled meaning" than most positivists, including Hart.
Another problem with positivism in South Africa is the problematic
quest for legislative intent. This quest is problematic because, as Realist
Max Radin noted, legislative intent is frequently elusive or non-exis0
tent.0'
Of course, the real problem with the quest for legislative intent in
South Africa is that the intent is likely to be malevolent. For this reason,
Dugard and others are understandably critical of the positivist approach,
which treats legislative intent as closer to the core sources of law than to
the penumbras. South African judges have indeed been (perhaps too) solicitous in the search for "true legislative intent," and have steadfastly
purported to "declare" the law illuminated by legislative intent. '10
Dugard calls for greater reliance on rules of interpretation "to moderate
the law's inequities," acceptance of "legal values" and "policy considerations" as well as positive legal rules and recognition and denial of concealed and inarticulate prejudices, such as the premise of loyalty to the
white status quo.'" Although he calls his new approach to law a "realistcum-value oriented approach"' 1 5 which is close to natural law and rejects
positivism, Dugard is trying to modify rather than eliminate the influential positivist model. The idea of the judge legislating between statutory
gaps is preserved. At the same time, Dugard urges greater creativity in
statutory interpretation by liberating the judge's discretion from legislative intent to more humanistic, value-oriented standards.
The flaw with even this version of positivism is that there is no
method of guaranteeing that the "legal values" or "policies" interpreted
by South African judges will advance human rights, particularly in light
of Dugard's recognition that background prejudices are difficult to eradicate, even once they are laid bare. Dugard presumes that there is a tradition of accepted liberal legal values at the heart of Roman-Dutch common
law,'10 but it is doubtful that consensus on such values runs high in South
Africa. Values such as "racial purity" and "separate development" would

102. Dugard, The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty, 88 S. AFR. L.J. 181,
183 (1971), citing Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871-2 (1930).
103. See, e.g., Remarks of Chief Justice Ogilvie Thompson, Centenary Celebrations of
the Northern Cape Division, 89 S. APR. L.J. 30, 33 (1972) (a judge is bound by legislative
intent, and must "administer the law, not as he perhaps would like it to be, or as he might
consider it ought to be, but as set out in the relevant statutory provisions as interpreted.").
See also the judicial invocations of positivism in R. v. Koenig, 1917 C.P.D. 225, 242; Byers v.
Chinn, 1928 A.D. 433, 329; R. v. Christian, 1924 A.D. 101, 124.
104. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 366-388.
105. Id. at 400.
106. See supra note 11.
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probably have more persuasive force. Hence, if it is a "fiction" for judges
to seek to discover legislative intent, it is also a fiction for them to ignore
a clearly evil legislative intent and an overwhelmingly repressive statutory
context.
Nevertheless, Dugard has brilliantly sketched the inadequacies of the
positivist model. In answer to Hart's question about whether the practical
consequences of stressing the distinction between law and morality have
been bad,10 7 Dugard resoundingly answers "yes!" The formulaic distinction has made it easier for the South African government to manipulate
the concept of law for unjust ends, and to enlist the support of judges in
perpetuating injustice. Judges are able to evade responsibility for the laws
they apply by deferring to Parliament and precedent and avoiding the
moral dilemma implicit in such activity. The situation in Dugard's eyes is
not unlike that in Nazi Germany, where Hitler exploited the distinction
so as to completely debase the German legal system.'
Hart might answer that, in theory, there is no reason why a judge might not take some
sort of moral action in response to his moral predicament, such as refusing to apply the unjust law, or resigning. But the objection still stands
that the practical consequences of the distinction have been bad.
B.

Natural Law

Natural law theory is the most potent historical alternative to positivism, because it manifests our constant striving for objective and universal values natural to all men. Natural law is a popular vessel for our
aspirations because it is such a flexible concept. From early on, the Greek
notion of natural law exploited the ambiguity of the term "nature." Nature could at once refer to the natural order decreed by divine law, and to
the natural capabilities of man to live a virtuous and just life. Aristotle's
conception of natural law ambiguously involved both the idea of natural
rules universally binding men (though unequally, since some men he considered natural slaves), and the idea of man as a naturally social being
who could fulfill his potential in society. Cicero and the Stoics further
developed the dichotomy so that man could live a just life by ascertaining
the universal laws of nature through reason. In the Middle Ages, the
scholastics stressed the transcendent version of natural law, only to be
followed by humanist concepts of virtue in the Renaissance. Locke's version of natural rights strongly influenced the leaders of the American
Revolution. After being submerged by positivism in the nineteenth century, natural law experienced a revival after World War II as the world
sought standards by which to condemn the brutal and widespread fascist
violations of human rights. Although the legal philosophy of Ronald
Dworkin may be distinguished from the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition
of natural law, it is his continuity with this tradition that makes him the

107. Hart, supra note 2, at 595.
108. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 395.
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chief representative of this school today.
Dworkin's theories of law and adjudication emphasize the essential
link between law and moral principles. Yet, despite stressing the relationship between law and morality, Dworkin would disagree with the strong
or subtractive tradition of Catholic "higher" natural law, which holds that
"an unjust law is no law at all." He recognizes that law has moral dimension, because sometimes
the answer to the question of what the law is may depend on (though
it is never identical with) the question of what background morality
requires . . .This is so not only in cases in which some legislative
source deliberately embeds moral tests in legal rules, but also in cases
where it is controversial what the law requires because no legislative
source has said anything decisive at all. It is so not only when legal
principles embodying moral concepts are concededly decisive of legal
arguments, but also when the question in play is just the question of
what principles are to be taken as decisive. 10 9
Dworkin thus accepts the role of "moral reasoning" in adjudication, but
rejects the "absurd view"11 0 that an immoral or unjust law is not a law,
because laws exist that are "in fact unjust."1'11
Dworkin's natural justice theory of adjudication differs drastically
from the positivist model of rules sketched by Hart. Emphasizing the protection of individual rights, Dworkin identifies the distinctive materials of
judicial reasoning - moral principles - with rights. Principles are defined early on as standards observed because they are requirements of
"justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.' 1 12 Later the
focus is narrowed to arguments of principle, which "justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some group
right." 13 Adjudication, which deals with principles, is distinguished from
legislation, which is characteristically about policies (instrumental goals).
Dworkin's "rights thesis" is that judicial decisions are and should be governed by principle, not policy, even in "hard cases.""' Additionally,
Dworkin attempts to satisfy the yearning for objectivity by providing that
"right answers" exist even in hard cases, although right answers cannot
be proved and may be controversial."'
This view of the nature and role of judicial discretion differs from
that of traditional positivists and the liberal South African supporters of
strong discretion.6 Dworkin believes that judges have no discretion in any
"strong" sense." Rather than an exercise of free choice, the interpreta-

109. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 342.
110. Id. at 341.

111. See, e.g., id. at 122-3.
112. Id. at 22.
113. Id. at 82.
114. Id. at 84.
115. Id. at 81.
116. Id. at 31-39, 68-71.
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tive function is viewed as bounded by objective legal texts. Background
considerations from the judge's life will inevitably play some role, but
they have no independent force and should be resisted. What results is
thus not a "choice" between competing texts and principles, but "judgment" leading to a decision required by law. In short, Dworkin ties adjudication to the judges' job of seeking justice, and law is expanded (and
may "discover" just law and not
elevated above politics) so that judges
17
legislate, like the positivists' judges.'
In many ways, Dworkin's model sounds ideal for South Africa. The
thrust of positivism is order, whereas the thrust of natural law is toward
justice. Natural law was once strong in the country's jurisprudence. The
Dutch scholar Voet said that laws "must be just and reasonable." Grotius,
of course, was also in the natural law tradition. But positivism replaced
natural law in nineteenth-century South Africa. 1 ' Dworkin's model
avoids the tendency of positivism to subordinate the judge to the legislature even when the judge is making law, as if he were a deputy legislator
who enacts law that the legislature "would enact" if confronting the problem. Where political power is denied to blacks, an envelope of protection
provided by just law declared by judges sounds attractive. The fact that
judges are seen as having no strong discretion - they only "discover"
rather than "make" law - would make liberal decisions more politically
palatable in a country like South Africa. One of Dworkin's normative
goals seems to be enhancement of judicial power; that is important in a
system where blacks have access to power only in the courts. And the
injection of justice and morality into the distinctive activist judicial role
contemplated by Dworkin could not fail to help blacks gain their individual and group rights. Or could it?
When the model is applied to South Africa, several worrisome
problems arise. The first is that Dworkin assumes a liberal democratic
system with a majoritarian representative legislature and shared egalitarian values, an assumption woefully inapposite for South Africa. The fear
of unconstrained anti-democratic discretion that prompts Dworkin seems
at best irrelevant and at worst defeatist in South Africa. In his Introduction to Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin sets out to "define and defend
a liberal theory of law."" 9 Most of his theory is descriptive, but the normative aspects conservatively seek a "political justification" for the "present structure."' 2 0 Dworkin's focus is presumably on the Anglo-American
tradition, but especially on the United States with its Constitution and
powerful Supreme Court. He certainly would not try to justify an authoritarian and anti-egalitarian political structure like that of South Africa,
which denies political rights to the majority of its people.

117. Id. at 82.

118. See DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 393; H. HAHLO & E. KAHN, SOUTH
AFRICA: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION 205-06 (1960).
119. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at vii.
120. Id. at 123.
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The distortions following from this initial assumption are clearly evident at the adjudicative level, where Dworkin assumes that judgments
about political rights merely reflect "political decisions of the past.""'
The sources of rights (and, thus, of "principles") are identified variously
as institutional history such as cases and statutes, as well as personal and
community morality.'" Judges are therefore bound to be affected by unjust precedent by the overriding requirement of consistency. Yet Dworkin
is ambivalent about morality. It sometimes seems to be akin to positive
morality (the specific customs and mores of a given community), and at
other times to critical morality (by which community morality is judged
and criticized). For example, "background" rights are defined as those
that provide a justification for political decisions of "society in the abstract. 1 2 3 But with society left undefined in size, this could be either the
positive morality of white South Africa or the critical morality of world
society. Confusion is compounded, but then dispelled, when Dworkin illustrates the ideal judicial process in hard cases by having his superhuman "Hercules" appeal to the "community's moral traditions," or "popular morality.' 2 4 These formulations indicate that Dworkin is referring to
positive community morality. Of course, the fact that the white community has a monopoly over legal and political power means that it will
probably be defined as the relevant "community." And appeal to white
community morality in South Africa is far more likely to restrict blacks'
rights than protect or expand those rights.
General difficulties with Dworkin's judicial principle/legislative policy
dichotomy are also exaggerated in the South African context. His position
that judges do not deal with policy arguments forces him into a strained
account that allows the substitution of principle for policy arguments.' 5
Particularly in the extreme situation of South Africa, arguments of principle about the rights of the white minority or the black majority tend to
blur with arguments of policy that segregation reduces social tension or
increases long-term social unrest. Apartheid, or separate development, is
usually seen as a collective community goal and thus as a policy, although
the black community would not share this goal. South African judges who
invoke apartheid policy must presumably be understood to refer to the
competing rights of the white minority. Dworkin's theory is unconcerned
with this, because the principled argument - here, the competing right
of the white minority - will not always be as strong when balanced
against other rights as the policy argument here, apartheid. In the extreme circumstances of South Africa, however, the competing rights of

121. Id. at 87.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 93.
124. Id. at 123-4.
125. "If a judge appeals to public safety or the scarcity of some vital resource, for example, as a ground for limiting some abstract right, then his appeal might be understood as an
appeal to the competing rights of those whose security will be sacrificed, or whose just share
of that resource will be threatened if the abstract right is made concrete." Id. at 100.
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the white minority are overwhelmingly strong both in legal theory and in
power politics. Dworkin's answer to the substitution problem is thus not
responsive to the specific problems presented by a system like South Africa's, or to the general problems of how to phrase, set the level of generalization, or weigh competing rights or principles. As apartheid is seen by
many South Africans as part of the moral or religious order, it is hard to
say that racial discrimination is not a moral principle. 2 6
A final aspect of Dworkin's theory that would bode ill for South African blacks is his approach to statutory interpretation. As we have seen,
many positivists view narrow legislative "intent" as close to the core concept of law, but follow Hart in tending to exclude "purposes" attributed
to statutory rules from "law. 1 2 7 Dworkin, on the other hand, tends to
view the "purposes" of rules as law. 2 ' The same tendency on the part of
many South African judges is criticized perceptively by Dugard as posing
a threat to recognition of rights for blacks.
C.

Positivism v. Natural Law on the Dilemma of the Moral Judge

Neither the positivist nor the natural-law model provides clear guidance for the moral judge in an immoral system. But each suggests a tentative approach. Recall that the positivist distinction between law and morality suggests that existing laws may be unjust, but are still law. It is
after one notes that law exists and is unjust that the moral dilemma of
personal obedience arises."' The task of the judge is complicated by the
addition of judicial obligation to legal and moral obligations. Positivism
thus may result in a judge's either applying the law because it is his obligation to do so, or not applying the law because personal moral obligation
defeats judicial obligation and prohibits obeying or applying an unjust
law. Hart merely wants to make certain that the problem is not concealed
in an illusion that laws always accord with morality.
Yet this apparently prudential focus on confronting the moral dilemma - without discussion of judicial obligation - may, in effect, foreclose alternatives between the extremes of applying or not applying the
law. Evading the issue by avoiding it, for example, is opposed to confronting the moral dilemma. Significantly, Hart's attack on the doctrine
that unjust laws are not laws begins only after noting that the "doctrine
meant that every lawyer and judge should denounce statutes that trans-

126. Dworkin admits that there "is no persuasive analysis . . .that insures that the
principle that blacks are less worthy than whites can be rejected as not a principle at all."
Id., at 343. Dworkin's original definition of principles, which requires that they be requirements of "morality" leaves ambiguous the distinction between what is good and what is
accepted as good. See id. at 83.
127. Hart, supra note 2, at 614-15.
128. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 105-108.
129. "Surely the truly liberal answer to any sinister use of the slogan 'law is law' or of
the distinction between law and morals is, 'Very well, but that does not conclude the question. Law is not morality. Do not let it supplant morality.'" Hart, supra note 2, at 618.
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gressed the fundamental principles not as merely immoral or wrong but
as having no legal character." Whether or not the option of in-court or
out-of-court protest on other grounds remains open, Hart clearly disfavors such methods even as rhetorical tools. Similarly, one would think
that lying about the law would be condemned for not confronting the
moral issue, for evading the imperative aspect of legal positivism, and for
distorting the analytical rigor of the law's vocabulary.
Moreover, the practical consequences of the positivist's distinction
between law and morality may lead to concealment rather than to exposure of the moral dilemma, because judges, especially in easy cases, can
take refuge in the concept of "merely applying the law." Whether or not
positivism is the chief factor in debasement of legal systems like that of
Nazi Germany or South Africa, it seems fair to say that it is at least a
significant factor. '30 If judges are able to use positivism to evade responsibility in easy cases, think how much more tempting it will be to do so in
hard cases, despite the theoretical existence of strong law-making
discretion.
The natural law approach to the problem of the judge in the wicked
legal system remains undeveloped, and points in contradictory directions.
On one hand, some natural law theorists suggest that an unjust law is no
law at all. On the other hand, theorists such as Dworkin would incorporate community moral principles as part of law. The consequent emphasis
on the judge's political responsibility, lack of discretion, the duty to be
consistent, and the "right answer" thesis pushes the judge in the direction of applying unjust law, even if it is in fact unjust or inconsistent with
the judge's personal moral views.' Judges cannot decide hard cases using background rights, but are limited to institutional rights. "Institutional autonomy insulates an official's institutional duty from the greater
part of background political morality."" 2 Although the judge's own moral
convictions and beliefs will inevitably enter into his decision to a degree,' 3 the judge is not free to give them independent force in his judgement. For example, if two coherent justifications can be given for earlier
Supreme Court decisions enforcing the due process clause, with one containing an extremely liberal principle that cannot be reconciled with the
criminal law of most states, and the other containing no such principle,
"Hercules cannot seize upon the former justification as license for deciding the abortion cases in favor of abortion, even if he is himself an extreme liberal."'3 4
Two other elements of Dworkin's theory may loosen this rigid con-

130. As several writers would imply. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law, supra
DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 374; R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COVER].
131. DwORKIN, supra note 6, at 87-89.
132. Id. at 101.
133. Id. at 123-124.
134. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).

note 2, at 657;
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ception of judicial duty. The first is the largely semantic distinction made
between the "choice" or "discretion" recognized by the positivists and the
"judgment" stressed by Dworkin. While denying that judges have discretion, Dworkin may let choices or discretion in through the back door by
recognizing that interpretation and judgment are required in determining
what the relevant moral principles are. As Dworkin's famous example of
Tal's smile in the chess game between the Russian grandmaster and
Fischer illustrates, the referee (like the judge) must interpret contested
conceptions such as "the character of the game" (or the character of the
legal system). 35 Despite Dworkin's protestations, this function could provide a loophole for judicial originality.
Dworkin never adopts the extreme natural law position that unjust
law may not be applied because it is not "law." But a second element of
Dworkin's theory that may increase the flexibility of the moral judge in
an immoral system links Dworkin to more traditional natural law
thought: the passion for justice, for infusing law with a moral dimension.
This passion is what drives Dworkin to defend the present American liberal structure as essentially just. His initial approach thus tended to bind
the judge to apply these essentially just legal principles, certainly in easy
cases, but also in hard cases. Little treatment is given to the problem of
his "fairness" requirement of judicial consistency yielding unfair results:
the primary answer Dworkin gives is that only the community's conception of fairness may override the argument for consistency so as to result
in disposing of unjust precedent, for example, as a "mistake.""13 Yet even
in easy cases, legal rights may conflict with background moral rights. And
in hard cases, background moral rights of the particular community may
not be very "moral" (in a critical sense).
In his Reply to Critics, Dworkin's response is close to the positivists'
distinction between legal and judicial duty as opposed to moral duty.1"'
He reiterates his idea that certain allegedly "moral" principles must meet
a threshold adequacy of "fit" with institutional history before they can
count as a justification, and amongst those principles . . . the morally
soundest must be preferred." ' Morality here is clearly used in a new
way, as a critical morality external to the wicked system. Dworkin continues: "it may be that no principle we would find acceptable on grounds of
morality could pass the threshold test," in which case "the general theory
must endorse some unattractive principle as providing the best justification of institutional history, presenting the judge with a legal decision and
also, perhaps, a moral problem."13 9 This is the situation in South Africa,

135. Id. at 102-3.
136. Id. at 122-23.
137. See id. at 327 ("We might want to describe the moral conflict a judge faces in such
a case by distinguishing his 'legal' duty which is to find for legal rights, from his 'moral' or
'overall' or 'final' duty, which may require him to ignore legal rights.")
138. Id., at 342.
139. Id.
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where liberal principles would not provide an adequate fit because of the
high number of decisions that would have to be thrown out as mistakes.
The key issue then would be "whether the principle is so unjust that it
would be wrong for the judge to enforce any legal right it supplies, and
right to him to lie in order to avoid doing so. '' 4" Dworkin concludes that
"it may be that he must lie, because he cannot be of any help unless he is
understood as saying, in his official role, that the legal rights are different
from what he believes they are."'" The alternatives of resigning or protesting on moral grounds are discounted as probably ineffective.
It is interesting that Dworkin chose to endorse the judicial lie as an
alternative, because it seems so inconsistent with his right-answer thesis,
which carries normative "gravity" calling for its application because it is
"right", and with his ideal of judicial consistency, which he has come to
call "integrity" in later works. Perhaps the solution is not surprising,
however, in light of Dworkin's constant identification of legal rhetoric
with reality. The right-answer thesis is defended as reflecting the way in
which lawyers and judges talk, and the moral judge's "lie" can similarly
be defended on normative grounds as encouraging "the beneficial and
unifying assumption that justice is always relevant."' 4 2 With Hart, however, Dworkin agrees that it would be misleading and3 therefore "unwise
to make this lie a matter of jurisprudential theory.'
Both the positivist and the natural-law models give ambivalent guidance to the moral judge in a wicked system. Sophisticated positivists want
to expose the moral problem, which leaves open the possibility that the
judge will choose to follow moral duty rather than legal duty. Positivism
also tends to emphasize legal duty, and the rules binding judges to apply
the law are positive legal as well as moral rules. Natural law similarly
contains contradictory elements. Competing interpretations of natural
law may result in the application of immorality as morality in the wicked
legal system, and this fact compels even sophisticated natural-law scholars to lean toward the idea that judges may not apply unjust law, or must
lie in order to avoid doing so. The following section examines the actual
response of two wicked legal systems to the dilemma of the moral judge.

III.
A.

THE DILEMMA OF THE MORAL JUDGE

The American Experience

The dilemma of the antislavery judge in America under slavery
presented many of the same problems faced by South African judges today. Laws treating slaves as property, and a Constitution that in part
sanctioned slavery confronted judges with a system of unjust laws on a
daily basis. The passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 created new
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opportunities to question the constitutionality of slavery and align the
law with growing antislavery sentiment, but these opportunities were for
the most part missed. Much scholarship has treated the issue of how confirmed antislavery judges like Joseph Story, Lemuel Shaw, and John McLean adhered to their roles as judges and applied slavery laws, but none
has been as lucid, comprehensive, and thoughtful as that of Professor
Robert Cover in Justice Accused.""'
Cover begins by sketching the background traditions of natural law
and positivism in eighteenth-century America. The sources of the natural-law tradition were many (ranging from the Bible and philosophy to
Grotius and Somerset's Case),'45 and some of the sources justified slavery
as natural. But most of the more recent and authoritative natural-law
sources (including Somerset's Case, which confirmed Blackstone's natural-law condemnation of slavery)"" supplied a framework for arguments
attacking slavery laws. The natural-rights rhetoric of the American
revolution strengthened the arguments. Natural law persisted in conflictof-laws, international law, and state constitutional contexts. Yet, at the
time the nation was founded, constitutional positivism, which included
natural law phrases within a written constitution, asserted itself. What
Cover calls a "pattern of moral-formal conflict" thus emerged, and influ47
enced the judiciary.1
The first instance of judicial construction Cover examines involves
cases falling under the natural-law "free and equal" clauses of positive
law state constitutions. South Africa, of course, has no such documents.
These were adopted as part of the "first emancipation" of slaves in the
northern states in the years following the Revolution. In Vermont, on the
one hand, construction was easy, because the 1777 constitution specifically called for the prohibition of slavery. 48 In Virginia, on the other
hand, no one thought that the clause adopted in 1776 freed the state's
dominant labor system: its quarter-million slaves. Judicial construction
depended on the extra-judicial climate, including the presence of antislavery pressure groups, and prior trends toward freedom. What is interesting is that often the most forthright opponents of slavery, like St.
George Tucker of Virginia, could write opinions sanctioning slavery. A
prominent opponent of slavery, and Tucker's teacher and predecessor at
William and Mary, George Wythe had written the opinion of the Richmond District Court of Chancery in Hudgins v. Wright 140 holding that
an Indian family that showed no negroid features was presumptively free
on the basis of appearance and the free and equal clause. Tucker felt
obligated to affirm the case merely on the racial ground with explicit dis-
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approval of Wythe's expansive presumption of freedom. Tucker's opinion
must have been painful to write, because Wythe had just been murdered
for providing that Michael Brown, a former slave protege, be named beneficiary of Wythe's estate.
Other judges at later times, in states where abolitionist rhetoric was
fiery and slavery was no longer a fact of life, were nonetheless constrained
by a "thoroughgoing judicial positivism."'"5 Instead of capitalizing on the
opportunity presented by the antislavery climate, Judges Randolph and
Nevius of the New Jersey Supreme Court relegated the free and equal
clause to a mere abstract, legally inoperative "preamble." Their chief justification was that an existing gradual scheme of emancipation rendered
the clause moot. 151 Thus they refused to free slaves petitioning their court
in the Post and Van Buren cases' 52 in the absence of a clearly expressed
legislative intent to do so. Cover attributes the harsh tone and intolerant
approach of Randolph and Nevius to their reaction to the demands made
on them by the opportunity presented for emancipation through judicial
law-making, the merely imitative aspects of New Jersey's adoption of the
clause in 1844, the perceived need to downgrade the constitutional utopian rhetoric of the ideological antislavery advocate in the case, and the
perception that the gap between law and morality was closing on its own
53
accord.1
The second instance of judicial construction that Cover examines involves statutory interpretation of emancipation and private manumission
acts. Not surprisingly, the same positivism nd role fidelity he discovered
in the context of broad and vague state constitutional language is also
present in interpretation of the narrow language of such statutes. Statutory interpretation in favorem libertatis was a possible approach in
America under slavery, as it is in present-day South Africa. A statutory
presumption in favor of liberty can be applied in any of several ways:
(1) always; (2) only if the statute itself is held to have a liberal purpose; (3) only if competing counterlibertarian interests do not outweigh
the liberal purpose; (4) only in areas of doubt not covered by express statutory language; or (5) never.
The presumption in favorem libertatis was not always applied in the
United States under slavery, but it was applied occasionally. Judge William Tilghman of Pennsylvania applied it in the second way mentioned
above: only when the statute itself had a liberal purpose. In Miller v.
Dwilling 154 Tilghman noted the silence of the Pennsylvania Emancipation Act of 1780 on the issue of whether a child born to a servant inden-

150. COVER, supra note 130, at 60.
151. Id. at 58. Compare the arguments of some South Afircan judges that the government's program of gradual reform renders liberal interpretations unnecessary.
152. State v. Post, State v. Van Buren, 20 N.J.L. 368 (1845), cited in COVER, at 55.
153. COVER, supra note 130, at 59-61.
154. 14 Serg. & Rawle 442, 443 (Pa. 1826), cited in COVER supra note 130, at 66.
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tured for a term of years (as opposed to a slave for life) would be free.
Finding no "clear expression" to this effect in the statute, Tilghman
found such bondage too "contrary to the general spirit of the act."' 55
Such a tepid application of a presumption in favor of liberty is related to
the third approach mentioned above, for even if a statute has liberal purpose, it may be seen to balance competing counterlibertarian interests,
such as property or security. The judge may rationalize that it is "unfair"
to favor either side in the balance. In any event, Cover notes that the
presumption in favor of liberty was never applied as a presumption that
operated of its own force, without regard to legislative intent.'5 6
By far the most common approach to statutory interpretation, and
one for which South African judges have been rightly criticized, is a positivistic inquiry into what the law is. As the civil war grew closer, Virginia
courts interpreted a private manumission statute in this way, so as not to
grant freedom to the child born to the manumitted slave. In Maria v.

Surbaugh 157 and Gregory v. Baugh

158

the interpretative process was de-

scribed as a simple positivistic task of ascertaining and applying the law.
Because it is the legislature's task to resolve moral and political issues
prior to judicial treatment, previous cases applying the presumption in
favor of liberty were said to have relaxed the rules of law "too much." 59
Cover summarizes the sporadic use of libertarian presumptions:
Because formal principles do not decide all cases, because there remained areas of doubt as to what the legislature intended, how to
characterize the broader spirit of legislation, or which of the uses of
context were more significant, there remained a fair ground for difference of opinion between men of equally good faith but unequal libertarian convictions. 60
The final cases Cover stresses arose under the fugitive slave clause of
the Constitution, and after 1850, the Fugitive Slave Act. The American
experience under the fugitive slave clause is now well known. Positivism
bound the Supreme Court and even confirmed opponents of slavery like
Justice Story and Judge Lemuel Shaw. Deferring to the importance of the
constitutional compromise, the judges almost uniformly felt duty-bound
to adhere to the clause and not to consider natural law.' 6' From 1850
until the outbreak of the Civil War, new constitutional issues regarding
the Fugitive Slave Act were raised and resolved. The statutory structure
established arguably violated due process by excluding the fugitive's testimony and providing pecuniary incentives for the commission's resolution
of cases against the fugitives. Yet Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachu-
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setts Supreme Court held the act free from constitutional doubt in Sims
Case. 6 2 The West soon followed suit when Justice John McLean of Ohio
6
also upheld the constitutionality of the Act.6'
Finally, the Supreme Court
of the United States, in Abelman v. Booth, dealt "the last and greatest
blow of the Taney court against antislavery."164 The Supreme Court denied states the habeas corpus power to reach the restraint of one held
pursuant to federal process. The constitutionality of the 1850 Act was
also, incidentally, upheld.
Applying cognitive dissonance theory to the decisions of the United
States under slavery, Cover isolates several typical judicial responses: (1)
elevating the stakes of formal adherence to law, (2) emphasizing a mechanistic view of the obligation to apply law and only "law," and (3) ascrib165
ing responsibility for the decision to other groups like the legislature.
One might expect these characteristic responses from a moral judge in
any immoral legal system. As we shall see in the next section, they show
up in twentieth-century South Africa as well.
B.

The South African Experience

The most thoughtful examination of the judicial process in South Africa is that of John Dugard. In Human Rights and the South African
Legal Order 16 he discusses the judicial techniques used in some of the
more famous cases. As in the United States, liberal judges are easier to
identify than liberal decisions. Like Cover, Dugard concludes that positivism contributed to abdication of judicial duty to protect human rights.
Some early decisions, however, showed that judges were trying to err
on the side of human rights. In 1882, Judge Kotze decided In re
Marechane 167 in which he held that all persons are regarded as equals
under common law in the absence of an express statute to the contrary.
This is equivalent to applying a presumption in favor of liberty, like that
discussed by Cover. Marechane is Dugard's Brown, because its abstract
rhetoric suggests that there are liberal principles inherent in the hybrid
common law of South Africa. Unfortunately, other pre-Nationalist decisions of South Africa after the Union of 1910 gave the imprimatur of
judges to racial segregation of the sort condemned in Brown. In the infamous case of Moller v. Kemioes School Committee, "0 a Cape statute
that did not require school segregation was applied to the action of the
Kemioes School Committee requiring such segregation. Sir James Rose

162. 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 285 (1851), cited in COVER, supra note 130, at 175-78.
163. Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F.Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Ohio, 1853) (No. 9, 583), cited in COVR
supra note 130, at 183.
164. CoVER, supra note 130, at 187, citing Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506
(1859).
165. COVER, supra note 130, at 229-238.
166. See note 11, supra.
167. 1 S.A.R. 27, 31 (1882).
168. 1911 A.D. 635.
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Innes of the Cape Provincial Division read the statute restrictively and
would not assume discriminatory legislative intent in the absence of a
clear expression to the contrary. Some of the most distinguished judges of
South Africa, including Chief Justice De Villiers and Justice Koetze of
the Appellate Division, reversed. Some of the justices suggested that perhaps the separate facilities were unequal; others suggested that the inequality did not matter. The thrust of the decision was that the probable
intent of the legislators - who, being from Holland, regarded natives as
inferior - and the political morality of the community made it difficult
to ignore the malevolent legislative intent, even if the court could not
"from a philosophical or humanitarian view be able to approve of this
' 169
prevalent sentiment.
The same approach of recognizing or reading discriminatory legisla17 0
tive intent into a neutral statute guided the majority in R. v. Padsha.
There, a three-judge majority, over two dissenters including Sir James
Rose Innes, reversed a lower court holding that an immigration statute
authorizing exclusion on economic grounds could not be used as a blanket
racial prohibition against all Asians.
Nevertheless, a relatively liberal undercurrent of decisions persisted
until 1934. In Dadoo Ltd. and Others v. Krugersdorp Municipal Council
171 a statute denying Asians the right to hold property was
strictly construed to allow their non-Asian corporation to do so. R. v. Dedtody 172
involved the very strict construction of a statute providing that "any native" without a pass was guilty of a crime. In an opinion very sensitive to
liberty, the court looked at the history of the Transvaal and determined
that the harm the legislation was aimed at was male violation of the pass
laws. The court refused to "extend" the pass laws to African women.
Other pre-1934 decisions involving "neutral" statutes that did not authorize discrimination tended more toward Brown than toward Plessy v. Fer17 4
guson.1 7 3 In R v. Plaatjies,
for example, the court held that a city could
not set aside an "exclusively white" section of a stream for swimming.
Similarly, Williams & Adendorff v. Johannesburg Municipality 175 defeated a municipal attempt to provide separate trams for "coloreds."
In 1934, the basic legal structure changed when South Africa decided
its Plessy: Minister of Posts & Telegraphs v.Rasool. 176 The statute at
issue in Rasool was silent on the existence or validity of racially segregated post-office counters. In a three-to-one decision of the Appellate Division, a majority held not only that "separate but equal" regulatory dis-
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crimination is legally "reasonable," but that separate post offices
accorded with the history of the Transvaal, "accepted principles and
good sense.' 17 Dugard is quick to point out that the court in Rasool was
actually making law, rather than merely declaring and applying it, 17 because the court overruled prior precedent (e.g. Williams & AdendorfJ)
and the trend of the law toward at least formal equality. The case went
even further than Moller in that it sanctioned racial segregation as reasonable and respectable.
Even after the Nationalists came to office in 1948 and "separate but
equal" doctrine was clearly established in South Africa through Rasool,
some courts struck down regulations where substantially unequal facilities were provided. "Mere technical inequality," however, was insufficient
grounds to do so. In R. v. Abdurahman,17' and R. v. Lusu,180 situations in
which no first class railway coaches were reserved for non- Europeans, or
were reserved but not substantially equal, were struck down by the Appellate Division. Unfortunately, these decisions resulted in legislative codification of the separate but unequal doctrine in the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act."8 ' The fact that judges remained on the bench who
were unsympathetic with the early "white domination" form of apartheid
precipitated not only this legislative rebuke, but the constitutional crisis
of the 1950's described above. 8 ' Unlike the situation in the United
States, therefore, where Congress took over the enlightened libertarian
role played by the Supreme Court, the South African legislature took a
reactionary and regressive approach.
With the success of its court-packing plan, the government joined in
the paeans of praise about judicial independence as a spate of executiveminded race and security decisions was handed down. In the field of race
relations, a number of decisions failed to apply Abdurahman, even
though no statute directly addressed the factual situation at issue. Mustapha and Another v. Receiver of Revenue, Lichtenburg, and Others 188
involved the termination of Indians' trading permits on racial grounds.
The court upheld the termination, although the statute did not expressly
authorize unequal administrative treatment. A black lawyer held in contempt for refusing to sit at a separate courtroom table got no relief in R.
v. Pitje,1 " although courtroom tables were not reserved for whites only
under the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act or any other authority.
In Minister of Interior v. Lockhat and Others,'" the removal of a group

177. Id., at 175-177.
178. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 314.
179. 1950 (3) S.A. 136 (A.D.).
180. 1953 (2) S.A. 484 (A.D.). See also, 1943 C.P.D. 242, 251 (test is manifestly oppressive or unjust "equality").
181. Act 49 of 1953; see, n. 18, supra.
182. See notes 57-64 and accompanying text supra.
183. 1958 (3) S.A. 343 (A.D.).
184. 1960 (4) S.A. 709 (A.D.).
185. 1961 (2) S.A. 587, 602 (A.D.).
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of Durban Indians under the authority of the Group Areas Act was challenged. Though the Group Areas Act did not authorize the unequal treatment that resulted, the court held that Parliament "envisioned" such unequal treatment, and it was not for the court to decide whether such
treatment was ultimately for the state's good. A similar trilogy of 1960's
cases in the security area illustrates the refusal of South African courts to
carefully scrutinize challenges to the ideal of individual liberty. In Loza v.
Police Station Commander, Durvanville'86 the court could have strictly
construed the new security laws to limit police powers. But instead the
Appellate Division held that a detainee can be re-arrested and detained
again after the expiration of the 190-day period provided for by statute.
In Schermbrucker v. Klindt, N.O., 1 87 the wife of a detainee got news of
the inhumane torture her husband was experiencing. She urgently applied for an injunction to stop the police brutality. The police denied the
charges. The court read the purposes of the detention statute broadly,
refused to apply a presumption that the legislature does not intend to
interfere with the judiciary and held, over two strong dissents, that it had
no power to allow a detainee's testimony (i.e., a detainee had no power to
testify) in an application to prevent wrongful interrogation. Finally, one
of the most widely criticized South African opinions, Rossouw v. Sachs, 88
found an intent on the part of the legislature to deny reading and writing
matter to detainees, although the security statute involved did not expressly remove such rights.
Dugard rightly concludes that the response of the South African judiciary to race and security cases such as those sketched above has been
inadequate, and (with Cover) he places significant blame on the vulgar
positivism that declares the law "as is" and takes the search for "true"
legislative intent as a definitive guide. "This enables judges," Dugard
writes, "to apply the harshest of laws obediently with an easy conscience
and may result in a failure to realize the extent to which technical rules of
interpretation may be involved to moderate the laws' inequities.' ' 89
Cover's other two observations are also relevant to the many South African decisions discussed here: the stakes of formal adherence to the law
were elevated, which is not too difficult to do in volatile South Africa, and
responsibility for the decision was usually ascribed elsewhere, to the legislature. Dugard is correct about the importance of the search for intent in
these and more recent cases, but he may be somewhat artificial or unrealistic in playing down the fact that an "evil" intent in many apartheid
laws is often discernible, and in assuming that most South African judges
would want to invoke rules of interpretation to moderate the laws' inequities.. While Cover focused only on the antislavery judge, Dugard looked at
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189. DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 374.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 15:1

all judges ("moral" and "immoral"). Dugard's study shows us that subjective values do play a greater role in immoral systems than we might
think. Some judges - at least until the court packing plan of the 50's
succeeded - were able to ameliorate the evils of apartheid somewhat.
Since Dugard wrote Human Rights and the South African Legal Order, several cases continue to exhibit the flaws of excessive deference to
the legislature and executive to which he refers.190 Other cases continue
the minority position of ameliorist sensitivity to liberty wherever possible. 191 The decisions and out-of-court statements of Judges Didcott,
Shearer,"s Milne,' and Corbett 94 are particularly noteworthy in this regard. All in all, the room for creative statutory interpretation is limited in
South Africa because of malevolent legislative intent. Before the
problems of such malevolent intent can be remedied, they must be fully
recognized. Recognizing the harsh realities underlying South Africa's repressive laws should not be an impediment to change; it should be the
first step to change.
IV.

WHAT'S

A

JUDGE

To Do?

Judges in South Africa are unquestionably part of the system. On
one level, everyone within a system of unjust laws is tainted. This may be
especially true of judges, for one may safely assume that they would not
be judges if they saw the whole system as utterly unjust. But such a blanket condemnation is useful only as abstract rhetoric. On a more realistic

190. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Minister of Prisons, 1979 (1) S.A. 14 (A) (no enforceable
legal right of prisoners to read news; courts cannot question commissioner's decisions); S. v.
Adams, S. v. Werner, 1981 (1) S.A. 187 (A) (offense to live in white areas even though no
accommodation in Indian/colored areas and substantial inequality, unauthorized by statute,
would result). These cases are discussed in Dugard, Some Realism About the Judicial Process and Positivism-A Reply, 98 S. AFR. L.J. 372, 384-387 (1981). See also Gumede v.
Minister of Justice, 1985 (2) S.A. 529 (N) (accepting Minister's casual "reasons" required to
be given by detention statute). Mathews says "[i]t is time for the South Africian appeal
court to review the earlier cases and modify, if not abandon, the principle that 'reason to
believe' and like clauses preclude it from any investigation whatever of the grounds for official decisions." Supra note 27, at 205.
191. See, e.g., Komani N.O. v. Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area,
1980 (4) S.A. 448 (A); Ndabeni v. Minister of Law and Order, 1984 (3) S.A. 500 (D)
(Didcott, J.).
192. See, e.g., S. v. Meer, 1981 (1) S.A. 739 (N) (Shearer and Didcott, JJ.) (Orders
banning meetings under Internal Security Act held "incorrigibly obscure" and "void for uncertainty"); In Re Dube, 1979 (3) S.A. 820 (N) (Didcott, J.); In Re Duma, 1983 (4) S.A. 469
(N) (Didcott, J.). See also Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 12, 1986, at 2, col. 3. (Natal
Supreme Court invalidates key clause in state of emergency regulations on grouds that the
government must prove that detention would help and the state of emergency).
193. E.g., S. v. Gibson, N.O., 1979 (4) S.A. 115 (N) (Milne, J.) (contempt of court and
defamation charges regarding press article critical of security police dismissed). See also,
Milne, Equal Access to Free & Independent Courts, 100 S. AFR. L.J. 681 (1983).
194. E.g., Goldberg v. Minister of Prisons, 1979 (1) S.A. 14 (A) (Corbett, J., dissenting)
(common law rights retained unless taken away by statute). See also Corbett, Human
Rights: the Road Ahead, 96 S. AFR. L.J. 192 (1979).
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level, not everyone can be tainted. Distinctions that cut both ways can be
drawn. The judge's role is harder to justify than that of other actors in
the system, because the dilemma arises not only in obedience but in application and enforcement of the laws as well. As Cover says, "the attorney's role within a system of law assumed to be immoral is much easier to
'
Yet if the judge hopes to work within
justify than that of the judge."195
the system to change it, his role is potentially easier to justify. Many
judges and lawyers in South Africa have opted for such a role. The general philosophical problem is familiar; many of us decide that participating in an organization or activity we disapprove of is worthwhile because
of the possibility of change. Is it better to do nothing at all? Sydney Kentridge has put it well: "if one participates in a system that distorts justice,
truisms about the limited functions of a judge will not necessarily save
one's soul." 19 The dilemma is not just a legal dilemma; it is a moral dilemma. 197 As such, the choice will involve compromises between competing conceptions of what is good, or bad.
A.

Apply the Law

Assuming a moral dilemma exists in South Africa, this is one resolution of the problem, but hardly a moral one. Those most affected by the
unjust laws have had no say in enacting the laws. Most judges in South
Africa, however, like most judges in the United States under slavery, will
resolve the dilemma in this way. Judges, after all, have not only been
trained in the law; they have come to live the law. It is understandably
hard for a judge to deviate from the dictates even of unjust law. An outsider is thus a bit presumptuous to criticize South African judges. In addition to the potent pressures pushing the judge toward role-fidelity we
have already encountered, such as positivism, parliamentary sovereignty,
and a bias toward the white status quo, rationalizations that allow the
judge to apply a law he has moral doubts about could come from various
other sources.
The political climate of South Africa is hot indeed, and the judge
may feel that the very security of the state or the order of being itself is
threatened by the slightest crack in the dike of apartheid. "Order" was a
justification for the maintenance of slavery, and it is a powerful justification for "separate development" in South Africa. But liberty as well as
order is supposed to be guaranteed by law.
A different rationalization occasionally offered in South Africa takes
the empty antidiscrimination rhetoric of the government seriously. According to this view, the gap between law and morality is temporary and

195. CovER, supra note 130, at 159.
196. Kentridge, Criminal Justice in South Africa, supra note 80, at 619.
197. As Cover said of the antislavery judges, "[m]ore and more, it appeared the question ought not to be put, 'How should a judge of integrity decide these cases?' but rather
'How can a man of integrity decide these cases?'" COVER, supra note 130 at 178.
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closing. The pressure on the judge to effect change is concomitantly reduced. Several assumptions within this gradualist approach are subject to
question, such as whether real change is coming and whether the overall
system is thus truly benevolent. Also, gradualists tend to forget that they
are part of the system, and that an antilibertarian ruling in one case may
reverberate to retard progress in other cases. An even more tenuous rationalization available is that conservative application of repressive laws
'
will yield a revolutionary reaction ultimately serving justice for all. 98
This approach would not be seriously considered by most South African
judges actually sitting. It also suffers from a failure to recognize the positive benefits that successful litigation can achieve, quite apart from any
considerations of whether violent revolution is a moral or wise alternative
or whether applying repressive laws could realistically further that alternative. In any event, the conclusion that those who participate in the system are morally responsible for that participation is hard to resist.
Evading the issue through docket control or procedural niceties only
delays the ultimate application of unjust law. Gilmore says that both
evading the issue and applying the law formalistically exalts procedure
over substance, and a "sort of Platonic" idea of law over reality. 19 9 The
reality that Gilmore refers to is the real need for tempering law with
mercy in systems like South Africa's. In the final analysis, the alternative
of applying unjust law cannot be a satisfactory solution to the moral dilemma, because applying the law ignores the dilemma itself.
B.

Resignation

Once a judge experiences a moral crisis, the alternative of resignation
must loom large. A lively debate on the morality and utility of judicial
resignation has been carried on in South Africa for some time.2 0 0 Some
judges have actually said that resignation is the proper response to truly
unjust legislation.2 1 The basic argument for resignation is that the system has become so pervasively unjust that remaining in it, especially in a
judicial capacity, confers legitimacy upon it. Resignation is the only honorable alternative, and may have some impact.
Resignation has impeccable theoretical credentials: Gandhi called on
the judge who was condemning him to obey the law and apply the maxi-

198. This is the position of the "Celestial Curia" in the recent Foreword to the Harvard
Law Review's discussion of the United States Supreme Court's 1984 term. Bell, Foreword:
The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REv. 4, 17-20 (1985).

199.

GILMORE,

supra note 1, at 38.

200. See, e.g., Wacks, Judges and Injustice, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 266 (1984) (South African
legal system is unjust; judges can do little about it; judges should resign); Dugard, Should
Judges Resign ?-A Reply to Professor Wacks, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 286 (1984) (Room and
materials for liberal judgments still exist; judges cannot help by resigning, so should stay
on); Wacks, Judging Judges: A Brief Rejoinder to Professor Dugard, 101 S. AFR. L.J. 295
(1984) (Legal system repressive; resignation may have some impact).
201. E.g., S. v. van Niekerk, (Fannin, J.), quoted in Dugard, Judges, Academics and
Unjust Laws: The Van Niekerk Contempt Case, 89 S. AFR. L.J. 271, 283 (1972).

1986

JUDGES IN AN UNJUST SOCIETY

mum possible sentence, or resign. 02 Gandhi, of course, joined Socrates in
accepting the penalty bestowed by positive law. But both adopted that
position for a reason: to expose the injustice of the system. Calls for resignation serve primarily to expose the moral dilemma facing the judge. If
judges are duty-bound to apply law, and the law is unjust or immoral,
then it follows that the moral thing for the judge to do is resign. This
syllogism was put to antislavery judges in America, 0 3 and it has been put
in the same form to South African judges. As Cover notes, the call for
resignation pushes judges "beyond the stage of reiteration of role definition. ' 2 0 4 When someone says "you must resign," it does not do to answer,
"but I am a judge."
The practical problem with resignation is that it is probably going to
be an ineffective means of helping those victimized by unjust laws. On the
contrary, unless massive resignations could be coordinated-a wholly unrealistic scenario in South Africa, given the composition of the judiciary-moral judges' resignations would eliminate any current hope of getting a moral judge at trial. Calls for judicial activism have had some
effect; calls for resignation have not. Dugard describes the situation:
All the one hundred or so judges who presently sit on the South African Supreme Court accepted office in the knowledge that they would
be required to apply the laws of apartheid. Any isolated resignation or
handful of resignations would, therefore, inevitably be discounted and
ascribed to some ulterior motive. Only a.substantial number of resignations would have the impact desired by Wacks, but such a possibility is so fanciful as to be completely eliminated. The sad truth is that
judges have missed the boat. Had they resigned in large numbers in
(say) 1955, when the Appellate Division was packed, or in 1967, when
the principle of indefinite detention without trial was first introduced,
there is little doubt that such resignations would have had considerable effect. But today, absent widespread resignations in protest over
some new horrendous legislative measure, resignations would fall into
the category of 'too little and too late.'205

If the virtue of resignation is that it avoids both the violation of the
judicial oath and the application of oppressive law, the vice is that it
probably will be ineffective, because other judges will apply that law. Resignation is not morally pure, either.

202. Gandhi, A Plea for the Severest Penalty Upon His Conviction for Sedition, in
THE LAW AS LITERATURE 465 (E. London ed. 1960).
203. COVER, supra note 130, at 151, citing W. PHILLIPS, A REVIEW OF LYSANDER
SPOONER'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1847).
204. COVER, supra note 130, at 215.
205. Dugard, Should Judges Resign? A Reply to Professor Wacks, supra note 200, at
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C. Protest or Civil Disobedience
Common to both protest and outright civil disobedience is the factor
of risk. Whether one protests in court or out of court, or engages in more
radical activity such as civil disobedience, sanctions can range from reversal on appeal to criminal charges on contempt or more serious offenses.
Protest can be in court or out of court, and can be mere rationalization designed to avoid confronting the moral dilemma or a genuine attempt to spur change. Occasionally, as we saw in Moller 206 judges may
make a perfunctory homage to justice in an otherwise unjust decision.
Sometimes, as in S. v. Adams, 20 7 stern disapproval of a racially discriminatory statute accompanies a decision upholding the statute. There, the
judge said "speaking for myself and if I were sitting as a court of equity, I
would have come to the assistance of appellant. Unfortunately, and on an
intellectually honest approach, I am compelled to conclude that the appeal must fail. ' 20 8 Such disclaimers and hints of disapproval do little
more than highlight the injustice of the system, and not with much hope
of yielding substantial change.
The risks of protest are well-illustrated by the van Niekerk cases.210
Durban Professor Barend van Niekerk was dismayed at the diminution of
the rule of law in South Africa, and made several speeches in which he
criticized specific laws and judicial decisions in South Africa. The criticism was trenchant but accurate. His first prosecution arose from an empirical study of discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty. After he was prosecuted unsuccessfully for contempt of court, he made a
speech in which he called on judges to protest the Terrorism Act, or at
least exercise their discretion in excluding evidence obtained through indefinite detention in solitary confinement.2 10 Underlying his criticism was
a strong natural-law approach in which he asked whether there was not a
point at which unjust laws cease to be laws at all. At his second trial, van
Niekerk was convicted for attempting to obstruct the course of justice
and improperly attempting to influence judicial decisions; 211 this despite
the temperate nature of his criticism and the omission of specific reference to any pending cases.
Although van Niekerk was an academician, not a judge, his prosecution has undoubtedly stifled criticism of the judiciary from within as well
as without. In-court criticism of the system by judges may result in sanctions if it is powerful and effective, and is meaningless if it is weak or
limited. In-court protests are all too often rationalizations that sidestep

206. See note 168 and accompanying text supra.
207. 1979 (4) S.A. 793 (T).
208. Id. at 801.
209. S. v. van Niekerk, 1970 (3) S.A. 655 (T); S. v. van Niekerk, 1972 (3) S.A. 711 (A).
210. Address by Prof. van Niekerk at Durban City Hall (Nov. 9, 1971), quoted in S. v.
van Niekerk, 1972 (3) S.A. 711, 716 (A.D.).
211. Id. at 711.
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the moral-formal dilemma and attempt to explain the judges' failure to
do justice. Out-of-court protests are even more risky,' 1 2 but most would
agree that some point can be posited where they are necessary." 3 As Gustav Radbruch said, the failure of German lawyers and judges to speak out
against the Nazi regime was a dereliction of duty.2"4 Protest is strategically limited, however. Explicit characterization of the whole system as
unjust might limit the protestor's ability to change it. Protest is also substantively limited. Unless coupled with a just result, protest achieves
little.
D.

Applying Conscience Through the Judicial Lie

Applying the law, resigning, and protesting are all flawed morally in
that all may be analogized to "honor among thieves." But applying conscience through the judicial lie is a moral use of legal power against immoral law. Merely applying conscience alone is a version of judicial protest subject to reversal or more severe sanctions. Although the judicial lie
is also a form of protest, it is less visible and thus more likely to be effective. Dworkin thus tepidly endorsed the lie as the most attractive solution
to the moral-formal dilemma.
The difficulties with the "lie" solution are both practical and theoretical. The solution has the virtue of responding to the only significant flaw
in Dugard's approach, which involves playing down the realities of oppressive law in South Africa via manipulation of liberal principles and
rules of construction. The lie recognizes evil legislative intent and consciously mischaracterizes it. Unfortunately, unless other actors in the legal system share the implicit assumption of Dugard and Dworkin that
positive law is identified in some intimate way with morality or natural
law, at least in the absence of a clear legislative statement to the contrary,
the less visible lie will not thereby be less controversial. The practical
difficulty is that the lie is perceived as dishonest, and requires "constant
battle over formal principles"' l such as jurisdiction, appellate authority,
and the bounds of the judicial and legislative functions. The theoretical
difficulty is twofold. A "lie" is a morally tainted thing, and to describe
what liberal judges in South Africa have done as a lie both misdescribes
and demeans their efforts. Thus Dworkin and Hart would not make the
"lie" option a matter of jurisprudence. Dugard denies the lie by saying
that the strange duality of South Africa's legal system, including both
liberal common-law principles and repressive legislation, allows the judge
merely to apply positive law.
While the need to infuse morality into an unjust legal system is so
great that results like those achieved by the judicial lie must be pre-

212.
213.
214.
215.

But see supra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.
See DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS supra note 11, at 294-5 (quoting van Niekerk).
See Hart, supra note 2, at 616-17.
COVER, supra note 130, at 198.
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served, a new explanation for those results that is more responsive to the
practical and theoretical dilemmas of the lie and more acceptable to jurisprudence is needed. The following section attempts such an explanation.
E.

Law and Judging as Interpretation

The central need for the moral judge in an immoral system like
South Africa is for a jurisprudential explanation that allows the judge to
change the unjust law and make new, just law. Moreover, this need exists
in a system which does not recognize any significant power of judicial
review. As discussed in Part II above, the positivist and natural-law models are both ambivalent about the judge's law-making function. Dugard
recognizes an interstitial law-making role nominally similar to that advanced by Hart and other sophisticated positivists, but Dugard deviates
from them in denying positive-law status to evil legislative intent. With
Dworkin, Dugard would inject quasi-natural law values from this world
into the judicial process, and these are characterized as positive law. Such
approaches have an aura of illusion about them. Illusion is not necessarily
a bad thing, as we shall see. But illusion that masks what the law is to
focus on what it could be runs the risk of being empty romanticism.
An alternative approach that may never become official or popular
also makes use of illusion, but to emphasize the illusion of thinking one
can ever know what the law "is." This skeptical alternative recognizes
that the law sometimes seems clear, as when a statute exactly addresses a
situation or a case "on all fours" with the case at hand exists. Nevertheless, this approach emphasizes that the law is constantly in flux, never
completely certain, and always indeterminate to some degree. All cases
are hard cases. After all, even easy cases are there because someone
thought they were worth litigating, often for purposes other than delay.
Because the trend of the law, the international and domestic political climate, and other factors all bear on the current interpretation of what the
law has been and will be, this approach recognizes that the law has been
unjust and could be just.
Before the charge of "empty romanticism" is leveled once again, note
that there is evidence from both the positivistic and natural-law schools
that this approach accurately describes law and judging. Dworkin, like
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 78, speaks of the "judgment" of the judge
between competing "wills" expressed in the legislature. Hart, while
speaking of "discretion," also denies the judge power to exert "mere" will
as the determinative factor in law-making. Yet both characterize the process of judging as essentially one of "interpretation." Interpretation subsumes both "discretion" and "judgment," and more accurately describes
the judicial process. Interpretation by judges does not exceed the legitimate limits of the judicial function; it is the essence of that function. In
this sense, interpretation need not be seen as "lying."
If not only judging but the law itself is interpretation, a more expansive and activist conception of the judicial role is possible. Dworkin has
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advanced a theory of the "law as interpretation" that envisions the law as
a description of how legal officials perform their tasks.216 He also believes
that interpretation has a prescriptive, normative side which aims at maximizing political and moral value.2'1 7 Dworkin's theory, which focuses on
judges, relates to my emphasis (one could hardly call it a theory) on law
itself as interpretation. The concepts of law and legal texts of whatever
kind are abstractions from reality before they are anything else. Like
other modes of art and language, such as religion, science, philosophy or
literature, legal structures are, at least initially, fictional structures. Such
interpretative frameworks are designed to help humankind come to terms
with experience and conceive different possibilities for the good life.
While law often crystallizes into an unjust framework for experience, the
fact that law is a fictional creation suggests that it can be malleable for
the many as well as the few, for South African blacks as well as whites.
Take the imaginative creations we call "rights," for example. Moral
lawyers in wicked legal systems are often forced to argue as if pre-existing rights should be given effect, when they (and the judges) know that,
to date, the rights have not yet "existed" in the sense of having been
recognized by the dominant legal texts subject to interpretation. Yet if
the judge, and thus the legal system, interprets the law so as to recognize
that right, the fiction will solidify and "real" existence will have been retroactively conferred on the right.
This version of law as interpretation differs from that of Dworkin in
three respects other than its more flexible view of law and the rights that
are to be taken seriously. First, it recognizes the subjectivity that Dworkin's legal philosophy tends to deny."' s If justice is an ideal toward which
law should strive and by which it is judged, each judge's personal sense of
justice must play a role. But justice will not come from unrestrained subjectivity, or selfishness. Justice demands that judges be receptive to
points of view other than their own. The impetus toward beneficial interpretation must come from a vision of law as affirmatively advancing justice, as opposed to merely mediating conflict through judicial compromise. Secondly, this view recognizes the real relativity of law at any given
place or time. The reason Dworkin has problems with the wicked legal
system is that the unjust laws in it are so pervasive that, so to speak,
"something is rotten" and "time is out of joint." Moral judges and moral
lawyers in South Africa must reject any "right answer" thesis grounded in
existing law because they know that the right answer will probably vitiate
rights rather than guarantee rights in their system. Yet once the anachronistic relativity of systems is recognized, the temporary analytical separa-

216. Dworkin, Law As Interpretation, in
Mitchell ed.
217. Id.
218. As
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(W.J.T.

1983).
at 266.
when he says that judges' background moral convictions enter into a decision
independent force. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 6 at 118,

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 15:1

tion of "is" and "ought" can be obliterated, as it has been by the Realists,
and arguments of value as to the "right interpretation," as opposed to the
historically-determined "right answer," can play their part. Finally, this
version of law recognizes and actually celebrates the creative, law-making
role of the judge. The law-making role of the judge may be enthusiastically embraced because interpretation is always subject to constraints
such as plausibility, personality, social context and prior law. In other
words, there are both subjective and objective elements to interpretation,
as we always suspected there were. Unfortunately, activist creativity
could result in change for the worse as well as for the better; thus, the
recognition of the law-making powers of the judicial system must be aligned with emphasis on the moral duty of the judge to guide the system
toward moral progress.
The "instructive" function of courts, their role as "moral tutor," is
tied to their duty to promote justice. Formation of values is a social function, but it is internalized through law.219 At its best, the role is exemplified by decisions such as Brown in the United States and Marechane in
South Africa.2 20 The problem in evaluative interpretation is the source of
values. The fear of such "inarticulate premises" as adherence to the white
status quo is what had prompted Hamilton and others to articulate limits
to the judicial "will." Although positivism may not result in application of
the "proper" value, and natural law may provide too many (possibly contradictory) values, the place of apartheid outside any such value structure
should be clear. Most white South Africans may continue to be racist, but
there is clearly sympathy against apartheid in the country as a whole.
Even the government formally condemns racial discrimination, and thus
implicitly concedes the extent to which such condemnation approaches a
universally objective value. Although one can legitimately be skeptical
about the possibility of a consensus existing or being discernible in any
community, 221 the broad international consensus is that the institutionalized system of racism known as apartheid is evil. If broad consensus is the
best test for objectivity we have, anti-apartheid sentiment is one of the
most objective values in the world. For this reason, judges in South Africa
should legitimately be able to appeal to this value in evaluative interpretation. Judges in the United States or other legal systems with closer
questions of just versus unjust law, and even South African judges (on
other issues), will continue to face the problem of standards for defining
laws as just or unjust. Something like Dworkin's moral principles or
Hart's policies would have to provide the answer.
The view of law as interpretation, in the meantime, does no more
than provide an explanation for just results that South African judges
may use to help solve their moral dilemma by establishing their own

219. See TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND (1977).

220. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Brest, The Fundamental Contradictions of Normative Constitutional
Law Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
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"Grand Style." 2 ' The results could be the same under the "lying" theory
advocated by Dworkin, or the realism-cum-value oriented approach of
Dugard. Yet the interpretative explanation reveals the flaws of describing
the creative, law-making function as a "lie" or "wrong answer" because it
reveals the excess simplicity in the view that legal "truth" is determinate.
The process of interpretation of law is only a mischaracterization of precedent when one accepts that there is an indisputably "correct" characterization of all the relevant legal factors. The search for "truth" or a
right answer in South Africa will probably yield a fascist "truth." The
explanation also avoids the pitfalls of underestimating the significance of
evil laws and evil legislative intent. Recognizing that interpretation is
evaluative, the explanation urges that judges have a duty to shape the law
in the direction of justice. Of course, once the blithe assumption (at the
heart of this article) that a law is unjust is removed, and genuine debate
over the meaning of justice is reinstituted, the moral judge will have less
guidance as to how to fulfill his duty. That is why this sketch of law as
interpretation works for South Africa, but would have to respond to the
central problem of judicial review - the search for standards of value in order to work in the United States.
In South Africa, judges are subject to the possibility of reversal on
appeal, reactionary legislative response, or even more severe sanctions.
For this reason the jurisprudential approach to law as interpretation
should be mentioned, but the subjective aspect should not be extensively
elaborated or publicized in the judge's decisions. Although the extent to
which the creative, interpretative function should be acknowledged is a
difficult issue, the potential for repressive reaction in South Africa is so
great that detailed treatment of the process of interpretation is best left
undeveloped. This is not to say that arguments for more expansive judicial review under the new South African Constitution should not be
made. But at present the chances afforded justice in already weak South
African courts should not be jeopardized. The myth of strictly objective
interpretation - the illusion referred to above - plays a necessary role
in protecting the scanty judicial independence that exists in South Africa.
Allowing judicial rhetoric denying the law-making function to continue as rhetoric, rather than making reality rise to the level of rhetoric (a
la Dworkin) or vice-versa (a la the Realists) serves a political purpose. To
my knowledge, the significance of the fact that some of the most liberal
South African judges employ the myth of objectivity in liberal decisions
has been overlooked by commentators.22 3 Yet the rhetoric of merely objective "interpretation" provides flexibility for implementing justice in

222. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960) (on
the "grand style" of judicial creativity in mid-19th century commercial cases, as opposed to
the "formal style" of the 1890's).
223. See, e.g., Harris v. Minister of the Interior, 1952 (2) S.A. 428 (A.D.), (Centlivres,
C.J.); Nxasana v. Minister of Justice, 1976 (3) S.A. 745, 747 (N) (Didcott, J.) (Courts constitutionally powerless to veto legislation; they can only "interpret" it.)
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South Africa.
V.

CONCLUSION

South African judges, not the author, live within that country's system of unjust laws. The liberal principles of the common law have been
seriously subverted by repressive laws that rigidly divide society and
often prevent the feelings that give content to justice from developing.
Consequently, many judges do not believe the system is unjust, or believe
that institutions like parliamentary sovereignty make it necessary to acquiesce in the system's justice. Expanded judicial review is possible under
the new Constitution, but has yet to be asserted.
The reigning schools of Anglo-American legal thought, which have
residual influence in South Africa, give the moral judge in such a system
little guidance. Both positivism and natural law are ambivalent about the
law-making powers of the judge. Not unexpectedly, the judicial response
of twentieth-century South Africa is thus comparable to the judicial response in America under slavery. By and large, most judges apply the
law.
Yet an undercurrent of liberal decisions has occasionally but persistently flowed in the direction of justice. Without being unrealistic about
the possibilities for drastic social change through South African courts,
one can say that there are avenues available to moral judges in South
Africa. Applying the law is an evasion rather than a recognition of the
moral dilemma. Resignation not only fails to promote justice, but may
promote further injustices. Protest and civil disobedience are not only ineffective but dangerous as well.
The judicial lie is thus the most attractive option for the moral judge.
Yet seeing libertarian results as "lies" may be counterproductive and ineffective. Recognizing the essentially interpretative nature of law and
judging avoids these pitfalls and provides the most legitimate and valuable role for the moral judge in an immoral system.

Legislative Developments: The Abolishment
of DISCs and the Creation of FSCs
BENNETT CAPLAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Congress created Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs)
to encourage the export of certain United States goods. Recently, however, Congress largely abolished DISCs. In order to continue to encourage
United States corporations to export products, Congress has created a
new type of corporate tax entity, Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs).
This article first describes DISCs. The article then discusses the
DISC replacements that will continue to promote exports by both smaller
and larger United States businesses. Specifically, this article will describe
the three DISC replacements - the FSC, the small FSC, and the "interest charge" DISC. A final part explores some possible future developments in this area.
II. A DESCRIPTION OF DISCs
Legislation creating DISCs was enacted in 1971 to help alleviate
United States trade deficits by promoting exports.1 DISCs were to accomplish this goal by providing tax benefits to United States companies
which exported certain domestic goods, called export property.' For DISC
purposes, export property included property which was made, grown or
extracted in the United States.3 Property not found to satisfy DISC purposes included patents, subsidized property, property found to be in short
4
supply, and oil.

A company could gain tax advantages through a DISC by strictly
complying with complex laws describing how to create and operate a
DISC. To qualify as a DISC, a company had to be incorporated under the
* M.A.L.D. 1985, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D. 1984, Boston College Law School; B.A. 1979, Columbia College. Mr. Caplan is an associate with the firm of
Adduci, Dinan and Mastriani, Washington D.C., and is a member of the District of Columbia Bar. The author would like to thank V. James Adduci, H, Charles F. Schill and Mitch
Cohen for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497, 535-53, codified at 26 U.S.C.
Sec. 991-97 (West 1982); DISC Substitute Detailed In Administration Draft Proposals, 20
TAX NOTEs 240 (1983) (hereinafter cited as DISC Substitute)
2. Note, Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISCs): How They Provide A
Tax Incentive For Exports, 14 VAND. L. REv. 535 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, DISCs].
3. 26 U.S.C. § 993(c)(1)(A); Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers, Foreign Source Income: An
Analysis of The Tax Reform Act of 1984 2 (July, 1984)[hereinafter cited as Foreign Source].
4. 26 U.S.C. §§ 993(c)(2)(A), (B); Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 2.
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laws of any state of the United States or the District of Columbia; issue
only one class of stock, with a minimum par value of $2500; elect to be
treated as a DISC; and satisfy certain receipts tests.5
The usual arrangement worked as follows, Company A would create a
subsidiary, Company B (the DISC). Company B would really amount to a
"shell" corporation. A would control B and would be able to use B in such
a way as to gain tax advantages on goods that A exported.'
Many DISCs were simple sales subsidiaries of the parent corporation.7 Most of these parent corporations were large manufacturing companies. These DISCs would receive the parent corporation's products and
then transport and sell those products abroad.8 The parent corporation
would set up these transactions in such a way so as to maximize the tax
benefits to the parent corporation."
The size of the tax benefit to the parent corporation depended upon
the amount of export income that was allocated either to the DISC or the
parent.10 DISC income was determined either by an "arm's length"" arrangement or under one of the two pricing rules for DISCs. 2 As long as
the DISC properly complied with the arm's length pricing rules, the DISC
could earn taxable income not exceeding the greater of:
a. Four percent of the qualified export receipts attributable to the
sale of export property plus ten percent of the related export promotion
expenses, which are the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred to obtain qualified export receipts; or
b. Fifty percent of the combined taxable income of the DISC and its
related supplier attributable to qualified export receipts plus ten percent
3
of the related export promotion expenses.1
The tax liability of the parent corporation for the DISC income that
was distributed from the DISC was determined in the following way. The
DISC's average gross receipts over a four year base period were com-

5. 26 U.S.C. §§ 992(a) 993(a), (b); See Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 3 and DISC
Substitute, supra note 1, at 240 for a more detailed description of these requirements.
6. Comment, DISC: A Continuing Problem, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 623, 624
(1979)[hereinafter cited as Comment]. See also DISCs, supra note 2 at 540-42 for a lengthy
description of the basic structure and operation of DISCs.
7. Comment, supra note 6, at 624.
8. Id. These DISCs being described were considered "buy-sell" DISCs. Another arrangement was to have DISCs sell abroad on a commission basis. The parent would transfer
the product to the DISC according to the inter-company pricing rules established in 26
U.S.C. § 994(a).
9. Id.
10. Note, Foreign Sales Corporation;A Viable Solution To The DISC Controversy, 11
SY R. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 47, 52 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Sales].
11. Id. at 52 n.31. "Arm's Length" is defined as the transfer prices established for specific transactions between two unrelated entities. This price is set at a price that would also
be used by two related entities. See 26 U.S.C. § 482.
12. 26 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) & (2).
13. Id.
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puted. Then the excess of the current year's receipts over 67% of the
average gross was determined."' 57% of this excess was treated as distributed income and was fully taxable. 5 The remaining 42% was retained by
6
the DISC and was deferred from taxation.
The tax benefits of a DISC had some interesting characteristics.
First, the taxes on a DISC's income were deferred, not forgiven, on the
portion of DISC profits from exports that were not deemed to be distributed.' 7 The amount of income deemed distributed to the parent corporation of its shareholders was subject to current taxation. In fact, the average amount subject to deferral for all DISCs was found to be about 17%
of the combined taxable income of the DISC and its parent.' 8
Second, a company could perpetually defer paying taxes on the DISC
proceeds by continually reinvesting the tax deferred income from the
DISC into export-related activities. 9 Most larger companies were successful in this objective and were continually deferring taxes on export proceeds. The smaller companies, however, by sometimes not fully complying
with the complex DISC provisions, were occasionally required to pay the
deferred taxes.20 The cumulative effect was that little of these deferred
taxes were ever recouped by the U.S. Treasury. The small amount of
taxes that were recouped were often the result of mistakes by small businesses in not satisfactorily investing export proceeds into export-related
2
activities. '

III.

FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS

As a replacement to DISCs, Foreign Sales Corporations (FSCs) were
created under the Tax Reform Act of 1984.22 DISCs have increasingly
been challenged by the international community as being illegal under a
treaty governing international trade issues, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 The United States, a party to the GATT,

14. 26 U.S.C. § 995(e)(3); See Note, Foreign Sales, supra note 10, at 53.
15. DISC Substitute, supra note 1, at 240.
16. 26 U.S.C. § 291(a)(4). The DISC legislation of 1971 was subsequently altered by
legislation. For a discussion of these changes, see Note, Foreign Sales, supra note 10, at 5354.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 995(b); Disc Substitutes, supra note 1, at 240.
18. Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 2-3.
19. Of DISCs and FSCs, 24 TAx NoTEs 8 (1984).
20. Telephone interview with Leonard Santos, Professional Staff, Senate Finance Committee, September 2, 1984 [hereinafter cited as Santos].
21. Id.
22. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 1000-03; 26 U.S.C. §
805(a)(West Supp.1986).
23. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. pt. 5 at A(11), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. The
GATT is, inter alia, a multilateral treaty which governs the trading practices between countries. The GATT has regulated international trading since the end of World War II. The
GATT has primarily addressed the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. See
Note, Foreign Sales, supra, note 10, at 56.
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decided to amend the DISC provisions in order to blunt the criticisms
leveled against DISCs. The FSCs achieve roughly the same objectives as
DISCs, yet they are specially designed to comply with the GATT.
A.

Reasons For the Repeal of DISCs

Since their creation, DISCs have been opposed by the European
Community (EC) and other signatories to the GATT.24 These countries
have contended that DISCs amount to illegal export subsidies, which violate the principles and the spirit of the GATT.2 5 In 1973, before a Panel
of signatories to the GATT, the EC filed a complaint against the United
States for its use of DISCs. 2 ' Three years later, the GATT Panel found
that the United States Government's failure to charge interest on the
deferral of taxes constituted an illegal export subsidy.27 The Panel also
held that DISCs illegally allowed a permanent deferral of taxes in income
derived from U.S. exports.2"
The GATT Council (the representatives of countries party to the
GATT) accepted the Panel's report but also adopted an "Understanding"
concerning export subsidies.2 9 Specifically, the Understanding stated that:
(1) a country did not have to tax economic processes located outside its
territorial limits and (2) that an exporting company had to treat its related foreign buyers at arm's length for tax purposes.30 Moreover, the Understanding permits countries to adopt measures to avoid the double taxation of income derived from foreign sources, which occurs when both the
host and home countries levy taxes on the same income. 1
The majority of the GATT Council, led by the EC member countries,
urged the United States to bring the DISCs into conformity with the
Panel's decision. 2 Nevertheless, the United States continued to defend
the legality of the DISC on the basis that the net effect of DISCs was
permissible. 3 The United States argued that the effect of DISCs as an
incentive to export redressed the tax export incentives of other countries
inherent in their systems of taxation.34
24. Foreign Sales Corporations, Senate Rep. No. 98-169, Vol. 1, 98th Cong. 630, 634
(1984)[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Note, The GATT Qualifier: Its Validity As A
Tax Standard And Its Effect on DISC and DISC Alternatives, 16 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 469,
473 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note,
25. Senate Hearings,supra, note 24, at 634. See GATT, supra note 23, at Art. XVI:I.
26. Note, The GATT, supra note 24, at 473.
27. Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 634; See also GATT: DISC And Other Discriminatory Income Taxes, 11 J.W.T.L. 564 (1977) for a thorough discussion of the Panel's
findings.
28. Senate Hearings,supra note 24, at 634.
29. DISC Substitutes, supra note 1, at 241.
30. Id.; See also Note, The GATT, supra note 24, at 475.
31. Id.
32. DISC Substitutes, supra note 1, at 241.
33. Id.; See also Note, The GATT, supra note 24 at 478-86.
34. See DISC Substitutes, supra note 1, at 241.
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In the GATT Council the EC member states in particular continued
to insist that the United States should bring DISCs into conformity with
the GATT. 5 These states went so far as to request the GATT Council to
take retaliatory trade measures against the United States."s These harsh
tones of the DISC debate, in the GATT Council, highlighted the bitterness of this dispute.37
On October 1, 1982, the United States proposed legislation to remove
DISCs as a contentious issue and to avoid the possibility of retaliation."
In March, 1983, the Administration approved and started to promote a
proposal designed to replace the DISC with a simpler, territorial-based
plan for the taxation of U.S. exports that would be legal under the
3 9
GATT.
B.

DISC Replacements

The Treasury Department and the United States Trade Representative developed a plan that would comply with the EC's objections to
DISCs under the GATT while, at the same time, would continue to provide tax benefits similar to those offered to American exporters with
DISCs. The result of these efforts was the Foreign Sales Corporation Act,
(the Act) which took effect January 1, 1985. The Act generally repealed
the DISC rules, and established new tax rules for the export of goods and
services.4 0 The Act did, however, retain the DISC rules subject to amendments for some small exporters; in addition, the Act forgave existing
taxes on deferred taxable income from already existing DISCs. In essence,

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 634.
38. DISC Substitutes, supra note 1, at 242.
39. Id.; See Dole, Rostenkowski Introduce DISC Replacement Bill, 20 TAX NoTEs 593,
595 (1983)[hereinafter cited as Dole).
40. Virgin Islands, Guam Likely FSC Locations as Companies Await Treasury Department List, INT'L TRADE REP. 257, 258 (1984); Dole, supra note 39, at 595.
The EC was somewhat skeptical of the FSC legislation. They objected strenuously to
the exemption granted to the deferred income of the DISCs granted by the FSC legislation
which treated the tax-deferred income of former DISCs as previously taxed income. The EC
objected to this grant of several billion dollars of tax deferrals to the DISC shareholders. In
fact, the EC has even threatened to challenge this procedure through GATT institutions.
Text of DeMarche made to U.S. Trade Representative (Nov. 8, 1983)(available at the Headquarters of the European Economic Community in Washington D.C.) [hereinafter cited as
DeMarche]. The EC has also asked for damages for the EC countries allegedly harmed as a
result of the operation of the DISCs. Note, Foreign Sales, supra note 10, at 62.
The EC objected to certain characteristics of the territorial provisions of a GATT Understanding. See infra text and notes at notes 94-102. The EC charged that many of the
actual substantive activities of the FSC would occur in the United States and not abroad as
required by the Understanding.
The EC also charged that FSCs might encourage the use of tax haven jurisdictions by
encouraging the flow of capital to those countries with a lower tax rate. This was felt to be
undesirable in light of the stated policy of both the United States and the EC to discourage
the use of tax havens. DeMarche, supra.
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the Act establishes three new types of tax export assistance - FSCs (for
large businesses), small FSCs, and "interest charge" DISCs (for small
businesses and exporters).
1.

Provisions For Larger Businesses - The FSCs

The FSC was designed to provide the same sort of DISC economic
incentives to domestic companies to export goods. Beginning January 1,
1985, a larger company became able to obtain a permanent exemption
1
from taxation on a portion of the export sales earned by the FSC.4
Generally, export goods which would have qualified for DISC treatment also began to receive beneficial tax consideration under FSCs. 2 In
addition, certain exports, such as particular types of depletable resources,
also qualified under the new FSC rules. 43
Partial exemption is granted on the export income of a FSC when it
meets two conditions: it must have an adequate foreign presence and, the
economic and management processes of the transaction (which generate
the income to be partially exempt) must occur outside the United
States.4 4 To meet the first condition of having an adequate foreign presence, FSCs must meet the following six requirements. The FSCs must: (1)
be formed under the laws of: (a) any foreign country that has entered into
an exchange of information agreement authorized under the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act, (b) any foreign country that has an income tax treaty with the United States and has been found by the Secretary of the Treasury to carry out the necessary exchange of information
requirements under the FSC legislation, or (c) any possession of the
United States (e.g., Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa or the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands);4 5 (2) have no more
than twenty-five shareholders at any time during the taxable year;"4 (3)
not have any preferred stock outstanding during the taxable year; 47 (4)
maintain an office outside the U.S. Customs territory at which the permanent books of account are maintained and keep tax records in the United
States;' 8 (5) have at least one director who is not a resident of the United

41. Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 5.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(D).
45. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)(i). See Dept. of Treasury News Release, Treasury Department Issues Notice Regarding Certificationof Exchange of Information Programs of Tax
Treaty Partners for Purposes of the Foreign Sales Corporation Legislation, (Nov. 6,
1984)(As of Nov. 6, 1984 the following countries had been certified for FSC purposes: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Jamaica, Korea, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
the Phillipines, South Africa, Sweden, and Trinidad and Tobago).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(B).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(C).
48. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(D)(i)-(iii); 26 U.S.C. § 6001.
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States;49 and (6) be separate from any of the new "interest charge"
DISCs."
To comply with the second condition, a FSC must meet the economic
process test and certain management requirements. The FSC must solicit,
negotiate or conclude the contract governing the transaction outside of
the United States."' In addition, one half of the costs incurred for publicity, handling orders, transportation, collection, and assumption of credit
risk associated with a transaction must be incurred by the FSC, outside
the United States. 5 2 The economic process test is also important in governing the tax consequences of the transfer of goods between a FSC and
its parent United States corporation."3 The portion of the FSC's net export earnings attributable to its foreign economic processes can determine
the tax liability of the parent.
The economic process requirements appear to differ from the DISC
requirement since a DISC could be a paper corporation without conducting any real economic processes. Interestingly, though, the FSC is not
required to become physically involved in the economic process requirements. Indeed, many of these services are being performed by agents
hired by the FSC who are located abroad and who specifically perform
these statutorily required economic processes. FSC management firms,
which perform these required functions, have blossomed abroad since the
enactment of the FSC legislation.
Finally, the FSC must meet certain management requirements. All
shareholder and directors' meetings must be conducted outside the
United States.5 4 In addition, the FSC must maintain its principal bank

49. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(E).
50. 26 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(F); Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 5.
51. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1)(A); Dole, supra note 39, at 595. The IRS issued regulations
which discuss what activities are included in the economic process test, explain how the
tests are applied and provide for the verification of activities. Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.924(d)IT(c).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(1)(B), 26 U.S.C. § 924(e); Dole, supra note 39, at 595. See also
Temp. Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.924(d)-IT(d) for a more detailed description of these requirements. The 50% test is applied to all'activities as a whole, i.e. the foreign direct costs do
not need to total or exceed 50% for each activity. However, it is necessary that the FSC
incur direct costs in at least three of the five areas. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.924(d)-IT(d)(5).
Moreover, there is an alternative 85% test that may be elected when the FSC's foreign
direct costs attributable to any of the foreign direct economic processes equal or exceed
85% of the direct total costs attributed to such activities. 26 U.S.C. § 924(d)(2); Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.924(d)-IT(6).
53. 26 U.S.C. § 925; Foreign Source, supra, note 3, at 9; Dole, supra note 39, at 595.
These economic process requirements must be complied with or the FSC may be disqualified. See 26 U.S.C. § 925(c). These economic processes are evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
See Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.925(c)-IT.
54. 26 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.924(c)-IT(b)(discussing which laws apply to various aspects of the meetings, where the meetings can be, etc. It is interesting to
note that, according to these regulations, these meetings may take place anywhere outside of
the United States and need not be conducted in the country or possession where the FSC is
located).
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account in a foreign country. All dividends, legal fees, accounting fees,
and salaries must be paid from a foreign bank account.5 5
The foregoing management requirements were specifically designed
to satisfy the GATT. Interestingly, a FSC may maintain a shell bank account under the current regulations and fill up the account out of funds
in the United States just prior to any disbursements. This fact has resulted in further EC criticism.
A properly structured FSC will qualify for a variable percentage of
tax exemption with the non-exempt FSC export income being taxed at
current corporate rates. The exempt portion may amount to as much as
74% or as little as 34% of the FSC's income depending upon the nature
of the transaction."6 The remainder of the export income is subject to
U.S. taxes. In addition, all of the income earned by FSCs from investments is subject to taxation."
In sum, The FSC differs from the DISC in two important ways. First,
the FSC must maintain a foreign presence and conduct a portion of its
business outside the United States.58 Second, the FSC grants an outright
exemption from taxation, rather than an indefinite deferral, on a certain
percentage of foreign income.5 9
FSCs are designed to have the same general tax effect on United
States exporters as DISCs.6 0 The tax benefit gained by most large exporters would be approximately the same as their previous tax savings with
DISCs. This result assumes, though, that these companies organize their
FSCs in tax haven countries.
FSCs have, however, non-tax effects that differ from those of
DISCs. s ' First, many exporters will now establish sales subsidiaries

55. 26 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(2) & (3). According to the Regulations, the bank in which the
account is maintained may be a U.S. bank and may be readily accessible from within the
United States. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.924c-ITc & d.
56. Dole, supra note 39, at 5951' Kessler, Legislative Update: Ring out the DISC - Ring
In The FSC, FED. BAR Assoc. NEWSLETTER & SECTION ON INT'L L. 5 (AUG. 1984). See also
Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 5-7 for a description of how to compute the tax for a FSC
and how distributions are made by a FSC. In general, where the FSC income is subject to
U.S. taxation, the income can be calculated in one of the following three ways: by an arm's
length pricing method, the gross receipts method and the combined taxable income method.
26 U.S.C. §§ 925(a)(1), (2) & (3).
57. 26 U.S.C. § 921(d)(2); See also Dole, supra note 39, at 595. The rules treating these
foreign trading receipts were modeled to some extent after the DISC rules on qualified export receipts. Essentially, qualifying receipts are those gains derived from the rule, exchange, or disposition of export property. 26 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1). Generally, qualifying export
property is property manufactured, produced or grown in the United States by an entity
other than a FSC for the use, consumption, or disposition outside of the United States. 26
U.S.C. § 927(a)(1)(A) & (B).
58. CRS Analyzes Effect Of FSC Proposal on Export Firms, 21 TAx NOTES 255, 255
(1983)[hereinafter cited as CRS].

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 255-56.
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outside the United States.62 It is likely that the FSCs will be incorporated
in qualifying countries that impose little or no corporate tax. 3 In particular, corporations will generally incorporate their FSCs in countries that
specialize in providing excellent financial services coupled with low corporate taxes in order to maximize the benefit of the tax exemption. '
Second, the requirement of establishing a FSC abroad might actually
dissuade some exporting companies from establishing FSCs.6

5

The costs

of establishing and maintaining foreign offices would undoubtedly reduce
the profit margin of at least some of the businesses currently operating
DISCs, thereby discouraging them from using the FSC provisions." Most
large businesses which took advantage of the DISC provisions have well
established foreign subsidiaries; for these companies, establishing and
maintaining a foreign presence might require little additional
investment.

67

Finally, it has been argued that the incorporation of FSCs abroad
could result in a transfer of some export related employment and activities from the United States to foreign countries." It is apparent, however,
that the economic processes that are required to be located abroad do not
constitute a large portion of the employment involved in the production
of United States exports. 9 Rather, the activities required to be located
abroad generally relate only to sales - generally a small percentage of an
exporting firm's employment.7 0 In addition, many of the activities required to be conducted by FSCs are already being carried out by employees or foreigners abroad and would not result in any transfer of employment." Thus, employment in the export sector would appear not to be
materially affected by FSCs.
2. Provisions For Smaller Businesses
The FSC Act provides two options for smaller exporters for whom
the foreign presence and economic activity requirements might prove too
burdensome.7 2 Both options do provide tax advantages for small exporters, although neither option is as advantageous to small businesses as the
original DISC provisions.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 256.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 922; CRS, supra note 58, at 255-56.
CRS, supra note 58, at 255-56.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 255.
Id. at 256.
Id.
Id. at 257.
26 U.S.C. § 927(0; See Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 257.
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"Interest Charge" DISCs

Old DISCs can elect to become "interest charge" DISCs, and thereby
avoid the costs of establishing or transferring export operations abroad. 73
A DISC with $10 million or less of export income may choose to continue
being an "interest charge" DISC.74 With the exception of receipts for export sales of military hardware, almost all of the income generated by
these DISCs is eligible for tax deferral.7 5 An interest charge based on the
treasury bill rate will, however, be levied on the deferred tax.78 In addition, any of the qualified export receipts that unexpectedly exceed the
$10 million limit will be fully taxable.7 The business can continue to
qualify as an "interest charge" DISC despite exceeding the $10 million
7
thresholda.
The benefit of being an "interest charge" DISC will vary from company to company.75 Basically, it is a question of timing. The usual benefit
of deferred taxes lies in the ability of a company to generate income from
the deferred taxes. In other words, the company enjoys the benefit of being able to use the money for its own investment purposes for the period
of the deferral, rather than immediately losing the money to the government.8 0 Under the FSC Act, however, the interest charge assessed against
the deferred tax liability would offset much of the income that the use of
the deferred taxes would produce. 8 '
Nonetheless, a firm can still benefit by using the "interest charge"
DISC. s ' For example, if a firm invests the deferred taxes wisely, it might
receive a return that is greater than the interest charges.8 3 Moreover, the
parent company can deduct the interest charges, thus further lowering
the actual cost of the charges." Finally, a firm can avoid some of the
interest charges by the selective timing of its payment of deferred taxes
85
over short periods of time.
On balance, it appears that the tax benefits of "interest charge"
DISCs are not as great as the advantages of the older DISCs. In addition,
small firms could probably gain more advantages with small FSCs.

73. 26 U.S.C. § 802; CRS, supra note 58, at 257.
74. DISC Substitute, supra note 1, at 244.
75. Id.; Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 658; Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 4.
76. 26 U.S.C. § 802; DISC Substitute, supra note 1, at 244, Senate Hearings, supra
note 24, at 658.
77. 26 U.S.C. § 802; DISC Substitute, supra, note 1, at 244.
78. Id.
79. CRS, supra note 58, at 257.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. This may, however, prove difficult to do because of the high rate of return required to receive a rate of return higher than the interest charge.

84. Id.
85. See id. for a discussion of how a company can profit from the use of timing.
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(b) Small FSCs
A small business can also elect to be a small FSC.86 Unlike the large
FSC, a small FSC need not satisfy the foreign presence and foreign economic process requirements to receive the same tax treatment as a large
FSC. 87 Thus, the small FSC is similar to "interest charge" DISCs in that
firms can avoid the onerous requirement of locating abroad.88 Otherwise,
the FSCs are still subject to the FSC operational rules - no exception is
provided, for instance, regarding the pricing rules for goods transferred
from a parent company to its small FSCs.
A firm would have to generate foreign trading gross receipts of $5
million or less to qualify as a small FSC." In the event of unforeseen
excess receipts over $5 million, these excess receipts would be subject to
taxation.9 0 In addition, a group of small FSCs which are connected to a
larger parent company would all be treated as a single small FSC. There
are regulations which prescribe how the $5 million gross receipts limitation is to be allocated among the related small FSCs.' 1
Overall, it is apparent that the small FSC provisions will benefit
and
small exporters, although the FSC provisions are more cumbersome
92
usually not as advantageous as the old small DISC provisions.

IV. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The FSC is designed to accomplish legally, within the bounds of the
GATT, what DISCs were charged with achieving in apparent contravention of the GATT. Nevertheless, the EC members do not consider FSCs
to comply with the GATT, since FSCs have largely the same effects as
DISCs. Moreover, replacing, the DISC with the FSC has not necessarily
dissuaded the Europeans from taking retaliatory measures against what
they consider to be an illegal export subsidy.s It is quite possible that the
Europeans could impose new countervailing duties against U.S. goods."
Indeed, Senator John Heinz (R. Pa.) has contended that Congress may be
"substituting one kind of trouble for another kind of trouble."' 95

86. 26 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1) & 927(f). The regulations discuss what is the effect of making
an election as a small FSC, when a corporation can elect to be a small FSC, the termination
of status as a small FSC, etc. Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.927(f)-IT(a).
87. Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 658. See 26 U.S.C. § 924(b)(2)(A); North and
Feinschreiber, From DISC to FSC, 1 EXPORT TODAY 59, 61 (1985).
88. But see Foreign Source, supra note 3, at 9 (suggesting that a foreign presence is
required).
89. CRS, supra note 58, at 257; Foreign Sales, supra note 3, at 658. See also, Search
for DISC Substitute To Be Taken Up By Congress, 20 TAx NoTEs 329 (1983).
90. 26 U.S.C. § 924(b)(2)(B)(i); Disc Substitute, supra note 1, at 244.
91. 26 U.S.C. §§ 924(b)(2)(B)(iii) & (iv).
92. CRS, supra note 59, at 257.
93. Bernick, Administration Urges Passage of Foreign Sales CorporationProposal, 22
TAx NoTEs 554, 555 (1984).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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In addition, the Europeans are incensed over the fact that a tax debt
of $12 billion owed by United States exporters using DISCs was forgiven
at the end of 1984.6 What they fail to realize, however, is that the corporations owing these taxes would probably not have paid them anyway.
Instead, these corporations would have invested the DISC proceeds into
export related activities, thereby continually deferring payment of these
taxes." Moreover, it is not uncommon for taxes to be forgiven in these
circumstances. Forgiveness is a common tax remedy when tax laws (such
as the ones creating DISCs) are repealed."
The EC members have objected to the fact that the corporations now
gain the benefit of being able to use the forgiven taxes in whatever fashion they desire. Since there was no limitation on the use by companies of
this $12 billion, these companies gained a windfall in the unrestricted use
of the DISC proceeds." Thus, EC member countries assert that, in fact,
DISCs permitted a permanent write-off. This bolsters their argument
that DISCs were illegal export subsidies all along. 00 The EC has discussed complaining formally in the GATT Council about the legality of
this permanent deferral. 0 1
Recently, the EC members included the FSC as objectionable, in a
list of U.S. unfair trade barriers presented to the U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter. Specifically, the EC members contended that the
FSC law was an inadequate response by the United States to the GATT
discussions relating to the DISC dispute.10 2
Although politically popular in the United States, FSCs may not
prove helpful to US exporters over the long run.103 The exchange rate
adjustments made on a long term basis account for this result. As a tax
incentive increases exports, there is a greater demand abroad for the dollar to buy these exports. The greater demand for the dollar, in turn,
drives the price of the dollar up in foreign exchange markets.'"' This
more expensive dollar makes U.S. exports more expensive for foreign
buyers and foreign imports cheaper for U.S. consumers. Thus, the initial
increase in U.S. exports erodes while imports to the United States increase.'0 5 It has even been concluded that "possibly the entire balance of
payments effects of the FSC provisions would . . .be neutralized." 1 "
Once this economic possibility is realized, despite the FSCs domestic pop96. Of DISCs and FSCs, supra note 19, at 8.
97. See id. This assumes that such a likely alternative would have been included in the
FSC legislation.
98. Santos, supra note 20.
99. Id.
100. Of DISCs and FSCs, supra note 11, at 9.
101. Id.; Demarche, supra note 40.
102. 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 50 (Jan. 8, 1986).
103. CRS, supra note 59, at 255.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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ularity, the legislators may eliminate the FSC provisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

The creation of DISC substitutes constitutes an attempt to dress up
the seemingly illegal DISCs in legal clothes. FSCs, small FSCs, and "interest charge" DISCs are all designed to satisfy the objections, of the EC
member countries, to the DISCs lack of compliance under the GATT.
Nonetheless, these DISC substitutes have not stemmed the criticism by
the EC. There will undoubtedly be future developments in this politically
sensitive area.

CRITICAL ESSAYS
The Evisceration of the Political Offense
Exception to Extradition
CHRISTOPHER
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The Supplementary Convention to the Extradition Treaty between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, was signed
on June 25, 1985, and transmitted to the U.S. Senate on July 17, 1985.'
This article will focus on the portion of the supplementary treaty which
effectively eliminates the political offense exception, and on the statement made by the Legal Adviser to the Department of State, the honorable Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, made in favor of the Supplementary
Treaty, on August 1, 1985. This article suggests that approval of the convention was a mistake and criticizes this Convention's evisceration of the
political offense exception and recommends that the supplementary
treaty, in its present form, not be approved.
First, this author will provide a comparative analysis of the political
offense exception and its application by various jurisdictions around the
world. This article's purpose is to demonstrate that the attempt to fight
international terrorism by way of an evisceration of the political offense
exception to extradition is not an efficient means of fighting terrorism
and, - more dangerously - is inconsistent with the United States Constitution, legal traditions and social values. Moreover, this analysis will
also demonstrate that the various approaches adopted by the nations
with which the U.S. negotiates on extradition matters provide the necessary means for courts to fight terrorism, while not eroding basic U.S.
institutions.

* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; J.S.D. 1985,
L.L.M. 1976, Columbia University School of Law; J.D. 1973, University of Utah College of
Law; M.A., The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; B.A., University of Utah. Professor
Blakesley was formerly an Attorney in the Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of
State. This article is adapted from the author's statement before the United States Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, made on November 4,
1985, in opposition to the proposed Treaty of Extradition between the United States and
Great Britain.
1. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
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POLITICAL OFFENSES: HISTORICAL AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

The political offense exception to extradition is one of the more controversial topics in extradition law today. This is because, paradoxically,

it is one of the most universally accepted, but still contested rules of international law. ' It remains heatedly contested because it is generally invoked by many who have participated in wanton violence (terrorism) and
who, therefore, should not be able to benefit by receiving its protection.8
Further, it is often difficult for courts to discern whether the conduct generating the criminal charge fits the criteria for the exception.
Virtually all extradition treaties contain the political offense exception or defense. Yet, in spite of its universality, no extradition treaty and
virtually no legislative act, has attempted to define the terms "political
offense" and "offense of a political character."" Thus, courts have had to
provide the guidelines for determining whether or not a particular offense
committed falls within the exception. The term "political offense" has
been characterized as referring not to a well-determined criminal transaction which can be specified in terms of a moral and mental element, but
as a "descriptive label" to be considered vis-a-vis otherwise extraditable
offenses. 5 This view of the political offense exception provides insight into
the courts' various approaches to its application. Three basic types of

conduct have been found to exist in the political offense exception to extradition.' The exception applies to those offenses which may be called

2. C. Van den Wijngaert, The PoliticalOffense Exception to Extradition:Defining the
Issues and Searching a Feasible Alternative, 1985 REv. BFLGE DE DROIT In'L. 1 (1985),
presented at the International Seminar on Extradition, International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Science, Noto, Italy (June 1983). It is universally accepted in that virtually all domestic extradition laws and international treaties contain the exception. Id.
3. Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom: Hearing
on Proposed Anti-Terrorism Legislation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Seas. (1985) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of State).
4. See authority in note 6, supra. Some scholars have suggested that the term is impossible to define. 1 OPPENHEIM , INTERNATIONAL LAW 707-08 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); Cf.,
Hammerich, Rapport general sur la definition du delit politique, in [1938] Actes de Ia
Sixieme Conference Int'l. pour l'Unification du Droit Penal 61; Van den Wijngaert, supra
note 2, at 4.
5. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2, citing M.C. BASSIOUNI, The Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES 408 (Bassiouni ed. 1975).
6. See generally Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2; J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LABORS OF SISYPHUS (1985); Note, Extradition Law: Applicability
of the PoliticalOffense Exception, 23 HARv. INT'L L.J. 124 (1983); Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception to Extraditionand Transnational Terrorist:Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Norms Created, 1 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1 (1977); Blakesley, Jurisdiction
Over ExtraterritorialCrimes, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (Procedure) (Bassiouni ed.

1986); M.C.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE

(1982); Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the United States: An Exercise in
Comparative and InternationalLaw, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. 653 (1980); Blakesley, The
Practice of Extradition From Antiquity to Modern France and the United States, 4 B.C.
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"purely political offenses" such as treason, sedition, or espionage. There
does not appear to be a significant problem with the application of the
exception in the context of so-called "purely political offenses."'7 In addi-

INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 39 (1981); see also Travers, La Loi Francaised'extradition du 10
mars 1927, 54 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 595, 600 (1927), for an analysis of the political offense exception in the French Extradition Law of 1927. GRIVAZ, L'EXTRADITION ET LES
DELITS POLITIQUES (1894); LAIRE, L'ExTRADITION ET LES DELrtS POLIT1QUES (1911); SOLDEN,
L'EXTRADITION DES CRIMINELS POLITIQUES (1892); Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and
Practiceof Extradition, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 247 (1933); de Hart, The Extraditionof Political
Offenders, 2 LAW Q. REV. 177 (1886); Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offenses in
InternationalPractice, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 948 (1963); Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Human-

ity and the Principleof Nonextradition of Political Offenders, 62 MICH. L. REV. 927 (1964);
Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of ExtraditionLaw, 48
VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962); Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. PTTr. L. REV. 65 (1964); Martens, L'Extradition
Pour Delits Politiques, 11 REVUE DE Dsorr INTERNATIONAL ET DE LEGISLATION COMPAREE
[R.D.I.L.C.] 44 (1881); Rolin, Du Principe de la Non-Extradition Pour Delits Politiques,
R.D.I.L.C. 17 (1892); Rolin, Les Infractions Politiques,15 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
545 (1887); Scott, "PoliticalOffense" in Extradition Treaties, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1909);
Weiss, Les crimes et delits politiques dans les rapportsde l'Autriche-Hongrieet de la Russie, 10 JOURNAL DU Dsorr INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 247 (1883); Yoshitomi, Extradition de
Coupables Politiques Chinois par les Autorites Britanniques de Tien-Tsin en novembre
1926, 34 REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 85 (1927). Objectivized definitions
of the notion of "political crime" have been attempted by many writers. Some are listed by
S. SCHAFER, THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL

10-11, n. 5 (1977).

7. Harvard Research, In InternationalLaw: Extradition, 29 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 15 (Supp.

1935); and Garcia-Mora, supra note 6, at 1239, provide some examples. For example, when

the Allies sought the extradition of William II of Germany from the Netherlands after
World War I by invoking article 227 of the Versailles Treaty, the Government of the
Netherlands rejected the request as being based on a political offense. The German Extradition Law of Dec. 23, 1929, art. 3(2), attempted to define political offenses. It stated that they
are:
[T]hose punishable offenses . . . which are directed immediately against the
existence of the security of the State, against the head or member of the government of the State, as such, against a body provided for by the constitution,
against the rights of citizens in electing or voting, or against the good relations
with foreign states.
Quoted in Harvard Research, supra.

This definition has been criticized as being both too broad and too narrow in light of
the modern totalitarian states. See S. SCHAFER, THE POLITICAL CRIMINAL (1977); GarciaMora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L.
REV. 1226, 1230 (1962). Finally, after much dispute, French jurisprudence opted for the opposite view. It was determined that the offense of this order would be considered nonpolitical for purposes of punishment.
Even purely political offenses have caused wavering on the part of the judiciary during
certain periods of time. For example, article 84, para. 3, of the French Penal Code of 1939,
and treaties between France and Luxembourg executed at about the same time, provided
that for the application of penalties, crimes and delicts against the security of the state
would be considered as common crimes. This created hesitation and considerable dispute in
French jurisprudence. During this dispute, certain chambres d'accusationsallowed extradition for these offenses, thus abrogating the political offense exception as far as these offenses
were concerned. These courts proclaimed the validity of this type of accord and affirmed
that, since 1939, offenses against the security of the state had lost their political character
for all intents and purposes. The ordonance du 4 Juin 1960 completely resolved the ques-
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tion, it may apply to "offenses of a political character," or common crimes
like burglary or homicide when committed for political purposes. The exception may also apply when the requested state's officials believe that
the extradition was requested for a political purpose.
The more difficult application of the defense relates to "crimes, the
circumstances of which give them a political character." This concept
may be broken down into several more specific approaches incorporated
by the judiciaries of various countries for determining whether to apply
the defense or exception to extradition.
Specifically, the various approaches developed by American and foreign courts include: the political motivation test (subjective); the injured
rights theory (objective); the model of connexity (objective); the political
incidence or disturbance test (objective); and the mixed approach (combines the political incidence, connexity, and motivation tests).
The subjective approach focuses on the intentions of the perpetrator
of the alleged crime.8 The objective "political motivation test" has been
applied on a few occasions by French 0 and American "0judiciaries. For

tion when it reinstated the political nature of these violations even for purposes of punishment. See discussion in MERLE & Vrru, TRArrE DE DROIT CRIMINEL: PROBLEMS GENERAUX DE
LA SCIENCE CmuMINELLE 333 (2d ed. 1973). Today, France is very careful to apply the political exception even in cases of common crimes committed for a political purpose. See decision on the extradition of Holder and Kerkow, reprinted in 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L.
168-75, and discussed at note 9 infra.
8. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2, at 5.
9. In re Holder, reprinted in 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168-75. This is the case of
an extradition request by the United States for the alleged hijacker of a Western Airlines
aircraft from San Francisco to Algeria. Holder was indicted for violation of several Federal
criminal statutes arising out of the hijacking of a plane in June 1972, during a domestic
commercial flight. Threatening to set off a bomb during flight, the accused allegedly obtained complete control of the plane. It landed in San Francisco where a replacement flight
crew and a second plane were obtained. Holder demanded and received $500,000; some 40
passengers were transferred to the second aircraft, which then flew to New York. That plane
refueled in New York, and then the passengers disembarked before the flight continued to
Algeria.
The United States extradition request was denied by the Paris Chambre des Mises en
Accusation, apparently on the basis of either the fugitive's political motives or the believed
risk of aggravated treatment because of his race (a European Extradition Convention criterion, 359 U.N.T.S. 273, art. 3, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272, art. 13 (1)(a)-(c) (1957)). Record
of the extradition request and its denial are in the extradition files of the Office of the Legal
Advisor to the Department of State. The legal briefs in opposition to the Holder decision
and the diplomatic note protesting it are reported in 1975 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L. 168-75.
See also In re Henin, Cours d'Appel (Paris), La Semaine Juridique 15274 (1967).
10. In re Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In approving the extradition to
the Dominican Republic of an alleged former agent of the late dictator Trujillo's intelligence
apparatus, a United States district court declared that "nothing in the record ... suggest[s]
that Ortiz acted with such essential political motives or political ends as might justify substantial relaxation of the political disturbance requirement... [T]he political offense principle is inapplicable here." Id. at 722.
British cases also have occasionally had a tendency to consider the political motivation
of fugitives: see Ex parte Kolczynski, [1955] 2 Q.B. 540, in which extradition was denied for
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example, some American decisions have hinted that the motivation behind the offense may be considered as a separate test for determining the
political character of the offense." However, as Judge Sofaer rightly suggests, the judiciaries in France, Switzerland, and the United States have
clearly moved away from the political motivation test. The French courts
appear now to have begun to follow the "predominance test" or "proportionality theory", a form of the "mixed approach" developed by Swiss
jurisprudence. This test appears to use both subjective and objective criteria to determine whether a given offense is of sufficient political character to warrant exception of its perpetrator from extradition.1 2 The test
was refined in 1951 by the opinion in the Ockert case where the Swiss
court defined political offenses, as those "acts which have the character of
an ordinary crime appearing on the list of the extraditable offenses, but
which, because of the attendant circumstances, in particular because of
the motive and the object, are of a predominantly political complexion."' s
The definition of political offense was modified by the Swiss again in 1952
in order to provide the flexibility to allow exception from extradition for
those who commit a crime, such as air piracy, and in order to escape from
a "modern totalitarian regime."" In 1961, the Swiss Federal Tribunal
summarized the jurisprudential development of the basic tenets of the
preponderance test and further refined the definition of political offense
so that even when the motive is largely political, the means employed
must be the only means available to accomplish the end pursued. 8 In
Ktir, the Swiss court granted a French extradition request for a French
national who was a member of the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (F.L.N.), who had been charged with the murder of another member
seven Polish seamen who had revolted aboard ship, wounded a political officer of the Polish
Government, and forced the ship into a British port where the crew asked for asylum. See
also Garcia-Mora, The Nature of PoliticalOffenses, supra note 6, at 1242-43; and Schtraks
v. Government of Israel, [1962] All E.R. 529 (House of Lords), in which the Government of
Israel had sought the extradition of an Israeli national who had helped his parents in refusing to surrender a child left with them temporarily, because they feared the child would not
be given a religious education. Extradition was granted.
11. In re Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. at 717. But see, Quinn v. Robinson, No. 83-2455, 783
F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), 86 L.A. Daily J. D.A.R. 581 (Feb. 26, 1986)(rejecting the political
motivation test as the sole test for the political offense exception and applying the so-called
"incidence test" to internal insurgencies. The court holds that for the political offense exception to apply, there must be an "uprising" and conduct giving rise to the charges must be
incidental to the uprising).
12. The test was developed in a series of cases, the most important of which are: In re
Vogt, 2 Ann. Dig. 285 (Tribunal Federal, Suisse (1924)); In re Kaphengst, 5 Ann. Dig. 292
(Tribunale Federal, Suisse (1930)); In re Ockert, 7 I.L.R. 369 (Tribunal Federal, Suisse
(1951)). See also Della Savia Case, 25 Nov. 1968, 95 A.T.F., I, at 462 (Tribunal Federal,
Suisse (1968)); Morlacchi Case, 12 Dec. 1975, 101 A.T.F., Ia., at 605 (Tribunal Federal,
Suisse (1975)); Castori Case, 19 March 1975, 101 A.T.F., Ia., at 65 (Tribunal Federal, Suisse
(1975)); Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2, at 8.
13. In re Ockert, supra note 12, at 370.
14. In re Kavic, Bjelanovic & Marsenijevic, 19 I.L.R. 371 (Tribunale Federal, Suisse
(1961).
15. Ktir v. Ministere Public Federal, 34 I.L.R. 143 (Tribunal Federal, Suisse (1961)).
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of the F.L.N. 6 .
The court made it clear that for the political offense exception to
apply to the circumstances, the motives inspiring the acts of the accused
fugitive, and the purpose behind these acts must all indicate that the acts
were predominantly political in character. According to the court, the test
presupposes the following:
[T]hat the act was inspired by political passion, that it was committed either in the framework of a struggle for power or for the purpose of escaping a dictatorial authority, and that it was directly and
closely related to the political purpose. A further requirement is that
the damage caused be proportionate to the result sought, in other
words, that the interests at stake should be sufficiently important to
excuse, if not justify, the infringement of private legal rights.1"
...

Thus, under this test, extremely serious offenses would rarely succeed
in being excepted from extradition. A crime, such as murder, would be
required to meet the "ultima ratio" test, i.e., that the act constituted the
only means to accomplish the political end sought."8
However, the test developed and applied by-and-large over the years
in the United States and Britain has been the "political incidence" test.
For example, in 1891, a British judge established the political incidence
approach,' 9 ruling that political offenses are those which are "incidental
to and form a part of political disturbances. 2 0 This is an example of an
objective approach which focuses on the act, without attention to the author's motivation. 2 '
The United States and British decisions have tended to adopt this
approach. For example, in 1894, a United States federal district court
held the political offense exception applied to government agents seeking
to suppress an uprising, as well as to the participants.2 2 In so holding, the
court stated a political offense is "any offense committed in the course of
or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion."2 3 This political incidence test is the basis for the predominant United States definition of the relative political offense. In a 1959 dictum, the District
Court for the Southern District of California gave the following definition:
Generally speaking it is an offense against the government itself or

16. Id. at 145.
17. Id. at 144. For a thorough analysis of the Swiss predominance test, see Carbonneau,
supra note 6. See also McCann Case, Cours d'Appel, Aix-en-Provence, 14 April 1975, (unpublished) English translation by Carbonneau, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEG. STUDIES. at 341
(1983); Da Palma Case, Cours d'appel, Paris, 14 Dec. 1967, La Semaine Juridique, No.
15387 (1968).
18. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2, at 8.
19. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
20. Id. at 166.
21. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2 at 5
22. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
23. Id. at 998.
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incident to political uprisings. . . .The crime must be incidental to
and form a part of political disturbances. It must be in furtherance of
one side or another of a bona fide struggle for political power." '
Some decisions have appeared to detract from this political disturbance test, hinting that the motivation behind the offense may be considered as a separate test for determining the political character of the offense.25 Other nations have rejected the motivation test and adopted an
objective "injured rights" theory. For example, the decision in the Gatti
extradition case 26 rejected the political motivation test and applied this
political objective test. This objective test requires the criminal action be
directed against the state's political organization. In the Gatti case, the
Republic of San Marino sought the extradition of a person accused of
attempting to murder a local communist cell-member. The French court
held that the offense was not of a political nature, stating:
[TIhe fact that the reasons of sentiment which prompted the offender to commit the offense belong to the realm of politics does not
itself create a political offense. The offense does not derive its political
character from the motive of the offender but from the nature of the
7
rights it injures.1
...

Another objective approach is the model of connexity, wherein the
common crime is considered a political offense based on its connection to
a purely political offense.2" Thus, a person who aids the escape of a spy,
who happens to be a son, daughter or friend, would fit within this defini-

24. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). Here a Yugoslav extradition request for a man charged with murdering a Croatian government official during World
War II was denied on the basis of insufficient evidence. After determining that the evidence
was insufficient, the court considered the political offense question, and offered its dictum
that the offense, if committed as alleged, would be political. Subsequently, this fugitive was
found to have been a participant in Nazi war crimes and found extraditable. Matter of
Artukovic, Case No. CV84-8743-R(B), (C.D. Cal. 1984), cited in C. Pyle, Extradition, Political Crimes and the U.K. Treaty, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, September 18, 1985, at 36. Some commentators have suggested that the Castioni political incidence test is adequate to deal with the severe modern problems of terrorism and
extradition. It has been criticized as being both over- and under-inclusive, "in that it appears to exclude from protection all political offenses which were not part of a general uprising or rebellion," [and it] "lays the framework for the claim that all acts committed during
times of political disorder, without regard to the character or victum of the crime, should be
insulated from extradition." Lubet, ExtraditionReform: Executive Discretion and Judicial
Participationin the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 14 CORNLL INT'L L.J. 247, 263
(1982). The Ninth Circut Court of Appeals disagreed and recently adopted and refined this
political incidence test in Quinn v. Robinson, supra note 11.
25. In re Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. at 717; discussed in notes 10-11 and accompanying
text.
26. Judgment January 13, 1947, Cours d'appel, 1947 Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70, France).
27. Id., at 145-6. The French Court of Appeal also stated: "We can only demand that
the motive which inspired the agent should not be considered an aggravation of the offense,
and that the extradited person should not be tried by an extraordinary tribunal." Id., at
146.
28. Van den Wijngaert, supra note 2, at 5.
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French legislation is illustrative of the third general type of political
offense. For example, French leglislation extends the political offense exception to deny extradition when officials believe the extradition request
was politically motivated. The French Extradition Law of 1927 provides
that extradition will be denied "when the crime or the offense has a political character or when it results from circumstances indicating that the
extradition is requested with a political purpose." 30
With regard to offenses relating to insurrections or internal wars (the
political incidence approach), article 5(2) of the French Extradition Law
of 1927, provides:
As to acts committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war by
one or the other of the parties engaged in the conflict and in the furtherance [dans l'interet] of its purpose, they may not have grounds
for extradition unless they constitute acts of odious barbarism and
vandalism 3prohibited
by the laws of war, and only when the civil war
1
has ended.

This provision has been criticized by French commentators

2

because

29. Bourke v. Attorney General, 107 IRISH LAW TIMES 126 (1973).
30. Extradition Law of March 10, 1927, La loi Relative a l'Extradition des Etrangers
[1927] D.P. IV, art. 5(2), reprinted in Code de Proc. Penal, after art. 696 (Dalloz 1984)
(emphasis added). The European Convention on Extradition, 359 U.N.T.S. 273 (1957), art.
3, (reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272, art. 13 (1)(a)-(c) (1957)) goes beyond both the Extradition
Law of 1927 and the United States-French Extradition Treaty by providing that extradition will be denied: when the offense is of a political nature; when it is connected to other
political offenses of a political nature; or when the requested state has reason to believe that
the request is presented with a view to punish the fugitive for considerations of race, religion, or nationality, or for his political opinions. It even provides for refusal of extradition
when the requested state has reason to believe that the accused's treatment by the requesting state risks being aggravated because of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.
See generally SCHULTZ, LA CONVENTION EUROPEENNE D'ExTRADrION m LA DELIT POLITIQUE,
MELANGES CONSTANT, at 313 (1971). Cf., European Convention on Terrorism, Europ. T. S.
No. 90, art. l(e) (1977). The Convention on Terrorism does exclude certain offenses from
coverage of the political offense exception, the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic
firearm, letter bomb, or parcel bomb, if the use endangers persons, but allows the parties to
the Convention to reserve the right "to refuse extradition in respect of any offense mentioned in Article I which it considers to be a political offense," as long as the reserving state
promises that, when it makes such a decision in individual cases, it will take due account of
three factors: the "collective danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons" or,
that the crime "affected persons foreign to the motives behind it," or that "cruel or vicious
means have [or have not] been used" in its commision. European Convention on Extradition
supra 15 I.L.M. 1272, art. 13(1)(a)-(c); noted in statement by Pyle, supra note 24, at 29.
Certainly, the European Convention on Extradition does not eliminate the authority of a
party's judicial branch from making the difficult political offense decision or, worse, suggest
use of their courts as an arm of the foreign victor in a civil conflict to punish its opponents.
Id.
31. Extradition Law of 1927, supra note 30, art. 5(2), para. 2 (emphasis added).
32. See, e.g., MERLE & Vrru, TRArrE DR DROrr CRIMINEL: PROBLEMES GENERAUX DE LA
SCIENCE CRIMINELLE, at 334 n. 1 (2d ed. 1973); and Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Regime
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both the commencement and termination of civil war are difficult to determine today. Moreover, these commentators find a moral flaw in the
provision. For example, after a civil war, the people extradited would not
necessarily be criminals in the non-political, common crime sense of that
term, but vanquished partisans of a cause. 3 French tribunals have become sensitive to these criticisms and have denied extradition under circumstances that would appear to be covered by the terms of the exception to the political crime exception, described in the article 5(2) of the
Extradition Law of 1927.1" For example, most of the chambres
d'accusations refused to extradite Spanish Republicans, sought by the
Franco regime after the Spanish Civil War, on the ground that their of3 5
fenses were of a political character.
French extradition treaties are similar to most other treaties in providing for exemptions to the political offense exception clause. Extradition is allowed, for example, for counterfeiting, even for political ends,
and for many forms of terrorism.36 Thus, the famous "clause Belge" allows extradition for the murder of the head of state or anyone in his family.3 7 Extradition is also allowed for offenses falling within the French
term "infraction sociale,"as it relates to the "doctrine de gravite." This

term represents those offenses directed against the social structure, rather
than the government per se.3" This approach provides an extremely narrow perception of political offenses, and does not generally permit offenses of extreme gravity to fit within the political offense exception.
These exceptions to the defense have developed over the years and have
been called the "humanitarian exceptions" to the political offense clause,
and are consistent with the concept that some offenses will not be excepted from extradition. These include the offenses of barbarous or wan-

Nouveau de l'Extraditiond'apres la Loi du 10 Mars 1927, 1927 REV. CRITIQUE DE LA LEGISLATION ET DE LA JURISPRUDENCE 503; DONNEDIEU DE VABREs, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT
CRIMINEL, at no. 1795 (2d ed. 1943).
33. See authorities in note 38, infra. One commentator in the United States believes
that the vanquished "heroes" of a civil conflict are, by definition, political criminals. They
would thus not be extraditable, although "mere followers" or partisans are not "heroes" and
hence, when they fail they are not real political criminals; if this were a legal definition, they
would be extraditable. See SCHAFER, supra note 7. Obviously, this is not a legal definition.
34. Extradition Law of 1927, supra note 30.
35. See, e.g., Judgment of June 6, 1941, G.P. 1953.2.113 (Toulouse); but see judgment
of October 19, 1941, G.P. 1942.1.16 (Algeria), in which extradition was allowed although it
was for offenses related to civil war.
36. Merle & Vitu, supra note 32, at 333.
37. This is also called the "assassination clause" ("clause d'attentat"). Virtually every
extradition treaty contains one.
38. MERLE & VITU, supra note 32, at 334. This is quite similar to what the Third Reich
developed and several socialist regimes have frankly espoused; the ideology-directed social
defense, perhaps, recognizes crimes as being political, yet punishable because they are attacks against the "supreme ideology." Thus, the social danger of "anarchy" makes it a punishable "nonpolitical crime" in the Soviet Union. Indeed, the essence of any crime in German and Soviet criminal law is its "social dangerousness." G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 864, § 10.5 (1978). See SCHAFER, supra note 7, at 1.
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ton violence, and crimes aimed at civilians rather than the military opposition. Thus, the judiciaries of several countries with whom the United
States has consistent relationships in extradition matters, have developed
sufficient standards for distinguishing a political offense from wanton terrorism. Thus, contrary to what the Executive Branch suggests, as its reason for wanting the extradition treaty under discussion, the offenses that
are reputed to be non-extraditable are extraditable.

II.

CRITIQUE OF THE TREATY

Article I of the Supplementary Treaty "amends the political offense
exception to extradition, containined in Article V, paragraph (1)(c) of the
current extradition treaty, by identifying particular crimes that "shall not
be regarded as offenses of a political character." 9 This article will focus
directly on this portion of the supplementary treaty which effectively
eliminates the political offense exception, and will analyze the statement
in favor of the treaty by the Honorable Judge Abraham D. Sofaer. The
purpose of this section is to reveal that the evisceration of the political
offense exception to extradition is an inefficient means of fighting international terrorism and is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, legal traditions and social values. For example, the elimination of the political
offense exception undermines the function of the judiciary provided by
the Constitution. Questions of fact and law, particularly concerning individual liberty, are issues for the courts. To undermine this role, by use of
a treaty or any other means, threatens the balance within the separation
of powers requirement. The proposed U.S.-U.K. Treaty presents such a
danger.
Judge Sofaer in his Senate testimony argues the U.S. Government's
position on the need for the proposed treaty by setting up a straw man.
He argues that the political offense exception is measured by the motivation of the actor, and that the judiciary is incapable of distinguishing acts
of wanton terrorism from political offenses. Judge Sofaer then destroys
the straw man by suggesting that allowing such criminals to avoid prosecution promotes terrorism and, therefore, the political offense exception
must be eliminated. Judge Sofaer argues that some courts have applied
the political offense exception to refuse extradition to fugitives in cases in
which the fugitives were, in the United States Government's view, actually terrorists. The political offense exception, therefore, must not be applied to any crimes which may be committed by terrorists. The political
offense exception, therefore, must not be applied to hijacking or aircraft
sabotage, to hostage taking or crimes against internationally protected
persons. Further, the exception must not apply to murder, manslaughter,
malicious assault, kidnapping, or property damage. The political offense

39. Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom: Hearings on Proposed Anti-terroristLegislation Before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, The
Department of State).
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exception must not apply to these offenses, argues Judge Sofaer, because
terrorists sometimes commit them and its application runs the risk of
courts not finding terrorists extraditable, thereby allowing those who have
committed wanton acts of violence to avoid prosecution. Thus the Government contends that the risk that terrorists will escape justice via the
political offense exception is very serious, based on the apparent risk that
it hinders the fight against terrorism, that the exception must be eliminated. Eliminating the risk of allowing some terrorists immunity from extradition and prosecution is worth the cost of eradicating the political
offense exception.
Underlying this rationale is,the belief that courts are often unable to
render proper decisions on the political offense exception; they cannot or
do not distinguish terroristic from non-terroristic conduct. It is true, no
doubt, that courts have made errors in the past and will Continue making
errors in the future on this and many other subjects. However, the dominant issue before the Senate and the American people is whether the risk
of erroneous decisions on questions of terrorism and the political offense
exception is so serious that it justifies removing from the judiciary the
authority to render decisions on matters which are quintessentially and
constitutionally judicial. Is this risk of error so great that we should allow
the elimination of the judiciary's role in determining matters of human
liberty? It is submitted that this sort of reaction to terrorism is more
dangerous than the terrorism itself.
In addition, it is not necessarily true, as suggested by Judge Sofaer
and the Executive Branch, that the war on terrorism will not succeed if
the poltical offense exception is preserved. Rather, the risk to the constitutional system of removing the issue from the judiciary is far greater
than the risk that judicial decisions will promote terrorism.
Close scrutiny of the specifics of the treaty and of Judge Sofaer's
statement before the Foreign Relations Committee in support of it will
serve to illustrate the dangers of the treaty and the misleading nature of
the Administration's argument. For example, Judge Sofaer suggests that
the amendment recognizes that "terrorists who commit the specified,
wanton acts of violence and destruction should not be immune from extradition, merely because they believe they were acting to advance a poltical objective. ' 40 One cannot quarrel with such an observation in general.
One certainly does not desire that persons who commit wanton acts of
violence escape extradition and prosecution. Judge Sofaer's statement,
however, suggests that the sole, or most significant test applied by the
courts for the appropriateness of the political offense exception is the
"political motivation test."
More accurately however, there are several tests applied by United
States and foreign courts which allow them to distinguish terrorist acts of
wanton violence from those subject to the political offense exception. In

40. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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addition, Judge Sofaer's use of the phrase ". . .terrorists who commit the
specified, wanton acts of violence. . .should not be immune from extradition. . ." suggests that the current state of the law relating to the political offense exception would allow "wanton acts of violence" to fit within
the protection of the defense, or that the courts are incapable of distinguishing "wanton acts of violence" or "terrorism" from political offenses.
Once again Judge Sofaer is incorrect. The current state of the law regarding the political offense exception to extradition does not provide immunity to perpetrators of wanton violence or terrorists, nor does it promote
terrorism. In essence, the U.S. Executive Branch wishes to amend an extradition treaty in a manner that will undermine the role of the judiciary,
by arguing primarily that the legal decision as to whether or not an act of
violence is wanton, and therefore not a political offense is one that cannot, and thus must not, be made by the judiciary.
However, under the current state of the law, nationally and internationally, the courts are capable of distinguishing wanton acts of violence
or terrorism from poltical offenses, and of allowing extradition of fugitives
who have committed the former. Other tests exist which are more acceptable than the political motivation test for determining the appropriateness of asserting the political offense exception. It is true that none of the
theories nor the application thereof provide a panacea. Indeed,a court
may have difficulties in a given case distinguishing between "wanton violence" or terrorism and "political offenses," but the courts are constitutionally designated to draw lines in difficult circumstances. The courts,
like any institution or person, may err occasionally, but they are capable
of distinguishing wanton violence and terrorism from crimes fitting within
the political offense exception to extradition. The studies emanating from
the Senate and House of Representatives in relation to the proposed federal criminal code have provided guidance as to how the line ought to be
drawn and the bills propounded therein have shown that it is possible to
41
make this differentiation.
III.

Focus

ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE TREATY

Specifically, the Supplementary Treaty seeks to exempt hijacking,
sabotage of aircraft, crimes against internationally protected persons, in-

41. See e.g., S.1940, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., § 3194(e)(2) (1982) (Extradition Reform,
Part M, of Title X, 1983 CIS S523-19 Senate Rpt. 98-225, at 346-50 (1983). 18 U.S.C. §
3184(e) makes it clear that offenses which have been made international crimes via international conventions (on hijacking, for example), may not be subject to the political offense
exception. Moreover, § 3194(e)(2) severely limits the application of the political offense defense in cases of the use of firearms or bombs in a manner that might injure another person.
The defense will obtain in such cases only under extraordinary circumstances. "Extraordinary circumstances"is purposefully left undefined. Id. See also, Anti-terrorism Act: Hearings on ProposedAnti-Terrorism Legislation Before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, 99th Cong., 2nd Ses. (1986) (statement of
Christopher L. Blakesley) (manuscript available upon request from the McGeorge School of
Law, University of the Pacific, or the University of Denver College of Law).
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cluding diplomats and hostage-taking, among other offenses, from coverage under the political offense exception to extradition. These are probably appropriate exceptions. These crimes appropriately may be, and
indeed likely already are, excepted from the political offense exception
under the current state of the law, although Judge Sofaer claims the contrary. 42 Thus, extradition would likely be available for them without the
proposed treaty. If the U.S. Government wants to be certain that this
conduct would not be excepted from extradition, it seems appropriate to
indicate that these offenses are now excepted from the defense. It should
also be noted, however, that Judge Sofaer inaccurately suggests "I that
generally the state with custody of the fugitive cannot, for jurisdictional
reasons, prosecute persons who have committed these offenses of hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, piracy or crimes against internationally
protected persons. However, these are offenses of such magnitude and
danger that they provide jurisdiction to prosecute pursuant to the universality principle of jurisdiction, and pursuant to several multilateral treaties, such as those on airplane hijacking and sabotage, and that on punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons including
diplomatic agents."' In addition, jurisdiction obtains under the protective
principle of jurisdiction, in any country whose sovereignty, national security or other important governmental interest is endangered.45 Thus, it is
misleading for Judge Sofaer to suggest that prosecution for such crimes
would not be possible. Stated more accurately, prosecution by the state
obtaining jurisdiction over the perpetrators would be available.
The other listed crimes for which the political offense exception
would not apply pursuant to the new treaty include murder, manslaughter, malicious assault, kidnapping and specified offenses involving firearms, explosives, and serious property damage. However it poses a problem to lump these offenses together with hijacking, piracy and crimes
against internationally protected persons. For example, murder, malicious
assault, manslaughter, etc. are common crimes. They are also offenses
committted wantonly by terrorists against innocent, non-military targets.
These offenses should be and currently are extraditable. On the other
hand, and this is crucial, the listed offenses are also crimes which could
be charged by the winning side against its opponents in virtually any civil
war or significant insurrection, even though the conduct was engaged
against military targets during armed combat. Excepting these offenses
wholesale from the political offense exception would prevent courts from
determining whether or not the conduct occurred under those circum-

42. See Sofaer, supra note 39, at 5.
43. Sofaer, supra note 39, at 5-6.
44. See Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction Over
ExtraterritorialCrimes, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 685 [hereinafter referred to as Extraditionand
Jurisdiction]; Blakesley, United States Jursidiction Over ExtraterritorialCrime, 73 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109 (1982).
45. Id.
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stances. It could require extradition, even in cases in which the conduct
was necessary in self-defense.46
True, murder, manslaughter, and malicious assault are heinous
crimes. War, also, is heinous. However, it is unwise to enter into a treaty
which reverses the legal tradition that prevents the state institutions from
participating in a foreign victor's justice. Even worse, this amendment
puts at risk the paramount constitutional principle that the judiciary decide questions of fact and law relating to human liberty. To allow this
erosion may well undermine the extradition process as an institution controlled by the rule of law. The impliciations of this evisceration are important and dangerous, not only to United States foreign policy, but also
to the domestic constitutional system.
Judge Sofaer's statement indicated that more treaties would take a
similar line. If the Supplementary Convention with Great Britain under
consideration were finally promulgated, one must ask what are the implications of the treaties with South Korea, 47 South Africa, El Salvador, or
the Philippines? Some states are seen as having strategic importance to
the United States, but also having a questionable reputation for democracy and fairness to political enemies. Indeed, there is evidence that some
regimes who fit this category have used their criminal laws and procedure
to harrass and eliminate political opposition. Is it the function of the Executive Branch to decide matters related to human liberty, faced with the
political and strategic pressures involved today? The evisceration of the
political offense exception allows the risk of the U.S. Government participating as part of these states' "long arm of the law." We must question
the wisdom and constitutionality of such an approach.
Other serious and practical implications need to be addressed. Suppose, hypothetically, that the U.S. entered into this treaty with a friendly
ally of longstanding. Suppose also, tensions developed domestically for
that ally to the point that civil war and a revolution occurred, wherein an
opposition government became ensconced in power. The treaty, as
amended by the Supplementary Convention, would require us either to
extradite those who had fought and caused death or property damage
through their fighting, or to violate the treaty. Obviously, the choice
would be an unhappy one. The proposed treaty in those circumstances
would either cause the U.S. to extradite fugitives who ought not to be
extradited, or to make a mockery of the treaty and the rule of law by
refusing to abide by its terms. If the Executive Branch tells us that treaties such as this will only be entered into with stable, democratic regimes,
do we want to leave the decision on that point to the Executive and bar
the judiciary from considering the questions of human liberty implicated
by the political offense exception?

46. Blakesley, Extradition and Jurisdiction,supra note 44., at 60, notes 167 and 168.
47. Talks on Extradition Treaty Soon to Begin, The Korean Herald, June 26 1985, at
1; as noted in C. Pyle, supra note 24.
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It should not be forgotten that the courts themselves, both in the
United States and abroad, have developed approaches to the application
of the political offense exception, such as the so-called "wanton violence"
or "violence against civilian population" exception."' These provide the
foundation for a judicial determination of whether to conduct of a given
fugitive was a political offense or mere terrorism. Thus, the current state
of the law, both domestically and internationally, already provides methods for the courts to differentiate between "terrorists" or wanton killers
of innocent people, and those who kill active-duty military personnel or
damage government property during a political/military uprising. There
is a difference between a hijacking and a skirmish between non-governmental fighters and governmental military personnel.
Judge Sofaer suggests the killing of Robert Stethem on TWA-847
would not be an extraditable offense. 49 The distinction between the killing of an off-duty, civilian clothed military person during the hijacking of
a civilian aircraft, and a firefight during a civil war seem significant
enough for courts to distinguish. Extradition pursuant to U.S. anti-hijacking treaties and the modern approaches to distinguishing acts of terrorism, would most likely render the perpetrators of this and most acts of
murder extraditable. Simarily,the recent tragic piracy on the Achille
Lauro would fit within the parameters of our extradition treaty with Italy'
and, although the political offense exception is part of that treaty, the
courts could certainly determine whether the violence and hostage-taking
50
was perpetrated against innocent civilians and not military opponents.
True, if the judiciary must make this decision, it might make a mistake. A
mistake would be tragic. However, even if the government believes the
Executive Branch would not make such mistakes, it seems the judiciary,
armed with jurisprudence developed over the past two-hundred years and
the constitutional mandate to decide such issues of fact and law, is best
equipped to render just decisions case by case. More importantly, failure
to leave this as a judicial perogative is a failure to abide by our primordial
constitutional principles of checks and balances, the separation of powers,
and the notion that questions of law and fact relating to human liberty
are within the province of the judiciary. It behooves the legislature to
draft guidelines to assist the5 judiciary in rendering appropriate and correct decisions in this arena. 1

48. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct.
390 (1981).
49. Sofaer, supra note 39, at 5.
50. Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Italy, arts. II, III, and IV, U.S.
Senate, Treaty Doc. 98-20 (1984). Hostage taking, even when done extraterritorially, was
made a federal crime in 1984, "Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Hostage Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1984). It would be extraditable under the universality
principle (piracy) and article II of the Extradition Treaty, which provides that extradition
will obtain when the conduct constitutes an offense in both contracting parties and is punishable for one year imprisionment or a more serious penalty.
51. Such legislation has been proposed. See, Blakesley's testimony in favor thereof and
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The Senate needs to address the fundamental questions underlying
the deliberations on this proposed treaty to eliminate the risk of error
-if the elimination of the political offense exception would accomplish
that - and whether these cases are worth the concommitant damage that
the government's approach would risk to the basic constitutional system.
The risk of error in extradition matters, as in all criminal law matters, is
the price of liberty. It is shocking that the U.S. Government, in the face
of the constitution, could suggest such decisions ought to be made by the
Executive Branch. The Senate should carefully consider the implications
before removing this type of decision from the judiciary and placing it in
the Executive Branch.
In conclusion, the conceptual and theoretical framework is available
for deciding whether an act is one of terrorism or should fit within the
political offense exception. Development of more efficient or just models
or approaches is necessary, but that is not to say that the courts are incapable of applying the current standards in a manner that will not only
assist in the battle against terrorism, but which will maintain the integrity of the constitutional system of checks and balances, the separation of
powers, and the integrity of the judiciary. The new treaty with Great
Britain assumes the courts are too incompetent or otherwise incapable of
deciding questions of law and fact relating to human liberty. The Executive Branch has proposed a treaty which will usurp for itself the quintessential and constitutionally mandated judicial calling because the Executive Branch and the British Government have been unhappy with the
results in some cases. The Senate and the American people should be
aware of that reality and understand its implications.

Judge Sofaer's testimony in opposition thereto, Anti-terrorism Act: Hearings on Proposed
Anti-terrorist Legislation Before the House of Representatives Committee on the Judici-

ary, Subcommission on Crime, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1986)(manuscript at 43-50).
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In the aftermath of the Achille Lauro hijacking the United States
sought to utilize its bilateral extradition treaties with Italy and Yugoslavia to obtain the provisional arrest of the hijacker's commander, the Palestinian terrorist Mohammed Abbas. These efforts were to no avail, and
the American people were rightly disappointed by this failure of the international extradition process.
Most Americans would be shocked to learn that, in several instances,
our own nation has refused to extradite terrorist fugitives to our democratic allies. In the last few years, the United Kingdom has requested the
extradition of fugitives accused of crimes ranging from murder to bombing, but federal courts have denied the requests on the ground that these
terrorists had committed "political" offenses that were exempt from
extradition.
Decisions such as these have led the U.S. Government to initiate negotiations with several of our extradition treaty partners. The first product of those negotiations, a revision of our treaty with the United Kingdom, was recently approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
This Supplementary Treaty is a necessary modification of our extradition
practice, and is an important step in the legal battle against terrorism.
The Supplementary Treaty amends the extradition treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom.' It explicitly identifies particular crimes - such as airplane hijacking and murder of diplomats that should no longer be regarded as "political offenses." The Supplementary Treaty recognizes that no criminal who commits these specified acts
of violence and destruction should be immune from extradition merely
because he was acting to advance a political objective.
The political offense exception is a long standing doctrine with noble
intentions. The concept has been incorporated into many United States
extradition treaties.2 But the overbroad application of any concept however enlightened- can lead to foolish and anti-social results. The po* Judge Sofaer is Legal Adviser to the Department of State. The author would like to
thank Steven T. Catlett, of his staff, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
2. See, e.g., Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives from Justice, Oct. 26, 1901,
United States-Belgium, 32 Stat. 1894, T.S. No. 409; Treaty of Extradition, May 6, 1931,
United States-Greece, 47 Stat. 2185, T.S. No. 855; Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 3, 1978,
United States-Japan, 31 U.S.T. 892, T.I.A.S. No. 9625.
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litical offense exception to extradition is unfortunately no exception to
this fundamental rule.
I.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION

The political offense exception is, above all, an exception. The basic
tradition of international law applicable with respect to fugitives from
justice is one of cooperation between nations to enhance their capacity to
maintain the lawful order and security upon which all liberty ultimately
depends. The oldest known document in diplomatic history - a peace
treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince Hittusili III,
concluded in 1290 B. C. - provided for the exchange of criminals of one
nation found in the territory of the other. 3 This principle of cooperation
in extraditing fugitives has survived to modern times.
The great 18th century revolutions were based, in part, upon the notion that individuals have the right to engage in revolutionary political
activity in pursuit of liberty. Those were times when today's democracies
were ruled by kings and emperors, when universal suffrage did not exist,
and when the mere open, verbal criticism of a ruler was frequently regarded as sedition or treason. In the wake of those revolutions, the emerging democracies of Western Europe did not want to surrender to foreign
sovereigns' revolutionaries who had committed offenses in the course of
exercising their political rights. The Jacobean Constitution of 1793, reflecting this revolutionary spirit, declared that the French people "grant
asylum to foreigners banished from their countries for the cause of freedom."' 4 The same sentiment gave rise to the seminal provision in the Belgian extradition law of 1833, which provided that a fugitive "shall not be
prosecuted or punished for any political offense ... nor for any act connected to such crime
From its inception, the political offense exception has been applied
without significant controversy to "pure" political offenses, which are
those directly related to the security of the state: sedition, treason and
the like. Governments and courts have had little trouble excepting these
offenses from extradition. By contrast, application of the exception to
"relative" political offenses has always been problematic. Relative political offenses are common, often violent crimes - such as murder and arson - whose perpetrators nevertheless claim immunity from extradition
because their criminal acts were allegedly committed in the course of a
rebellion or for a political purpose.
Historically, claims of immunity from extradition based on "relative"

3. See Langdon & Gardiner, The Treay of Alliance Between Hittusili King of the Hit-

tites and the PharaohRamses II of Egypt, 6 J. EGYPTIAN ARCHAEOLOGY 179 (1920).
4. French Const. of 1793, art. 120, reprinted in 6 L. DUGUIT, H. MONNIER & R. BONLois POLITIQUES DE LA FRANCE DEPIus 1789
(6th ed. 1952)(emphasis added).
5. CODES BELGES, 1927 at 1113, 8 BULL. OFF. 1195. See generally Deere, Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 Am. J. INT'L L. 247, 250-53 (1933).
NARD, LES CONSTITUTIONS ET LES PRINCIPALES
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political offenses have posed difficulties for civilized nations. For example,
in 1855, a Belgian court invoked the political offense exception to deny a
French request for extradition fo a fugitive who had placed a bomb under
the railway line over which Emperor Napoleon III was traveling.6 This
decision led the Belgian legislature - the country in which the exception
was first codified - to amend the 1833 extradition law to refuse to recognize as political offenses certain common crimes used by terrorists for political ends. The statute provided:
An attempt (attentat) against the person of the head of a foreign government or against the members of his family, when this attempt constititutes that act of murder, assassination or poisoning, shall not be
considered as a political offense or an act in connection with a political offense. 7
This provision, known as an "attentat clause", gained widespread acceptance as a limitation on the political offense exception.
Courts have continued to grapple with the political offense exception
through the years. For example, in 1891, Britain's Queen's Bench divisional court considered a Swiss extradition request for one Castioni, a fugitive who had shot and killed a State Council member in the course of
an armed attack upon a municipal building. In a landmark decision, the
justices held that a criminal act was not protected under the political offense exception if committed merely "in the course of" a political conflict
or uprising; it must also be done "in furtherance of" a political cause. The
court found that Castioni had acted as a participant in an insurrection,
that the shooting had, in fact, not been an act of personal malice against
the victim. The justices therefore ruled that the offense was political and
denied extradition.' American courts that have recently refused extradition have relied heavily on the ruling in Castioni.s
Three years after Castioni, however, the British courts refined the
doctrine. The French Government requested extradition of one Meunier,
who had bombed a crowded cafe and an army barracks. Meunier fought
extradition by invoking the political offense exception. Justice Cave held
that, for an offense to be judged political, "there must be two or more
parties in the State, each seeking to impose the Government of their
choice on the other." Meunier, the court found, was an anarchist who was
the enemy of all organized society. Accordingly, he was not subject to the
exception and was ordered extradited. 10
While Castioni, narrowly construed, may have made sense when it

6. Judgment of Feb. 17, 1855, Cour d'appel, Brussels, 1 Pasicrisie Beige 115.
7. Deere, supra note 5, at 252.
8. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
9. See, e.g., In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979); see
also Hannay, International Terrorism and the PoliticalOffense Exception to Extradition,
18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 401 (1979) (criticizing the Magistrate in McMullen because
he "mechanically applied" Castioni).
10. In re Meunier, [18941 2 Q.B. 415.

DEN. J. INT'L

L. &

POL'Y

VOL. 15:1

was decided, it makes no sense today to deny extradition to a nation such
as Switzerland - with a democratic political system and a fair system of
justice - in such a case involving a man who attempts to impose his will
on the people through murder. If civilized society is to defend itself
against terrorist violence, some offenses committed in or against stable
democracies must fall outside the scope of the exception, even though
they are politically motivated. The Meunier decision represents an early
recognition that legal principles such as the political offense exception are
based on the determination of sovereign nations to refuse, for humane or
ideological reasons, to cooperate with other nations in the enforcement of
criminal statutes. These principles do not create "rights" in the individuals who assert them. Each nation must decide how far to extend the doctrine based on its own values, and many have refused to shield from justice individuals who would destroy the freedoms and lives of others to
gain political advantage."
II.

ABUSE OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION

A few examples should illustrate how some courts have extended the
doctrine too far, and how harmful and unacceptable the results can be. In
1972, two American citizens, Holder and Kerkow, hijacked a domestic
U.S. flight, extorted $500,000 from the airline that owned the plane, and
forced the pilot to fly to Algeria. They were indicted in the United States
for aircraft piracy, kidnapping, and extortion. The United States requested their extradition to stand trial. Although the crimes were extraditable offenses under the U.S.-France Extradition Treaty,12 a French
court denied extradition in 1975. The court noted that, at one point in
the skyjacking, Holder had demanded that the plane be flown to Hanoi.
(He later dropped that demand.) The court held that Holder's invocation
of Hanoi as his destination demonstrated that he had acted out of political motive, thus bringing the crimes within the scope of the political offense exception. 13
Another egregious example of overbroad application of the exception
resulted from the 1973 hijacking by five U.S. citizens of a domestic flight.
They demanded and received $1 million in ransom for the passengers'
release and then forced the plane to fly to Algeria. Two of the fugitives
had escaped from prison, where they had been serving sentences for murder and armed robbery. The five fugitives later made their way to France

11. For example, over twenty European nations, including the Republic of Ireland, are
parties to a convention that, inter alia, modifies the political offense exception. See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed Jan. 27, 1977, entered into force
Aug. 4, 1978, Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976).
12. See Extradition Convention, Jan. 6, 1909, United States-France, 37 Stat. 1526, T.S.
No. 561; Supplementary Extradition Convention, Feb. 12, 1970, United States-France, 22
U.S.T. 407, T.I.A.S. No. 7075.
13. See E. McDoWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168
(1975).
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and the United States sought their extradition. A French court, however,
refused to extradite. The court accepted the fugitives' claims that they
had hijacked the plane to escape racial segregation in the United States
and that the charges against them constituted political persecution. The
court therefore implicitly held that the skyjacking and extortion were political offenses. 4
Several court decisions in the United States have applied the political offense exception as expansively and unreasonably as it has been applied against the U.S. by other nations. For example, in Karadzole v. Artukovic,'5 the Ninth Circuit considered Yugoslavia's extradition request
for one Andrija Artukovic. Artukovic was charged with sending thousands
of civilians to Nazi death camps while he was Minister of the Interior of
the wartime puppet government of Croatia. The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that Artukovic should not be extradited. Both
courts held that his crimes were "political". Several recent decisions are
similarly shocking. They all concern Provisional Irish Republican Army
(PIRA) fugitives," but the U.S. Government's objections to them are
based on principle, not on an opposition to any particular movement.
One example concerns William Quinn. He was accused of a variety of
crimes, including the placing of bombs in public places (such as a railway
station, a pub, and a restaurant) and the mailing of letter bombs to a
Roman Catholic Bishop, a judge, and a London newspaper. These bombs
caused significant damage. One letter bomb exploded in a judge's face
and a guard who opened another letter bomb lost his left hand. Quinn
was eventually stopped by a policeman in London for questioning about a
burglary. He fled, and another policeman tried to arrest him. Quinn shot
the policeman three times, killing him.
Quinn escaped to the United States, where he was arrested in San
Francisco and his extradition was sought by the United Kingdom. The
evidence of his guilt was overwhelming - his fingerprints were on the
bombs, and the gun that killed the policeman was in his apartment. Nevertheless, in 1983 a federal district court barred Quinn's extradition, ruling that a "political uprising" existed in the United Kingdom and that
7
Quinn's acts of murder and bombing were "incidental" to that uprising.1
The Ninth Circuit recently vacated this decision and held Quinn extraditable.18 But the grounds for the Circuit Court decision are remarkable.

14. See E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12425 (1976).
15. 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 355 U.S. 393
(1958). Artukovic was later deported to Yugoslavia to stand trial.
16. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Mackin, Mag. No. 86 Cr.
Misl. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal denied, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen,
Mag. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979); Quinn v. Robinson, No. CV-82-6688
RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), vacated and remanded, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
17. Quinn v. Robinson, No. CV-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 1983), vacated and
remanded, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
18. 783 F.2d at 817.
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The court merely held that the District Court had incorrectly assessed
the scope of the "political uprising", and that it existed only in Northern
Ireland.' 9 Quinn's crimes took place in London, hence they could not be
deemed political offenses.2" Thus, Quinn merely chose the wrong location
for his acts. Under the Quinn decision, he, and other PIRA terrorists,
would be free to murder and bomb without losing the potential benefits
of the political offense exception, as long as they did so in Northern
Ireland.
Another example involved Joseph Patrick Doherty, who blasted his
way out of a prison in Belfast and fled to the United States while awaiting a court's decision on charges of murder, attempted murder, and possession of firearms with intent to endanger life. Doherty was convicted
two days after his escape and the United Kingdom sought his extradition
based upon his conviction and on new charges relating to his escape.
Based on his review of Irish history and politics, a U.S. district judge
concluded that a political conflict existed in Northern Ireland and that
Doherty's offenses had been committed "in the furtherance of that struggle." The judge recognized that: "it would be most unwise as a matter of
policy to extend the benefit of the political offense exception to every
fanatic group or individual with loosely defined political objectives who
commit acts of violence in the name of those so-called political objectives." 12' The judge, nevertheless, drew an exception for the PIRA. After
an analysis of its nature, structure, and the mode of its internal discipline, the court concluded that PIRA has "both an organization, discipline, and command structure that distinguishes it from more amorphous
groups such as the Black Liberation Army or the Red Brigade."' 22 The
judge declared that Doherty's offenses were political and denied
extradition.2 3
What the PIRA and other less structured terrorist groups have in
common is far more significant in applying the political offense exception
than the ways in which they may differ. All of these groups exhibit a
willingness to engage in violence to achieve political ends. Furthermore,
many radical groups in the U.S. and Europe, as well as their attorneys,
would challenge the conclusion that they lack the necessary structure or
would otherwise fail to constitute a rebellious force. Some have thousands
of "fighters", such as the PLO, or supporters, such as the radical religious
groups on the West Bank who have killed and maimed several Arabs.
Others may be smaller, but they are nevertheless organized and have concrete political objectives which they seek to achieve by force.
This has led to an intolerable situation. We must not allow our country to become a haven for criminals who belong to groups that use vio-

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 81.
Id. at 81-82.
In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 277.
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lence for political ends against the citizens of other countries - just as we
expect that foreign governments should not harbor terrorists who commit
violence against U.S. citizens.
III.

REFORMING THE POLITICAL EXCEPTION

Some commentators assert that reform of the doctrine is not necessary, and maintain that courts already possess adequate doctrinal tools to
prevent terrorists from using the political offense exception as a shield
from justice. They claim, even in the face of decisions like Doherty that
the United States does not extend the political offense doctrine to fugitives who commit "wanton crimes". This so-called wanton crimes exception originated in Eain v. Wilkes. 24 In Eain, the Court held that political
offenses were acts that disrupt the political structure of a State, and not
the social structure that established the government." [Thus] the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a protected
political act even when the larger "political" objective of the person who
sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian population of a
country.2"
While the Eain decision is certainly a welcome recognition of the
inappropriateness of violence as a political tool in a democracy, any claim
that, after Eain, the United States does not extend the political offense
exception to fugitives who commit "wanton crimes" is misleading and exaggerated for several reasons. First, unfortunately, this decision has not
been followed by other jurisdictions. 2 Second, Eain did not hold that attacks on civilians could never fall within the scope of the political offense
exception and did not rule on whether attacks on individual military or
other government personnel, such as policemen, constituted acts that
"disrupt the political structure of a state" and thus were political, or if
they were acts that "disrupt the social structure", and thus not political.
Instead, the Eain court held that under the facts of the case, there were
no direct links between the perpetrator, a political organization's goals,
and the specific act.
Seen in this light, Eain does not support assertions that the United
States does not extend the political offense exception to those committing
wanton crimes. The limited reach of Eain is yet another demonstration of
the necessity for reform of the political offense doctrine.
Reform of the exception can occur in either of two ways: across-theboard reform through amendment of our extradition statute, or treaty24. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
25. Id. at 521; see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 477 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1984), Reporters' Note 6 (characterizing
Eain as holding "that random acts of terror are not political offenses").
26. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
477 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1984), Reporters' Note 6 (noting that, as of 1984, Eain had not been
uniformly accepted); see also Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986) (criticizing

Eain).
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by-treaty revision, by amending our extradition treaties with certain
countries. Unsuccessful attempts have been made to amend our extradition statute. Such efforts cannot be exclusive. A legislative approach
would be uniform, applicable to our extradition relations with every country. Uniformity, however, is no advantage in this situation. We currently
have extradition treaties in effect with almost one hundred other nations.
These nations include stable democracies and countries that have suffered instability or have undemocratic regimes.2 7
While it is important to maintain extradition relations with as many
countries as possible, we need not treat every regime identically. Some of
these nations do not permit opponents of the government in power any
lawful means of political dissent. With respect to such countries, the political offense exception has a greater role to play than with respect to the
stable democracies, where it has unfortunately become a shield behind
which terrorists can hide.
This fundamental difficulty with modifying the exception through
amendment of our extradition statute has led us to pursue a more narrow,
carefully-drawn approach. Instead of across-the-board modification, we
have decided to seek treaty-by-treaty revision. This allows us to tailor the
political offense exception's reach to account for the nature of the country
with which we are dealing. The Supplementary Treaty with the United
Kingdom is the first completed step in this process. The United Kingdom
meets the criteria we have established: its political system is amenable to
redress legitimate grievances and the judicial system provides fair treatment. Obviously other nations offer a similar degree of freedom for peaceful political dissent. We are seeking to negotiate limitations of the political offense exception with such countries. Moreover, the Supplementary
Treaty makes the political offense exception unavailable only for certain
listed offenses, such as murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and hijacking,
which are not permissible means to express political dissent in a democratic regime that offers nonviolent alternatives.
CONCLUSION

The Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom
and other modifications of the political offense exception, are important
steps in applying the rule of law to terrorism. Certainly further steps will
be necessary, but we cannot continue to permit our courts to endorse the
use of violence to accomplish political goals. In stable democracies like
the United States and the United Kingdom, there is another way. The

27. See, e.g., Treaty Relating to the Reciprocal Extradition of Criminals, Dec. 18, 1947,
United States-South Africa, 2 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243; Extradition Treaty and Accompanying Protocol, Nov. 22, 1927, United States-Poland, 46 Stat. 2282, T.S. No.789; Extradition Treaty, July 23, 1924, United States-Romania, 44 Stat. 2020, T.S. No.713; Convention
Relating to Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No.
5476; Treaty on Extradition, May 24, 1973, United States-Paraguay, 25 U.S.T. 967, T.I.A.S.
No.7838.
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Supplementary Extradition Treaty, through its modification of the political offense exception, will eliminate the availability of the United States
as a haven for those unwilling to use peaceful means. It is also an essential step to enable us credibly to urge other nations to extradite terrorists
to this country. Thus, revision of the political offense exception and ratification of the Supplementary Treaty. is a moral imperative. Without it, we
contribute to the increase in terrorism by providing shelter to its practitioners, and provide a morally deficient example to the other nations of
the world. We must stop letting terrorists get away with murder.

\
\,

CASE COMMENT
In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH: A Critical
Analysis
BY JANE ANN LANDRUM*

I. INTRODUCTION
John R. Brown, Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit United States
Court of Appeals concluded in In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3102 (U.S. July
17, 1985) (No. 85-98), that Anschuetz, a West German corporation, which
was subject to in personam jurisdiction in a federal district court, must
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and provide interrogatories, documents and notices of deposition for use in the American court.
Judge Brown concluded that the Federal Rules would not be supplanted
by the Hague Evidence Convention. When a party was subject to an
American court's jurisdiction, he believed, it was not mandatory to obey
this international treaty.
Judge Brown's discussion in this case is riddled with complications.
The purpose of this case comment is to evaluate and criticize the Anschuetz decision, and to explore some workable alternatives.
II.

FACTS OF ANSCHUETZ

In January of 1979, a collision between two ferry boats precipitated
an action between the Mississippi River Bridge Authority and Compania
Gijonesa de Navegacion S.A. (Gijonesa). Gijonesa brought a third-party
complaint against Anschuetz, a West German corporation, alleging the
failure of a steering device designed by Anscheutz as a contributing cause
of the accident. In October of 1983, Gijonesa amended its complaint to
allege product liability claims against Anschuetz and embarked on a
round of discovery involving interrogatories, requests for production of
documents and notices of depositions. In January of 1984, Anschuetz
moved for a protective order with respect to all these requests. In February, the United States Magistrate ordered Anschuetz to comply with
Gijonesa's discovery demands. On April 18, 1984, Anschuetz moved for a
protective order based on the Hague Evidence Convention to stop the
* Jane Ann Landrum is a J.D. candidate at the University of Denver, College of Law.
B.A. 1984, Graceland College.
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depositions scheduled to take place in West Germany on May 2, 1984.
The Magistrate denied the motion. Anschuetz appealed to the district
judge, but the judge upheld the Magistrate's denial. When Anschuetz appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for a Writ of Mandamus,
Judge Brown's decision followed.'
III.

THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

A. Definitions
The Multilateral Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters2 was ratified and entered
into force by the United States on October 7, 1972 and by the Federal
Republic of Germany on April 27, 1979. The preamble to the Convention
identifies its dual purposes: (1) to facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of Request and to accomodate the different methods used
for such actions; and (2) to improve mutual judicial cooperation in civil
and commercial matters.3
Professor Philip W. Amram', a prominent American proponent of
the Hague Convention, described the Convention and its purposes as
follows:
The Convention recognizes the use of letters of request, the technique
used in the civil law, as the principal means of obtaining evidence
abroad. However, the Convention permits increasing the powers of
Consuls to take evidence, codifies existing rights to take evidence informally without the use of judicial authorities, and introduces into
the civil law world on a limited basis the concept of taking evidence
by commissioners.
Articles 1 and 23 define the letters of request regulated by the Convention. Letters must issue from a "judicial" authority and must be issued in a "civil or commercial matter." They must be used to "obtain
evidence" or to perform some "other judicial act.""
Other relevant articles for the discussion of Anschuetz are the
following:
Article 9 requires the requested authority to follow any special proce-

1. For a full account of the facts see In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 604605 (5th Cir. 1985).
2. Multilateral Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial
Matters, done 18 March 1970 (1972), 23 U.S.T. 2555, TIAS No. 7444, 8 I.L.M. 37 (1969).
3. Id.
4. Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on International Rules and Judicial Procedure, and a delegate of the United States to the Hague Conferences on Private International Law in 1956, 1964, and 1968, and the Conference on the
Proposed Convention.
5. Amram, Note: United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad, 67 Am. J. INT'L L. 104 (1973).
6. The Hague Evidence Convention, supra, note 2.
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dure specified by the requesting authority, subject to the limits of incompatibility, etc.
Article 10 states: in executing a letter of request the requested authority shall apply the appropriate measures of compulsion in the instances and to the same extent as are provided by its internal law for the
execution or orders issued by the authorities of its own country or of requests made by parties in internal proceedings.
Article 12(b) directs that execution of a letter of request may be refused if the state addressed considers that its sovereignty or security
would be prejudiced thereby.
Article 23 states: A contracting State may at the time of signature,
ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents
in Common Law countries.
Article 27 states that the Convention "shall not prevent a contracting
state methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this
Convention."
The Hague Convention was designed to facilitate the process of obtaining evidence in foreign countries without doing violence to the rights
of foreign nationals in their own countries, or to each country's notion of
its own sovereignty.8 Professor Amram concluded:
What the Convention has done is to provide a.set of minimum standards to which all countries may subscribe. It also provides a flexible
framework within which any future liberalizing changes in policy and
tradition in any country, with respect to international cooperation,
may be translated into effective change in international procedures.
At the same time it recognizes and preserves procedures of a country
that now or hereafter may provide international cooperation in the
taking of evidence on more liberal and less restrictive bases, whether
this is effected by side agreement, side convention or internal law and
practice.9
The United States Justice Department views the Convention as "a
great step forward in the area of international judicial assistance in civil
and commercial matters."10

7. It is the position of the Federal Republic of Germany that, according to the legislative history and the purpose of Article 9, the provision for declining to proceed in a specially
requested way are to be construed narrowly, i.e., it must be genuinely impossible, not merely
impracticable, to correspond with the requested method. Shemanski, ObtainingEvidence in
the FRG: The Impact of the Hague Evidence Convention on German-American Judicial
Cooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 472 (1982).
8. Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A.J.
651,655 (1969).
9. Id.
10. Boyd, Contemporary Practiceof the United States Relating to InternationalLaw,
72 Am. J. INT'L L. 119, 133-134 (1978); as cited in Oxman, The Choice Between Direct
Discovery and Other Means of ObtainingEvidence Abroad: The Impact of the Hague Evi-
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In recommending ratification, Professor Amram described the possible effects of the Convention: "It makes no major changes in United
States procedure and requires no major changes in United States legislation or rules. On the front, it will give United States courts and litigants
abroad enormous aid by providing an international agreement for the
taking of testimony, the absence of which has created barriers to our
courts and litigants."'"
Civil law nations (e.g. the FRG), on the other hand, agreed to make
the cooperative procedures for securing evidence in their territory more
effective even to the point of requiring their courts to use some commonlaw practices alien to them, such as the ability of Commissioners to
gather evidence in their country. The Convention was proposed in a
'spirit of accomodation'. Grounded in that agreement was an expectation
that the Convention procedures would be used and that their territorial
sensitivities would be respected. 2
According to Professor Bernard H. Oxman's, even if the treaty did
not foreclose all other options for the state seeking evidence abroad (as
articulated in Article 23 above), it may require a state to consider in good
faith the use of the Convention's procedures before resorting to procedures that are not permitted by the internal law or policy of the state
where the evidence is located.' 4 In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
etc. v. Superior Court, Alameda County 5 (VWAG 1982), a California
Court of Appeals cited Article 27 of the Convention to conclude that "the
Convention established not a fixed rule but rather a minimum measure of
international cooperation. The articles within the Convention should
therefore be flexible. In light of the different understandings of 'pre-trial'
procedures in civil law and common law countries, it is more likely that
foreign courts would honor requests that reflect an American court's decision that each item of evidence sought is properly relevant and necessary
for the just disposition of a precise issue or plausible claim."'"
B. The Anschuetz Opinion
The Anschuetz court declared initially that the Hague Convention is
permissive rather than mandatory, pursuant to another district court's
ruling in Lasky v. Continental Products Corporation, et al.' 7 In Lasky,

dence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REv. 733, 761.
11. Amram, supra note 8.
12. Id.
13. Professor of Law at University of Miami School of Law, Miami, Ohio.
14. Authority for such a synthesis could be found in the liberal rule that a "treaty shall
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/-27 (1979), as cited in
Oxman, supra note 10 at 761.
15. 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1982).
16. VWAG 1982, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
17. 569 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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the court cited Article 27 of the Convention in support of its conclusion
that the Convention "shall not prevent a contracting state from using
methods of taking evidence other than those provided for in this Convention."'" Judge Brown distinguished his case from the three prominent
California cases," holding that the state laws in those cases needed to
yield to the supremacy of a federal treaty, but "the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have the force and effect of a federal statutes,"2 so they need
not yield to a federal treaty.2 ' The Anschuetz court touched only briefly
on the purpose of the Hague Convention, which was so clearly and adamantly expressed in VWAG 1982. The VWAG 1982 court held that "the
Hague Convention provides international access, by means consistent
with local sovereignty, to evidence within West Germany. One of the
principal objects of a Convention on this subject is to bridge differences
between common law and civil law nations. '22 Instead, Judge Brown
dwelled on the reservations in the Convention. He said articles such as
Article 2323 allow states to limit the scope of evidence taking for which
they will employ their compulsory powers on behalf of foreign courts, but
does not give foreign authorities the significant prerogative of determining how much discovery may be taken from their nationals who are litigants before American courts. 2 4 "If the Anschuetz corporation were to
have its way, foreign authorities would be the final arbiters of what evidence may be taken from their nationals, even when those nationals are
2
parties properly within the jurisdiction of an American court." 5
IV.

INTERNATIONAL COMITY

A. Definitions
Courts which agree that personal jurisdiction affords them the right
to use the domestic procedural laws, recognize at the same time the countervailing force of international comity. International comity is "the concept that the courts of one sovereign state should not, as a matter of
18. The Hague Convention, supra note 2, Art. 27.
19. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court in and for County of Sacramento (VWAG 1973), 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct. App. 1973); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, etc. v. Superior Court, Alameda County (VWAG 1982), 123 Cal.
App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1982); and Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County (Pierburg), 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App.
1982). In these state court cases, the judges ruled that the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution dictated that a Federal treaty preempted state procedural law.
20. United States for Use of Tanos v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 361 F.2d 838
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966); cited in Anschuetz, at 608.
21. In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 608.
22. VWAG 1982, 176 Cal. Rptr., at 881.
23. Article 23 of the Convention states that a contracting state may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute letters of request issued for
the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as known in common law countries. See The Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 2.
24. In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 612.
25. Id.
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sound international relations, require acts or forbearances within the territory, and inconsistent with the internal laws, of another sovereign state
unless a careful weighing of competing interests and alternate means
make clear that the order is justified; judicial restraint is the basis of this
concept which American courts traditionally recognize."26
To allow a forum court to substitute the Hague Convention with its
own practices would not promote uniformity in the gathering of evidence
nor generate a spirit of cooperation among signatories to the treaty.27
Traditional rules of international comity prohibit court orders that are
inconsistent with another state's laws, unless a balancing of competing
interests and alternatives justifies the order.28 Judicial self-restraint is a
policy of avoiding international discovery methods productive of friction
with the procedures of host nations." The failure of one litigant in a domestic action to demand compliance with the Convention cannot divest
the foreign nation of its sovereign judicial rights under the Convention.
The Convention may be waived only by the nation whose judicial sovereignty would thereby be infringed upon.30
Competing interests were weighed in Graco v. Kremlin, Inc.,31 by the
standards in RESTATEMENT SECOND OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40
(1963), which require each State to consider moderating its jurisdiction in
the light of such factors as:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the
territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person,
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be32expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by
that state.

The Graco court also noted that the

RESTATEMENT SECOND

§ 40 was

not tailored specifically to resolve conflicts between foreign laws and discovery requests. However, RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW §. 420 (Tentative Draft No. 3)(1980), gives courts guidelines in this
situation. The factors are:

26. VWAG 1982, 176 Cal. Rptr., at 883.
27. 100 F.R.D. AT 60.
28. Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH)(18 Av. Cas. par. 17,
222), as cited in Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Bob Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984).
29. VWAG 1982, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior
Court in and for the County of Sacramento, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct.
App. 1973).
30. Pierburg Gmblt & Co. KG v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 137 Cal. App.
3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 876 (Ct. App. 1982).
31. Graco v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
32. See Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 512.
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(a) the importance of the documents or information,
(b) the specificity of the request,
(c) the origin of the documents,
(d) the extent to which the foreign state's interests are implicated,
and
(e) the possibility of securing the information through alternate
means."3
In the United States, evidence gathering in civil litigation is primarily a function of the parties, not of the court. A party seeking evidence
here for use in a civil action abroad does not usurp the authority of any
United States court, so long as no compulsion is involved. In many civil
law countries, however, the gathering of evidence is an exercise of "judicial sovereignty" entrusted exclusively to the courts.84
The Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has stated:
In drafting the Convention, the doctrine of "judicial sovereignty" had
to be constantly borne in mind. Unlike the common-law practice,
which places upon the parties to the litigation the duty of privately
securing and presenting the evidence at the trial, the civil law considers obtaining of evidence a matter primarily for the courts, with the
parties in the subordinate position of assisting the judicial
authorities. 8
The Report went on to state:
[t]he act of taking evidence in a common-law country from a willing
witness, without compulsion and without a breach of the peace, in aid
of a foreign proceeding, is a purely private matter, in which the host
country has no interest and in which its judicial authorities have normally no wish to participate. To the contrary, the same act in a civillaw country may be a public matter, and may constitute the performance of a public judicial act by an unauthorized foreign person. It may
violate the "judicial sovereignty" of the host country, unless its authorities participate or give their consent. This civil law approach has
a direct bearing upon choice among the three general methods of taking evidence abroad.3 '
In S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey) 37 , the Permanent Court of International Justice held that "a State may not directly invoke its compulsory
process against foreign nationals in the territory of a sovereign state without the latter state's consent." West Germany, since its inception, has
taken the position that gathering of evidence within the state by a foreign
state may be regarded as a violation of West German's judicial sover-

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Oxman, supra note 10 at 762.
Id.
Id.
1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, (Judgment of Sept. 7).
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eignty.38 Politically, every intrusion by a court of one nation into the sovereign domain of a foreign nation has the potential for creating a political
problem between the nations concerned, because it may be regarded as an
infringement on a country's territorial sovereignty.
To alleviate this problem somewhat, West Germany and the United
States signed a Treaty of Friendship 9 which provides that:
Each Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable treatment to
the nationals and companies of the other Party and to their property,
enterprises and other interests... [the] offices, warehouses, factories
and other premises of nationals and companies of either Party are
Subject to official search and examinations. . .only according to law. 4
The relevant law is presumably that of the place where such premises
are located. 4' The two countries agreed this treaty would stay intact after
the adoption of the Hague Evidence Convention.42 There is another area
of law incorporated into international comity. The "constitutional law"
that orders relations among separate nations is customary international
law as well as treaties and other agreements to which the nations are parties. The basic treaty provisions requiring respect for a foreign state as a
sovereign equal, and protection of the rights and interests of its nationals
and companies, are set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
Among the interests to be weighed, the concept of "territorial sovereignty" is rooted in the U.N. Charter as .well as U.S. precedent and I.C.J.
case-law. The U.N. General Assembly declared that sovereign equality of
all member nations includes the concepts that:
(a) States are juridically equal;
(b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;
(c) Each State has the duty to respect the personality of other States;
(d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State
are inviolable ....43
Chief Justice Marshall authored the American formulation of the
principle of territorial sovereignty in 1812: "The jurisdiction of the nation
within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of [sic] no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction. . . .[T]he jurisdiction of

38. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, etc. v. Superior Court, Alameda County, 176
Cal. Rptr., 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (Ct. App. 1982), citing Report of United
States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference (1969) reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
785, 804, 806; Edwards, Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (1969)
18 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 618, 646, 647.

39. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United
States-West Germany, art. I., 1, 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
40. Id.
41. Oxman, supra note 10 at 746.
42. Id. at 745.
43. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1; as cited in Oxman, supra note 10 at 733.
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courts is a branch of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power.' 4 This is in agreement with the P.C.I.J.'s views in
The S.S. Lotus case.
B. The Anschuetz Opinion
In the Anschuetz case, the West German government's and the
United States Department of Justice's opinions were clearly set out. The
German government stated that "the taking of oral depositions in Kiel,
Germany, and the production of documents located in Kiel, would be a
violation of German sovereignty unless the order is transmitted according
to a letter of request as specified in the [Hague Evidence] Convention.'
It can therefore be implied that with full knowledge of all the provisions
of the Convention, West Germany would have accepted and executed letters of request properly given to them. The Department of Justice contended that the Hague Convention is not the exclusive method of obtaining evidence and that the district court's order regarding document
production did not conflict with any treaty obligation of the United
States under the Convention. The Department of Justice, however, urged
that a careful comity analysis be employed by courts before departing
from the mechanisms of the Convention. It is also the Department's position that a district court's order of depositions to be conducted on German soil is a violation of the international law obligations of the United
States.' 6 The Department of State supports the German position, and has
offered in the past "its own services in transmitting letters rogatory to the
German authorities as provided by federal law' 7 and the Hague Evidence
8
Convention.4
The Anschuetz court did not heed the above authorities' advice, and
chose instead to take a stricter view of international comity. Using the
definition in Companie FrancaiseD'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum,'4 Judge Brown concluded that "American
courts should refrain, whenever it is feasible, from ordering a person to
engage in activities that would violate the laws of a foreign nation. Comity, however, is not a matter of absolute obligation. . .; it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens
or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." ' 50 The An-

44. The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
45. In re Anschuetz at 605.
46. Id.
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b); as cited in VWAG 1973, 33 Cal. App.3d, at 505.
48. The Hague Convention, done Mar. 18, 1970, (1972) 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
7444, 8 I.L.M. 37 (1969).
49. Companie Francaise D'Assurance Pour le Commerce Exterieur v. Philips Petroleum, 105 F.R.D. 16.
50. In re Anschuetz, at 609; citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), and Companie
Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 28.
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schuetz court also relied on Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik1 to define international comity. The Murphy court decided
that: (1) to require a litigant to proceed first under the Convention at a
relatively late stage in discovery, and particularly where it appears that a
request for production of documents under the Convention would be futile; (2) the United States interest in facilitating the manner in which
foreign citizens doing business in the United States are available for litigation far outweighs West German's interest in protecting the integrity of
its judicial rights and procedures and; (3) in the interest of the parties
and of sound judicial administration generally, unnecessary delay in discovery should not be tolerated.52 The Lasky court as well as the Murphy
court recognized that they must exercise self-restraint pursuant to principles of international comity, but reasoned that where it was not clear that
compliance with discovery would require a violation of West German law
or impinge upon the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany's
law, discovery could go forward under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce53
dure and the Hague Evidence Convention would not be applied.
The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b) provides the same three
procedures" (i.e., discovery through a Consul, a court-appointed commissioner, or a letter rogatory [letter of request]), but unlike the Convention,
states further that it is not requisite to the issuance of a commission or a
letter rogatory that the taking of the deposition in any other manner is
impracticable or inconvenient; and both a commission and a letter rogatory may be issued in proper cases. 55 A notice or commission may designate the person before whom the deposition is to be taken either by name
or descriptive title. A letter rogatory may be addressed "To the Appropri56
ate Authority in (here name the country)".
The Anschuetz court relied on United States v. First National City
Bank57 , in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held "it is no
longer open to doubt that a federal court has the power to require the
production of documents located in foreign countries if the court has in
personam jurisdiction of the person in possession or control of
materials. 58

51. Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360 (D. Vt. 1984).
52. Id. at 363.
53. Lasky, 560 F. Supp. at 1228-1229.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b): In a foreign country, depositions may be taken (1) on notice
before a person authorized to administer oaths in the place in which the examination is
held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United States; or (2) before a person
commissioned by the court, and a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of
his commission to administer any necessary oath and take testimony; or (3) pursuant to a
letter rogatory [i.e. letter of request]. A commission or a letter rogatory shall be issued on
application and notice and on terms that are just and appropriate.
55. Id.

56. Id.
57. United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968).
58. Id. at 900.
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Another court disagreed with this assumption. In PhiladelphiaGear
9
Corporation v. American Pfauter Corporation"
, a Pennsylvania court
conceded that "a corporation doing business in this jurisdiction. . .remains subject to any discovery orders that might issue. . . [but
went on to declare that] the proper exercise of judicial restraint requires
that the avenue of first resort be the Hague Evidence Convention." 6 The
fact that a witness, documents, or a person in control of other evidence
located abroad is subject to the jurisdiction of the court does not necessarily mean the court should apply the ordinary discovery practices of the
forum."' This analysis is in agreement with PhiladelphiaGear in that the
existence of jurisdiction is relative rather than absolute, and should not
be taken out of context.2
The notion that jurisdiction to command appearance before the court
"domesticates" the witness or party for all purposes relevant to the litigation is fallacious.68 Courts should not ignore the foreign nationality or locus of the witness or evidence. To allow a forum court to proceed under
its own practices with no regard to the Hague Evidence Convention or
with no awareness of the need for international cooperation "runs afoul of
the interests of sound international relations and comity.""
The Anschuetz court purported to follow Societe Internationale
65
pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commercials, S.A., etc. v. Rogers,
declaring that "a finding that the production of documents is precluded
by foreign law does not conclude a discovery dispute. A United States
court has the power to order any party within its jurisdiction to testify or
produce documents regardless of a foreign sovereign's views to the contrary." 6 Judge Brown fails to note, however, the deciding factor in Societe Internationale:"The Court must weigh considerations of international comity in determining what sanctions, if any, to impose for a
failure to comply with the court's order. '6 7 The Supreme Court of the
United States then concluded that when good faith efforts to comply with
the production order are shown, and a party fails because to so comply
would subject itself to criminal prosecution, a federal district court cannot impose the sanction of dismissal. It was clear to the Supreme Court
that the inability to satisfy discovery requirements fostered by decisions
and circumstances beyond a party's control constitutes sufficient reason

59. Philadelphia Gear Corporation v. American Pfauter Corporation, 100 F.R.D. 58
(E.D. Pa. 1983).
60. Id. at 61.
61. Oxman, supra note 10.
62. Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 60.
63. Oxman, supra note 10.
64. Philadelphia Gear, 100 F.R.D. at 60.
65. Societe Internationale pour Participations Industrielles et Commercials, S.A., etc. v.

Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
66. Id. at 204, 206.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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for non-compliance."
In re Anschuetz is a demonstration of an American court's exploitation of the tenuous relationship between domestic and international law.
Judge Brown asserted that "insofar as the Anschuetz corporation seeks
discovery it would be permitted the full range of free discovery provided
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But when a United States adversary sought discovery, this discovery would be limited to the cumbersome
'
procedures and narrow range authorized by the Convention." "7
This analysis is inconsistent with any of the facts in the case. Anschuetz corporation gave no indication that it did not also expect to be
bound by the Hague Convention procedures. It merely asked the other
parties to use the Convention as a first resort, and invited further discussion if that proved to be an impossibility. There were no efforts made
whatsoever to apply the Hague Convention.
Domestic procedures should only be limited to the extent of comity
considerations, curtailed discretion, or implied statutory qualifications.
Courts must conform to channels and procedures established by the host
71
nation.
V.

CONCLUSION

If international agreements are ever to be effective, a court must seriously attempt to comply with them before automatically jumping from
the jurisdictional conclusion to the domination of internal over international law. Treaties must always be regarded with the same spirit of cooperation in which they were made; otherwise they are useless. The basic
principles of sound international relations in case-law, statutes, and restatements dictate that the Hague Evidence Convention must be used as
an avenue of first resort. It is a flexible document to be sure, but at the
same time it serves as an assurance to the civil-law countries that the
United States is willing to make some compromises in order to close the
gap a little between civil-law and common-law discovery procedures. Anschuetz dilutes the efforts made by American legislators in 1972, when
the Hague Convention was ratified. A close scrutiny of this case proves
that the court in Anschuetz should have ordered all parties involved to
first make the attempt to use the Hague Evidence Convention.

69. Id.
70. In re Anschuetz at 606.
71. Volkawagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court in and for the County of Sacramento, 33 Cal. App. 3d 503, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct. App. 1973).

NOTE
The Salzgitter Archives: West Germany's
Answer to East Germany's Human Rights
Violations
ELIZABETH

A.

LIPP=I*

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, ties and conflicts between the two
Germanies, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), have served as an important barometer of the
larger relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.'
While a clearly discernible improvement in the political, economic and
cultural climates can be observed in recent years, three major points of
contention remain as a basis of conflict between the two countries:, 1) the
insistence on the part of the GDR that the West Germans recognize East
German citizenship and nationhood;' 2) the demand by the GDR that the
100 kilometer Elbe River border (between the cities of Lauenburg and
Schnakenburg) be relocated to the middle of the river, instead of being
entirely within the Federal Republic of Germany;4 and 3) the GDR request for the dissolution of the Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in Salzgitter5 (Salzgitter Archives), a West German
* Elizabeth A. Lippitt, J.D. 1986, University of Denver; B.A. 1981, Colorado College.
Ms. Lippitt wrote this article while a student at the University of Denver. The author
wishes to express her thanks to Professor Armin Wishard of the Colorado College for his
invaluable assistance and expertise in the preparation of this Note.
1. See, G. GAUS, Wo DEUTSCHLAND LIEGT 234 (1980), W. HEAPS, THE WALL OF SHAME 1
(1964), W. HUBATSCH, THE GERMAN QUESTION 321 (1967), J. MANDER, BERLIN: HOSTAGE FOR
THE WEST 13 (1962).

2. Elbegrenze: Keine Einwtinde der Allierten? Die Welt, Apr. 4, 1984, at 53, col. 1.
3. Die DDR Dringt auf Mehr Respekt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 20, 1981,
at 4, col. 1. See also, SPD Will Aktivere Ostpolitik, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb.
27, 1985, at 1, col. 1. See also, D. CHILDS, THE GDR: Moscow's GERMAN ALLY, FOREIGN
RELATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR RECOGNITION AND BEYOND (1983); H. KIRSCH, THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1985); J. MANDER, BERLIN: HOSTAGE FOR
THE WEST 100-09 (1962)
4. Rechtmdssige Farderungen der DDR zur Kenntnis Nehmen, Siddeutsche Zeitung,
May 6, 1984, at 3, col. 1. See also, DDR Aussenminister Behdrrt auf GeraerFdrderungen,
Horizont, Oct. 6, 1984, at 21; Strauss Verlangt Standfestigkeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Mar. 11, 1981, at 11, col. 1.
5. Central Registration Office of the Federal Judicial System in Salzgitter. This federal
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agency established in 1961 to record and document all human rights violations occurring in East Germany.6 The questions of citizenship and the
border disputes are relatively well known owing to frequent media coverage. 7 The Salzgitter matter is quite unknown outside either Germany.8
The subject of Salzgitter is a controversial one for both Germanies,
but is particularly embarrassing and politically sensitive to the East German government. Since the fall of Hitler's Germany, the Allied occupation, and the building of the Berlin Wall, the East Germans have been
struggling to achieve a degree of political independence and a measure of
respect not only from its West German brothers, but also from the rest of
the world.9 This article examines the East German legal system, the inequities of the present system in the eyes of many Western observers, and
the West German answer to an East German problem: Salzgitter.

I. GDR:

SIGNATORY TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Although the GDR is a socialist state, many of which are notorious
for human rights violations, 10 according to many Western governments
and independent investigations by such organizations as Amnesty International, it is nonetheless a signatory to both the Final Act of the Confer-

agency records and documents civil rights violations occurring in the GDR.
6. Presse des Ministeriums fdr Auswrtige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Aussenpolitische Korrespondenz, 16 (1975).
7. The preamble to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany provides:
The German People in the Lander of Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg,
Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein, Wilttemberg-Baden and Wirttemberg-Hohenzollern,
Conscious of their responsibility before God and men,
Animated by the resolve to preserve their national and political unity and
to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe,
Desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period,
Have enacted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law for the
Federal Republic of Germany.
They have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation
was denied. The entire German people are called upon to achieve in free selfdetermination the unity and freedom of Germany.
GRUNDGESETZ,

preamble.

The FRG Constitution speaks of one German nation, thus preventing recognition of GDR
citizenship and nationhood; this accepts the temporary situation of German states, but only
one German nation. The Elbe river border remains unresolved due to imprecise documents
drawn up by the Allies at the end of WWII. The West German Government's stand is that
the entire river is West German territory, with the GDR beginning at the Eastern shore;
however, there is already de facto acceptance of GDR claims by sharing the river without
confrontation with East German patrol boats to the middle of the river.
8. The relations between the two Germanies are volatile and sensitive, and any adverse
publicity only threatens an already delicate balance.
9. See, K. FICKE, POLIrIK UND JUSTIZ IN DER DDR (1979); K. FRICKE, DDR STAATSICHERHErr

(1982).

10. For a more complete thesis on the human rights violations in the GDR, see, Men-

schenrechtsverletzungen in der DDR, 18

DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV

(1985).
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ence on Security and Cooperation in the Europe Agreement" (commonly
known as the Helsinki Agreement of 1975), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.12 The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights provides in part that:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.'"
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also provides
for the freedom of thought and religion", freedom of speech' 5, the freedom of association I6 , the right of peaceful assembly 7, as well as the right
to leave one's country.' 8
Not only has the GDR agreed on an international scale' 9 to observe
and guarantee human rights as outlined in the Helsinki Agreement, but it
has also guaranteed these rights in the Constitution of the German Democratic Republic. Among the fundamental rights provided by the East
German Constitution are: freedom of religion2 0 , right to democratically

11. The complete text of the Final Act is found at 14 I.L.M. 1293 (1975); and 73 DEP'T
STATE BULL,

323 (1975).

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe opened at Helsinki on July 3,
1973, continued in Geneva from September 18, 1973 to July 21, 1975, and was concluded in
Helsinki on August 1, 1975 by the representatives of the 35 participating states: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, German
Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia.
The only European country not represented at the Conference was Albania.
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
preprinted in 16 I.L.M. 168 (1977), (entered into force March 23, 1976).
13. Id. at art. 19(2).
14. Id. at art. 18.
15. Id. at art. 19.
16. Id. at art. 22.
17. Id. at art. 21.
18. Id. at art. 6.
19. J. JoycE, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DocuMENTs (1978). Among international
instruments signed by the GDR are: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on the Political
Rights of Women; Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others; Slavery Convention of September 25, 1926; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery; and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
20. W. SIMONS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD (1980), The Constitution
of the German Democratic Republic, art. 39.
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and vote in 'democratically formed elections'22 , freedom of the

press and expression in general 3 , right of peaceful assembly2", freedom of
association2", freedom of movement within the German Democratic
Republic. "

Unfortunately, the provisions are often not followed by the GDR. All
the guaranteed rights are subordinated to the interest of the State as a
result of so-called "rubber paragraphs" which allow the State wide latitude in interpreting the rights outlined in the Constitution. The East
German legal system, as is typical of socialist countries, revolves around
the state and its maintenance of Marxism-Leninism, rather than to serve
its people. 7 The GDR utilizes its "legal system" to commit egregious
human rights violations. Without allowing its citizens recourse in courts,
rights to protest or criticize, or criticism by independent, international
organizations, whose charges are labelled "interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state." This is clearly the one major difference between judicial systems in the East and West which has been at the center
of many contentious debates from Helsinki to the follow-up conferences
in Belgrade and Madrid.
II.

DOCUMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

As the GDR neared its 30th anniversary in 1979,28 a number of international human rights groups 2 9 focused their attention on various cases of
imprisonment for political reasons in an attempt to point out the abuses
of the East German legal system. In particular, these groups sought to

draw attention to the imprisonment of Rudolf Bahro, a dissenting Marxist sentenced to eight years imprisonment in connection with his writing
0 a book critical of socialism as practiced in the
of Die Alternative,"
8
GDR. Bahro was punished because the book had been published in the
West and had received broad Western press attention.32 These groups
also sought to bring attention to the case of Nico Hfibner, a young man
who refused induction into the armed forces of the National People's
Army based on his reference to the Allied Military Status of Berlin, a

21. Id. at art. 21.
22. Id. at art. 22.
23. Id. at art. 27.
24. Id. at art. 28.
25. Id. at art. 29.
26. Id. at art. 32.
27. Positive, Loyal, Schwankend, Negativ. Der Spiegel, Feb. 20, 1985, at 117, col. 1.
See, infra note 40 [hereinafter referred to as Der Spiegel].
28. Address by Professor Armin Wishard Ph.D., Ldineburg, West Germany (Oct. 1982)
(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter cited at Wishard].
29. Amnesty International and the International League for Human Rights.
30. R. BAHRO, THE ALTERNATIVE IN EASTERN EUROPE (D. Fernbach trans.) (1978).
31. Id.
32. Wishard, supra note 28, at 1.
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convention signed by the Allies at Potsdam 3 which prevents the inhabitants of both East and West Berlin from being drafted into the armed
forces.14 The East Germans, who chose simply to ignore this Convention,
jailed Hibner for his insistence on asserting his rights and rejection of
the state's arbitrary circumvention of established treaties.5 A third case
involved the continued harassment by the East German Government of a
prominent philosopher, Robert Havemann, for his political views." Although these particular cases were all widely publicized, the result merely
masked the critical condition of East Germany's overflowing jails filled
with prisoners who were convicted for alleged crimes against the socialist
state. Exact numbers of presently-held political prisoners are difficult to
ascertain,37 since all information regarding East German violations is obtained from escapees40 or prisoners now released"8 and in the FRG,'3 or
visitors to the FRG.
The Rubber Paragraph
The "rubber paragraph" is frequently used to justify actions by the
GDR that the Salzgitter organization questions. The East German penal
code ("Strafgesetzbuch"), Article 214, provides in part:
Whoever impedes the activity of state bodies with violence or threats,
or shows disrespect for the laws in a way endangering public order, or
urges disrespect of the laws, shall be punished by imprisonment of up
to three years or by a suspended sentence, short-term detention, a fine
or public rebuke."'
This is known by the people of both Germanies as the "rubber para-

33. Potsdam Protocol of 1945. See also, Four Power Declaration of 1945.
34. Wishard, supra note 28, at 1. The Convention was signed at the Potsdam Protocol
of 1945.
35. When Jehovah's Witnesses object to military service, the GDR will sometimes make
a concession allowing them not to carry weapons. However, those who refuse to oblige to
this small concession have been sent to prison for outright pacifism. See, J. STEELE, INSIDE
EAST GERMANY: THE STATE THAT CAME IN FROM THE COLD 158 (1977).
36. Wishard, supra note 28, at 1. These cases typify those documented by the press and
the Salzgitter Archives.
37. Since 1970, the GDR has stopped publishing criminal statistics on a regular basis.
See, J. STEELE, INSIDE EAST GERMANY: THE STATE THAT CAME IN FROM THE COLD 156 (1977).
38. A particularly insidious practice in the GDR is the incarceration of prisoners of
conscience with (and as) ordinary criminals so as to avoid the charge of having imprisoned
political prisoners. Furthermore, the GDR derives annually, millions of monies in hard currency by "selling" prisoners to West Germany, whose government quietly agrees to this
trade in a humanitarian gesture. The GDR bases its demands on the education and training
of each individual; that is, a physician may command up to $U.S. 50,000 or more to be
released, a worker somewhat less. Precise figures are not published by West Germany so as
to not draw attention to the arrangements which could endanger future deals.
39. Wishard, supra note 28, at 1.
40. Buchhaltung des Verbrechens, Weltbild, June 8, 1984, at 21, col. 2 [hereinafter
cited as Weltbild].
41. STGB.DDR art. 214, § 1.
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graph". 2 This provision, in spite of its apparent application only to "violence or threats", allows the authorities to jail people almost at will. According to Amnesty International, no officials are aware of its application
to anyone who has used or advocated violence. 43 The purpose of Article
214 seems to be to protect the activity of the public bodies rather than
citizens.""
The elements constituting a crime "impeding state or social activity"
are unclear. For example, in September 1979, Mr. and Mrs. Januszewski
were arrested and sentenced to about three years imprisonment for submitting applications for a period of one year to government authorities
for permission to emigrate.4 5 The couple called attention to the Helsinki
Agreement permitting freedom of emigration, and all written laws of the
GDR, wishing to emigrate to West Germany. After several applications
had been rejected, Mr. Januszewski sent a letter to Willi Stoph, Chairman of the East German Council of Ministers, in which he wrote, "A life
in the GDR for my family and me does not seem to be worth living under
conditions where human rights are violated.""' The authorities construed
this letter as an attempt to blackmail, practically equivalent to a suicide
threat in East Germany, and it formed the primary basis of the charge
against the Januszewskis brought under the "rubber paragraph" (Article
214). The couple was finally released in July of 1981. 4'
Because political prisoners (Amnesty International estimates between 4000 and 6000 in the GDR)"4 are not prosecuted as a separate category in East Germany, 4' and consequently are not distinguished from the
ordinary criminals, it makes it difficult not only to estimate the number
of political prisoners populating the penitentiaries of the GDR, 0 but also
to ascertain the number of prisoners who have been sentenced to long
prison terms purely for insisting on rights which are ostensibly guaranteed in the GDR's Constitution or by international conventions signed by
the representatives of East Germany."1 Others have committed minor po52
litical crimes in hopes of being ransomed out to the West.
The "Slave Trade" Between the Germanies
Not only are these prisoners punished for asserting their basic

42. Wishard, supra note 28, at 1.
43. Amnesty International, Restrictions on the Right to Freedom of Expression in the
German Democratic Republic 23 (1980).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Wishard, supra note 28, at 4.
49. Id. at 6.
50. See, supra note 43.
51. Id. at 1.
52. Palenberg, Disquiet on the Western Front: Observations on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Berlin Wall, 5 FLETCHER F. 352, 359 (1981).
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human rights, they are exploited for economic gain. In order to obtain
badly needed western hard currency" the East German government offers political prisoners to the West in what is known as the "Buy-Free"
program.5 4 Under this program, Western countries can "purchase" these
prisoners' freedom at an exorbitant price. 5 Depending on the profession
of the bought prisoner, prices vary, and can be as mush as $50,000 for a
doctor." East Germany attempts to rationalize this program by asserting
that the loss of these individuals results in a drain on the human resources of their society, and thus should be compensated. Although this
may be viewed as a humane endeavor, its obvious purpose is to alleviate
an already overburdened penal system on the verge of collapse.5 7 Out of a
total population of 15 million in 1950, now close to 17 million, an estimated 20,000 political prisoners were released; in 1960 - 16,000; in 1964
10,000; in 1972 - 25,351, plus 6344 from preventive detention; in 1979,
a total of 21,928 were given amnesty.5 8 This practice should not be construed as a humane gesture; it also allows the East German authorities to
continue to apply pressure on its citizens and dissidents, provides badly
needed western currency, and alleviates the GDR of having to cope with
"embarrassing" individuals by "selling" them to the West.59
The Advocate Practicingin the GDR
In West Germany, with a population of approximately 61.5 million
people, there are approximately 47,000 attorneys." With a population of
17 million, a mere 600 is all the Minister of Justice has provided."
A recent article in Der Spiegel, a major West German magazine, recounted an interview with a "retired" East German advocate.62 Dieter
Graf, 41, practiced from 1970 to 1982 as an attorney in the GDR. After
numerous conflicts with the State justice system, he now works with a
church organization in Magdeburg, East Germany. 3 Graf describes the
justice system of East Germany in which most lawyers fully acquiesce to
state demands, as "through and through political; where only Party members are good advocates, and the truth that they investigate must always
avail itself to socialism." ' What do the rest of the advocates do? A few
play along; some, like Graf, resign, and the rest battle against their

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 357, 359.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Der Spiegel, supra note 27, at 117.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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helplessness."
Frustrationof the Legal Practice in the German Democratic Republic
The East German legal system is fraught with injustice against the
accused. Violations begin in pre-trial confinement, where psychologically
destructive methods of interrogation and conditions of imprisonment are
employed.6 Pre-trial confinement is prolonged for long periods, the accused is denied the right to a defense lawyer of his own choice, and a copy
of the charges is frequently refused to the accused, and the public is excluded from the proceedings. 7 According to the Criminal Procedure Code
paragraph 64, section 2,'8 every defense attorney is allowed to take a look
at a copy of the client's charges. What is actually permitted in practice
is an entirely different matter. This system is strengthened by the fact
that a lawyer first of all serves the state, and only secondarily his client.7 0
In the typical scenario involving an East German attorney, the advocate should always attempt to speak quietly to his client. This is done to
avoid eavesdropping devices present in every conference room. The attorney strives to have his client acquitted, and prevent the authorities from
establishing proof against his client. Days before the trial, authorities
thrust documents at the defense attorney informing him that the sentence has been decided, written down and sealed, in anticipation of a final
result. A responsible advocate protests to the judge. But the judge typically evades the issue, explaining that an intern with the tribunal,
designed the "prejudgment" merely on an experimental basis. The judge
insists the entire episode has nothing to do with the actual criminal matter. On the day of the hearing, the attorney pleads for acquittal, but must
do so without any proposals or motions. Naturally, the accused is sentenced and later gets a statement of the decision. The defense attorney is
not particularly surprised that the only difference between the "designed
judgment" and the actual judgment is that the latter carries the judge's
7 1

signature.

The processes of the East German legal system seem to be designed
to thwart an attorney's effective representation of his client.7 2 Allegedly,
each defense attorney is permitted to examine a description of his client's

65. Id.
66. Wishard, supra note 28, at 2.
67. Id.

68. STPO.DDR para. 64, § 2.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Der Spiegel, supra note 27, at 117.
Id.
Id.
The Marxist-Leninist principle of law is politically and socially functional. See, 1 K.

ZWEIGERT, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1977). For a more complete explanation

of the origins of Marxist-Leninist law in the Soviet Union, and the basis for GDR legal
system, see, R. DAVID, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY (1974). See infra note
74.
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criminal offense, and make an investigation of the charges." However, if
the attorney chooses to do so, his actions are strictly controlled. When the
attorney receives the indictment, employees of the Justice Department
watch him closely. Since no photocopies or other recordings of any proceedings are allowed, these employees scrutinize the attorney's actions
closely, noting all excerpts the attorney writes down. The attorney's associates are also forbidden to peruse these excerpts. These attorneys must
struggle through restriction after restriction in the preparation of their
client's defense. In short, although the GDR would like to show itself to
the rest of the world as a state observing the rule of law, in fact the judicial system of this socialist state is designed to achieve the opposite
effect.74
In addition to the practice of criminal defense, attorneys are available in the GDR for civil, family and other legal matters. These channels
of the legal system are even more inefficient than those of the criminal
justice system. Even though there are specific laws reserved for these special situations, secret sentences, breaches of the law and repression characterize the daily routine of the justice system. 75 The law embodied in the
civil statutes emerges from the "cocoon of the practice of law" as a tool
for the suppression of the citizens, which promotes the strength of the
76
State Party.
Overriding Concern with the State's Dominance in Private Affairs of its
Citizens
Assume a couple comes before the judicial tribunal for a simple di-

73. STPO.DDR para. 64 § 2.
74. Der Spiegel, supra note 27, at 117. In K. SONTHEIMER & W. BLEEK, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF EAST GERMANY 88-102 (1975), the authors explain that there is no
distinction between law and politics:

[Tihe law is not so much a means for safeguarding order and existing conditions but rather a means of further developing the socialist society . . . it
[the legal system] is principally a tool of politics . . . a specific form of state
and social activity serving to safeguard, protect and advance those rights of the
people and that observance of modes of behavior declared to be obligatory in
the common interest and embodied in the Constitution and the laws.
[Tihere are no independent judicial bodies, which can keep a check on the
legality of acts of the state, moreover the relative constancy and reliability of

legal authorities which are well known in bourgeois constitutional states do not
exist.
In the legal system of the GDR, the juridical protection of the individual is
of subordinate importance, for both constitutional and legal theory proceeds
from the fact that the political, economic and ideological condition for human

development have already been created in the GDR and do not first have to be
effectively safeguarded by the verdict of a court of law.
See also Childs, supra note 3, at 135-39. But see Buchholz, The Social Courts in the German DemocraticRepublic: Bodies of Criminal Justice, 4 INT'L. J. COmp. & APP. CRIM. JUST.
37-42 (1980) (written by an East German law professor).
75. Id. at 124.
76. Id.
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vorce. Before the judge can grant the divorce, he must complete a checklist concerning the couple and their "attitudes". The checklist provides
for determination of the following:
(1) Attitude to the socialist society-state - positive, loyal, vacillating, or negative?
(2) Upbringing of the children as socialist personalities - satisfactory, or not?
(3) Influence and effects of ideological diversions (i.e., through
West German radio and television, and West German printed
material)?
(4) Motive of the divorce
- affections, an expected child, or eco77
nomic considerations?
The judge must also respond to possible "countercultural, decadent, immoral, and antisocial behavior and absenteeism" of the couple, and
should decide whether the couple is involved in the proper educational,
cultural, political and social organizations, as well as the children, and
whether more information is required from local authorities before the
78
divorce may be granted.
In summary, as Graf contends, the GDR justice system, the bureaucracy of the government, and the socialist state itself make the life of an
attorney very frustrating. As Graf complains,"the Party has everything to
1 9
do with everything.

III.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY RESPONDS TO EAST GERMAN
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: SALZGITTER.

The "Zentrale Erfassungsstelle der Landesjustizverwaltungen in
Salzgitter" (commonly referred to as the "Erfassungsstelle") or "Central
Archives of the Federal Justice Department in Salzgitter," is a documentation center for offenses committed in the GDR for which many in the
FRG believe the East Germans should be held accountable.8 0 The Erfassungsstelle was instituted in October 196181 in reaction to the building of
the Berlin Wall in August of that same year.8' The agency is staffed with
about a half-dozen employees, headed part-time by District Attorney
Carl-Hermann Retemeyer. Retemeyer is the representative of the Attorney General's office from the District of Braunschweig.

77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id. at 118.
80. Holtfort, Ein Relikt des Kalten Krieges, Sozialdemokratischer Pressedienst, Dec.
18, 1984, at 1.

81. Fromme, Sechs Untermieter der Polizei in Salzgitter sind den DDR-Oberen seit
Jahren ein Dorn im Auge, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Oct. 15, 1984, at 17, col. 1. See also
Schmidt, Ein riesiger Aktenberg unter DDR - Beschluss, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Jan. 20,
1975, at 7, col. 2.
82. Winters, Salzgitter ist nur eine Dokumentationsstelle, Frankfurter Allgemeine,
Apr. 3, 1984, at 5, col. 1.
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The purpose of the agency in Salzgitter is to assemble material documenting human rights violations committed by the government of the
GDR, as well as to secure evidence reporting such crimes. 3 Contrary to
what many Europeans believe, the Archives in Salzgitter are not comprised of a collection of evidence of Nazi war crimes, but rather it is concerned with the maltreatment, arbitrary arrests, convictions, and penal8 4
ties in the GDR that appear too severe by West German legal standards.
For example, out of a total of 1,132 crimes that were registered by the
Salzgitter staff in 1983, 940 were judgments of a suspicious nature."
Procedure of the Salzgitter Archives
The task of assembling the political and violent offenses committed
in the recent past in East Berlin and the GDR is done by utilizing an
elaborate alphabetized color-card system. Presently, this system contains the names of over 80,000 GDR and East Berlin citizens.8 " The
Salzgitter staff distinguishes the East German offenses by using four major categories, each with its own color. Registered on yellow cards are approximately 50,000 names of persons responsible for illegal conduct
against the citizens, primarily consisting of judges and attorneys. On blue
cards are listed the perpetrators of physical mistreatment of prisoners in
the penal system. The red cards combine the names of "denouncers"
(Denunzianten) of the GDR with spies and informers for East Germany.
Finally, at least 31,487 "sacrifices and victims" (those individuals whose
whereabouts are unaccounted for) are registered on white cards.8 8 The
West German attack on these abuses by the small staff in the Central
Archives was so extensive that after fourteen years of existence, the
Erfassungsstelle had to be significantly expanded. One can begin to appreciate the enormous task that Salzgitter was designed to undertake.
The information gathered by the Salzgitter staff is separately organized by types of atrocities committed:
1. Incidents of homicide of every manner, including kidnappings,
committed by the regime with the purpose to restrict freedom of
movement in order to achieve loss of human dignity and the humiliation of the citizen. Also included is a category for "terror convictions",
which is a catch-all for acts committed by the East German State not
readily categorized by Salzgitter, but are nonetheless excessive.
2. Maltreatment and acts of cruelty.
3. Actions grounded on a suspicion of criminal offenses under
Section 220(a), genocide (V61kermord), Section 234(a), abductions
83.
84.
85.
86.
Schlaf,
87.

Fromme, supra note 81, at 17, col. 1.
Holtfort, supra note 80, at 2.
Id. For examples of political suspicion, see infra note 95.
Naumann, Ein Staatsanwaltund funf Mitarbeiterbringen Honeckers SED urn den
Berliner Morgenpost, Apr. 15, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
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(Verschleppung), and Section 214(a), political suspicions (politische
Verdichtigung) of the criminal code."9

As soon as sufficient grounds for a violation are identified, they are
registered at the Salzgitter Archives."
In the first category, homicide, the data is comprehensively assembled and investigated. In particular, the witnesses are questioned and all
evidence is heard. A judge then decides whether to accept the evidence or
if further investigation is needed. The records of the cases are submitted
to a court according to the West German Criminal Procedure Code section 13,1' and are then delivered to the district attorney. This process is
necessary because the Salzgitter Archives do not have jurisdiction to
charge and initiate criminal proceedings. For example, the Salzgitter
Archives cannot question a witness without permission from the court.92
In the second category, maltreatment, the cases are "expressions of
political oppression of the GDR." ' Escapees report their stories of intentional maltreatment. The incident is registered at the Salzgitter Erfassungsstelle, the wrongdoer's name is recorded in the card file system.94
In the last category of political suspicion, including genocide and
other criminal offenses, the cases are predominantly ones which involve
informers who have disclosed information about escape plans to the GDR
authorities.9 5 These cases are usually limited to a hearing with the victim,
and the facts are turned over to the district attorney. The names of the
informers are registered at the Erfassungsstelle in the event that they
travel into the Federal Republic of Germany. If they are apprehended in
the FRG, they are tried in the new jurisdiction of the victim."'

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. col. 1, 2.
Salzgitter Institute Publication, at 3.
STPO.DDR, § 13.
Salzgitter Publication, supra note 90, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.

95. Spoo, Auch SPD -

Ltinder ritteln nicht an der Erfassungsstelle, Frankfurter

Rundschau, Dec. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 3. As an example of "political suspicion", a case concerning a separating couple made its way to the Erfassungsstelle. The wife had abandoned
the husband with the intention of divorcing him. While at a marriage counseling agency, the
husband fabricated a fear that his wife might leave the GDR with his son. With the intention of saving the marriage, the husband emphasized that his wife had actually prepared the
illegal trip to the outside. The wife was convicted of illegal emigration, and incarcerated for
over a year. Thereafter, she was allowed to leave the GDR. Later, the husband followed her
to the FRG. On August 21, 1984, the husband was sentenced to a year and three months for
causing the incarceration of his wife.
In a second case, a former soldier of the East German People's Army during his duty as
a border soldier in East Germany, upon orders shot a 20-year-old escapee in Harz. The
reports, according to West German sources, indicated that the shooting was most likely fatal. Although the incident was ignored in East Germany, upon arrival from escaping the
GDR, a subsequent jury trial in Stuttgart sentenced the former GDR soldier to 15 months
imprisonment.
96. Id.
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Salzgitter occupies itself primarily with actions and judgments concerned with political subversion. Witnesses or victims are questioned
about their fate and report about the nature of their charges and types of
penalties regarding fellow inmates. The Erfassungsstelle proceeds by
questioning possible witnesses and gathering the facts of an illegal conviction, then registering the conviction. The sentences in the GDR for attempted escape average a minimum of one year. The official who abused
his power in such a judgment is recorded in the card system and crossreferenced with other similar judgments. 7
Since 1961, the Central Archives in Salzgitter have counted 4,306
government-sanctioned homicides." Under the category of "maltreatment", the Salzgitter staff has recorded 603 incidents of egregious human
rights violations, 2,343 incidents of political harassment, and a total of
22,290 convictions on political grounds, with over 30,000 arrests and
sentences." The Erfassungsstelle has registered over 50,000 names of persons responsible for human rights violations. 0 0
West German authorities have instituted the Archives and these legal
proceedings under the belief that the civil and criminal laws of the FRG
are valid not only domestically, but also for GDR citizens. 1 " According to
the Penal Code paragraph 7, section 2, subparagraph 1,102 the Code of the
FRG applies to criminal acts committed or suffered by persons who at the
time were West German citizens or after the act became West German
citizens. 03 According to the FRG, the decision as expressed by the Federal Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of the basic
treaty O4 between the the Germanies on July 31, 1973, the GDR is not a
foreign jurisdiction in relation to the FRG. 0 5 Therefore, according to the
West Germans, and since East Germany has not been officially recognized
as a separate sovereignty by the FRG, the West German penal code applies not only to West Germans, but to East Germans as well.' 0 6
It should be noted that the West Germans have more in mind than
the pursuit of human rights in East Germany. It is the stated position of
the West German Government that some day Germany will be re-

97. Id.
98. Sudmeyer, Dorn im Auge Ostberlins, Stuttgarter Nachrichten, Aug. 21, 1984, at 19,
col. 2.
99. Id.
100. Berliner Morgenpost, supra note 86, col. 4.
101. Holtfort, supra note 80, at 2.
102. STGB.DDR para. 7, § 2, subpara. 1.
103. Salzgitter Publication, supra note 90, at 5.
104. The Basic Treaty Between the FRG and the GDR, Nov. 14, 1972, provides a basis
for relations between the two Germanies, to facilitate trade, travel and relations. For an
English translation and commentaries on its constitutionality see, F. HESS, GERMAN UNITY:
DOCUMENTATION AND COMMENTARIES ON THE BASIC TREATY (1974).
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united.' 7 Although this may seem unrealistic to the rest of the world, the
West German goal dominates East/West German politics. The Salzgitter
Archives may be used as a tool to effectuate this goal. For their part, East
German authorities have no intention of joining the West. Yet, the East
German authorities are sincerely threatened by the Erfassungsstelle in
Salzgitter: it undermines GDR sovereignty claims as an independent
state, interferes in internal affairs, and is a possible threat that GDR
leaders may in some uncertain future face a Nuremberg-type tribunal,
and thousands of GDR state functionaries, judges, soldiers, police and
party members would be charged and possibly convicted.108 As long as
Salzgitter is in existence, it is a "thorn in the eye" of the authorities in
East Berlin. 09

IV.

THE

GDR:

SALZGITTER IS AN ACT OF REVENGE

The East Germans maintain that the Salzgitter Archives were established as a method of revenge after Germany's division and can only be
viewed as such."10 The GDR claims that the Salzgitter office is staffed
with pensioned Nazis, carrying on their evil work from years ago."' The
East German officials accuse the Archive employees of document falsification, and with attempting to undermine a legitimate state of law and order." 2 The GDR officials argue that the Salzgitter Erfassungsstelle offends the basic treaty between the two Germanies."13 In particular Article
6,"' where the parties agree to respect the independence and separate
sovereignty of the two states." 6 The existence of Salzgitter is seen to offend various international principles, including the Helsinki Accords articulating the principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign
states." ' The East Germans maintain that as long as Salzgitter exists, a
normalizing of relations between the states or nations will be impossible,
because it supports a policy of hypocrisy and confrontation," 7 and is a
relic of the cold war which threatens the peace and security of Europe." 8

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Sudmeyer, supra note 98, at 19, col. 2.
110. Ein Wilrmfortsatz, Horizont, No. 3, 1981, at 7, col. 3 [hereinafter cited to as
Horizont].
111. Erfassungsstelle in Salzgitter Treibt Noch Immer Ihr Unwessen, Neues Deutschland, Jan. 8, 1981, at 2, col. 1.
112. DDR Korrespondent Olaf Dietze aus Salzgitter, Aktuelle Karnera, Nov. 2, 1980.
113. Presse des Ministeriums fur Atiswartige Angelegenheiten der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republic, Aussenpolitik Korrespondenz, 16 (1975).
114. The Basic Treaty, art. 6, supra note 104.
115. Horizont, supra note 110, col. 2.
116. Juristische Aggression, Aktuelle Kamera vom 27.11.80.
117. Horizont, supra note 110, col. 2.
118. Neues Deutschland, supra note 111, at 2, col. 2.
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V.

OPPONENTS TO SALZGITTER IN WEST GERMANY

Although the work of the Salzgitter Archives is applauded by many
West Germans, its existence is not unquestioned. Unlike conservative
parties, some groups in the FRG, especially the newly emerged Green
Party and, to some extent, the Social Democrats (SPD), believe that the
reunion of the two Germanies is unrealistic, and that Salzgitter should be
abolished. " 9 The West German Republikanischer Anwaltsverein (RAV),
or West German Bar Association, maintains the Erfassungsstelle Archives
are superfluous and ineffective. 2 0 In December of 1984, prominent social
democratic (SPD) lawyers and politicians, (including the more liberal social democratic bar members Jifrgen Schmude, Horst Ehmke and Hans
Vogel) recommended at a hearing before the West German Bundestag
(parliament) that the Central Archives in Salzgitter be dissolved.'2 ' The
RAV's position is that the West German government holds no legal basis
on which to implicate East German authorities.
According to Article 6 of the Basic Treaty,' 2 the two Germanies are
restricted to exercise power within their own sovereignties.'1 3 Dr. Werner
Holtfort, president of the RAV, asserts that the "cold war" mentality that
led to the institution of the Central Archives in Salzgitter is no longer
valid, nor does it provide any basis of jurisdiction.'2 4 In his speech before
the West German Parliament, Holtfort stated that "the FRG must accept
that one Germany no longer exists, but two . . . " and that the West

German citizens can no longer protect the GDR's citizens, nor could they
prosecute them under the guise that West German law is for every German."' 2 5 For these reasons, the groups who oppose the Salzgitter Archives
believe that the institution lacks any 1meaningful
purpose, and only dis26
rupts the necessary efforts of detente.

CONCLUSION

As the GDR continues its violations of human rights of its citizens,
more East Germans will undoubtedly seek other solutions and resort to
protests outside the official, government-guided movement. Arrests, discrimination and forced expatriation, supported by a well-intentioned but
misguided West German policy of "buying out" political prisoners, are
likely to increase in the future. The debate over the Salzgitter Archives is
sure to continue for years to come, both within the West German government, and in talks between the two Germanies. Until the issue is settled
119. Spoo, Fossil des Kalten Krieges, Frankfurter Rundschau, Aug. 15, 1984, at 3, col.
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to the satisfaction of both governments, the Archives will continue to
serve as a collection agency for human rights violations in the GDR and
allow the FRG to apply a considerable amount of pressure to improve the
respect for human rights in the GDR. It is possible that the agency will
be abolished at some point in the future in exchange for improvements in
the civil rights record of the GDR and better relations between the two
countries. Until such time, East German authorities are sure to feel the
sting of criticism by having their civil rights record publicly recorded and
exposed. As the GDR's confidence and prominence in world affairs grows,
the country desires to avoid being portrayed as a persistent violator of its
citizens' rights. 127 In no small measure the Salzgitter Archives have served
to bring about improvements for GDR citizens by focusing the spotlight
on repeated and egregious violations of GDR and internationally accepted
norms of behavior in the area of civil rights. Retemeyer states that if the
work he and his associates conduct, and the "scare tactics" of the Institute keep one soldier from shooting, then it has paid for itself a thousand
28
times.

127. The effect of the publicity of civil rights violations is exhibited by cases that are
soon rectified after such adverse publicity from concerned organizations.
128. Weltbild, supra note 40.
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NATION AGAINST NATION: WHAT HAPPENED TO THE

DREAM AND WHAT THE U.S.

CAN DO ABOUT IT,

This is an extremely important book on a very important, if indeed,
unpopular subject - the experience of the United States with the United
Nations since its founding in 1945.
The creation of the United Nations seemed to follow inexorably from
the devastating experience of World War II and its 50 million dead. Having refused to join the League of Nations, largely ithe inspiration of
Woodrow Wilson, and having tasted the bitter fruits of an isolationist
policy that helped facilitate the rise of Hitler and a militant Japan, President Roosevelt and the American people gave a rapturous welcome to the
concept of an international organization that would help ensure peace.
But, as was recognized even then, the success of the peacekeeping efforts
of the new organization depended on the determined collaboration of the
victorious powers, and continued good relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States. The confidence expressed by President Franklin
D. Roosevelt that he and the Soviet's leader, Joseph Stalin, could "get
along" now appears an unbelievable miscalculation by a politically astute
statesman. As events quickly demonstrated, wartime allies soon became
rivals and an all-out "cold war struggle" began after the end of World
War II began.
In the period 1945-60 the United Nations became a secondary platform in the struggle between the giant powers. The United States possessed the support of a majority in the General Assembly, and could
count on the support or at least the abstention of most of the Security
Council, leaving the Soviet Union in the undesirable position of using the
veto.
Perhaps the high point of the period of early promise of the U.N.
resulted from the successful action of the Security Council in June, 1950
when the Soviets absented themselves from Council deliberations in pro* William M. Beaney is Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Denver
College of Law and a member of the Advisory Board of the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy.
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test against the Council's actions in denying the China seat to Peking. In
retrospect this was a victory that displayed the real weakness of the U.N.
In the absence of good relations between the Soviet Union and the
United States, the U.N. was a flawed instrument for the maintenance of
peace. The 20 million deaths attributable to various wars since 1945 emphasize the limitations of the U.N. as a peacemaking and peacekeeping
body.
After 1960 the successes enjoyed by the United States through the
Assembly support became less and less frequent. The Third World came
into being, formed of many small, developing nations (whose votes possessed trading value) and became a vital part of the Assembly. As
Thomas Franck makes clear, they frequently do not vote solidly as a bloc,
but, as a group with a generally socialist bent they are determined to
propose measures and plans that require the wealthy nations (read
United States and Western Europe) to share more of their resources with
the poor nations of the third world.
As the Soviet Union has found the United Nations a more comfortable arena, and the United States has increasingly experienced defeat in
the Assembly and several of the specialized U.N. agencies, in part due to
the anti-Israel posture of the third world, questions have been raised in
the United States Congress, and in high places of the Reagan Administration as to whether continued U.N membership is in the national interest.
The United States has already withdrawn from UNESCO, charging gross
mismanagement by its Director-General, but plainly, it was a move dictated in large part by the unwelcome policies pursued by that agency. As
the author points out, there are serious losses occasioned by the withdrawal from UNESCO, and he urges caution in considering such severe
steps.
What the author shows, citing numerous examples, is that even with
the apparent reluctance of the majority of the U.N. members to march in
step with these United States policies, the U.N. has proved a useful forum for vital discussions and political maneuvers on many past occasions
and, if diplomatic planning and skillful implementation become more evident in the future, the United States can win its share of successes. One
of the strengths of Professor Franck's study is the citation of numerous
instances where the United States simply plunged ahead without a coherent set of plans or goals. One of his conclusions is that:
The United Nations has shown, recently, that it can still win on issues
ranging from Israel's right to participate in the system to respect for
the status of Puerto Rico... Indeed, we could probably win more
often, if we were willing to do the necessary long-range strategic planning and deploy seasoned personnel and equip them with sufficient
carrots and sticks: in short, if we were to take the U.N. seriously as a
place for politics. (p. 271.)
In short, he argues that if we are to participate effectively we must
send a top team, with proper instructions, to play the nation's hand.
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Whatever one may think of her personal ideology, is not one dismayed to
learn that Ambassador Kirkpatrick was known for her ". . . penchant for
gratuitous truculence, the personal put-down, and indifference to others
that has made her, by far, the most personally unpopular representative,
ever, of the U.S. in the U.N." (p.269.) In partial defense of Ambassador
Kirkpatrick and her predecessors, it must be a difficult task for any
United States representative to perform effectively when one's superiors
display a negative attitude toward the U.N. which they wish, or allow, to
be reflected in the conduct of our delegation to the world organization.
If Professor Franck refuses to give very high grades to the professional conduct of the United States at the U.N., what is to be said about
the behavior of the U.N. and its organs? In 1946 Stalin referred to the
United Nations Charter as "a rather good document," but as the author
observes, "Stalin plainly had not for one moment considered redefining
Soviet self-interest to accommodate the idea that his nation might have a
significant stake in the new system of collective security and conflict resolution." The United States at first seemed willing to make an accomadation, but even before losing control of the system, began to abandon it as
a primary instrument of diplomacy. With the superpowers devoted to
other means for advancing their respective interests and resolving their
conflicts, the U.N. assumed a quite different coloration from the dreams
of its founders. Professor Franck describes most vividly the development
of the various instruments and components of the U.N. system. Perhaps
only the Security Council has performed approximately as envisaged.
With the dramatic exception of the Korean episode, described above,
each of the superpowers has used the veto to forestall action harmful to
its interests. The reproving comments of the United States spokesmen
and media when the Soviets made liberal use of the veto in the early
period of the U.N.'s life, disappeared when it became evident the use of
the veto served the interests of the United States.
More interesting has been the growth in the powers of the General
Assembly and the office of the Secretary-General. The author's description of how Dean Acheson as part of his 1950 Korean policy pushed the
General Assembly into a new peacekeeping role through the "Uniting for
Peace Resolution", is a masterful example of how short-range considerations may produce long-range disaster. Once having tasted the heady experience of involvement in situations where the Security Council was incapable of acting, the General Assembly became the willing instrument
for peacekeeping during the 1956 Suez crisis and other future threats to
peace. As a consequence, the growth in the membership of the General
Assembly has resulted in the interesting, though unanticipated spectacle
of the Third World pursuing various goals and enterprises that have little
to do with the major powers, but which produce an unrealistic sense of
power among nations whose equal vote belies their impotence on the
world scene.
The story of the growth in power of the Secretary-General is equally
fascinating. The title of Professor Franck's chapter dealing with this sub-
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ject is highly descriptive, "The Secretary-General Invents Himself'.
(ch.7.) This is perhaps the high spot of the U.N. story. As the author
reminds us, "[p]recisely because [the Secretary-General] role is not
spelled out by the Charter, it is also not hedged with debilitating limitations and procedural incapacities. In this sense, the Secretary-General has
had the freedom to invent himself in the light of the experiences and
realities of the postwar world and has not been hobbled to a bad guess as
to what those realities might be." (p. 118.) A series of strong personalities
shaped the office - particularly the Norwegian Trygve Lie and Dag
Hammerskjold, a Swede. U Thant and Kurt Waldheim, while less innovative did little to shrink the role. On numerous occasions, the SecretaryGeneral throughout U.N. history, has chosen to speak directly to popular
constituencies throughout the world, and has not hesitated to prod governments, both large and small, when peace was threatened or the moderation of conflict seemed possible. The current officeholder, Javier Perez
de Cuellar, like his predecessors, decried the state of world affairs in
which the U.N. has been unable to play the role planned for it, and
warned that the nations "are perilously near to a new international anarchy." (p.133.)
This brief account of Nation Aganst Nation barely suggests the richness of Professor Franck's brilliant account of the occasional successes
and many failures of the U.N. Clearly written, replete with case accounts
involving events and people, this is a book that deserves reading by every
national policy-maker and interested citizen. For apart from his scrupulous respect for the facts, Professor Franck's judgments are always objective and well-conceived. This is a book written from an international perspective by one who has seen the U.N. from the inside.

Rethinking The Sources Of International
Law
Reviewed by Ali Khan*
VAN HOOF, G.J.H., RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Kluwer

Press, Boston (1983); $40.00; ISBN 90-654-4085-2, xiv, 322 pp.; index.

Article 38(1) of the statute of the International Court Of Justice, an
authoritative repository of the sources of international law, was drafted in
1920. Since then, the world has changed dramatically: decolonization has
increased the number of states to more than one hundred fifty; the developing countries are striving to forge a new international economic order;
ideological conflicts have become more complex, if not*more contentious;
and science and technology have broadened as well as deepened the possibilities for interaction and interdependence between states.
This befuddling mass of new developments poses novel legal
problems, particularly regarding the sources of modern international law.
For example, it is not clear to what extent, and under what circumstances, do Resolutions and Declarations of the United Nations General
Assembly, and treaties that have been signed but have not yet entered
into force, create and constitute legally binding norms of international
law. Legal scholars disagree on whether Article 38(1) is of itself a sufficient guide to identify valid rules of modern international law. The doctrine concerning the sources of international law remains complex and
controversial.
Questions arising in the practice of international law prompted Van
Hoof's search for sources examined in the present study. He probes for
"strictly legal" criteria that would answer the more practically relevant
question of whether a given rule is actually a rule of international law.
His quest for practical answers cuts through the controversial terrain of
doctrinal disputes by taking several middle-of-the-road positions. Yet this
study is philosophically provocative: it provides numerous useful insights
that illuminate the dark domain of doctrinal controversy.
The book consists of three parts. Part I discusses the normative concept of international law. The author argues that since at the present
time no single substantive ideal is universally recognized as the basis of
international norms, the validity of international law has to be derived
from a "procedural" source, which is composed of the State's consent.
Moreover, a consensual system is inherently dynamic and, therefore, the
sources of international law may change through State practice lato
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sensu. The author relies upon Hart's model of a union of primary and
secondary rules to show that States in the realm of international law, like
legal officials in the municipal system, are the final "law-determining
agencies." (p. 283) Ironically, Hart should disagree. But the author makes
persuasive arguments to show that Hart's model is "a sound approach to
the sources of international law." (p. 53)
Part II analyzes the traditional sources embodied in Article 38(1).
The author shares a common intuition that the modern rules of international law have spilled over the confines of the Article. But he disapproves of the doctrinal approaches that are currently employed to explain
this overflow. He suggests that the Article should not be stretched to contain the new phenomena. He rejects the "new sources" approach as well.
Any doctrinal approach, he further argues, that causes uncertainty must
be discarded. "What is needed," he states, "would seem to be a more integrated approach consistent with the traditional sources and at the same
time capable of explaining new developments in a more structural way."
(p. 288)
The final portion outlines an analytical approach to systematize the
various stages of the law-making cycle, unravelling the legal implications
of each distinctive stage. Since State practice lato sensu constructs international law, he argues, the law-making process should be carefully analyzed to separate legally binding manifestations of the consent of States.
Thus, there is a "grey area" between law and non-law, which contains
legally binding norms. A close examination of this grey area yields numerous "manifestations of consent or acceptance of States which are no
longer covered by the traditional sources of international law." (p. 279)
This thesis is intriguing as well as legally useful.
The author's analytical structure is founded on several assumptions
that are doctrinally controversial. One may legitimately quarrel with him
on whether his "strictly legal" approach is in fact strictly legal. Some argue that for the sake of clarity and certainty, there is, or at least ought to
be, a distinct dividing line between legal and non-legal norms. Therefore,
they fail to appreciate the paradoxical utility of the "grey area."
In sum, the book under review is a valuable contribution to the literature on international law. The arguments are creative, and presented in
a systematic manner, and I am convinced that the author has skillfully
demonstrated that the theoretical renaissance in international law is gaining momentum.

A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of
Antarctica
Reviewed by Sudhir K. Chopra*
QUIGG, PHILIP W., A POLE APART: THE EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA, Mc-

Graw Hill Publishing Co., New York (1983);$19.95; ISBN 007-051-0539, xiv,
288 pp.

In 1959, the successful negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty' froze Antarctica out of the political arena of international rivalry. Since then, there
has been considerable scientific activity on the Antarctic continent. In
1973, exploratory drilling in the Ross Sea area revealed important facts
about the oil and gas potential of Antarctica.2 This revelation came at the
time of the world oil crisis. The initial success in finding traces of oil and
gas reserves prompted the Consultative Parties' to structure the
Antarctic resource regimes." Being aware of sovereignty problems in Antarctica, however, the treaty powers first negotiated the Antarctic Marine
Living Resource Convention (CCAMLR), which was concluded in 1980.5
The development of the living resource regime was apparently less problematic since it involved fewer issues of conflicting sovereignty claims in
the Southern Ocean than on the Antarctic land mass.
Since 1979 the Consultative Parties have been occupied with the minerals issue. The minerals regime, which appears to be close to the final
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Australian T.S. (1961) No. 12; U.K.T.S. No. 67; U.S. Department of State The Conference
on Antarctica, 1959, at 61-67; 1 B. RUSTER AND SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 18-24 (1975); International Environmental Law Multilateral Treaties 979:91
(1980); W. BUSH, 1 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1982).
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ANTARCTIC LAW & POLITICS, 244 (1982). A report published pursuant to the drilling of four
holes under the Deep Sea Drilling Project projected and estimate reserves to be 45 billion
barrels of petroleum and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. The report was later withdrawn as it was considered too speculative and inaccurate.
3. Consultative Parties are the nation states with decision-making powers. Twelve
states in 1973 were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, United States Soviet Union, and South Africa.
4. Two separate regimes for living and non-living resources.
5. The Convention for Antarctic Marine Living Resources was signed on May 20, 1980.
The Living Resource Convention was negotiated pursuant to Recommendation IX-2 of the
Ninth Consultative Meeting (1977); S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 157 (1985);
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draft, is still being negotiated. 6 While the Consultative Parties have been
busy negotiating the minerals regime, the world's interest in the Antarctic
affairs has grown steadily. The fact that the Antarctic issue is now being
debated for the first time in the United Nations makes Antarctic affairs
all the more complex and controversial.' Consequently, A Pole Apart is a
very timely and welcome addition to the not-so-easily obtainable literature concerning Antarctica.
The 218-page text, which was written prior to the United Nations debate and the Falklands War, covers a wide range of Antarctic issues. Beginning with the history of the discovery and exploration of the Antarctic,
the book examines a broad scope of issues including scientific research,
resource potentials, territorial claims, the Antarctic Treaty, as well as the
interests of the world community. Other related issues discussed are the
economic potential and environmental concerns of the Antarctic. The
first two chapters, dealing with early discovery, exploration and scientific
research, are very informative and give the reader a full overview of the
seventh continent's discovery and richness of the resulting scientific investigations. The detailed discussion of the scientific activities carried out
before, during and after The International Geophysical Year (1957-58) is
quite illuminating to a new reader of Antarctic affairs. (See pages 46-65.)
The third chapter, which is brief but informative, provides an introduction to the Antarctic resource potential before it delves into an examination of the complex politico-legal issues. This chapter concerns both
living and non-living resources.' The discussion of non-living resources,
specifically oil and gas estimates and relatedtechnology, will be of greater
interest to a student of Antarctic affairs. (See pages 94-98.)
Chapter four deals with the legal issues related to Antarctica, such as
territorial claims, non-recognition of claims and efforts to internationalize

6. Mineral Resource Convention is currently in its second draft. The negotiations on
minerals issue was begun pursuant to Recommendation X-1 of the Tenth Consultative
Meeting (1979). For drafts of the convention, see, XXIII ECO, No. 1 (Bonn: July 11-22,
1983) and XXVII ECO, Nos. 2 and 3 (Tokyo: May 22-31, 1984).
7. Although in 1956 and 1958 India made proposal for discussion of Antarctica at the
United Nations, the matter was withdrawn without debate. (U.N. Doc. A/3118/Add.2, Oct.
17, 1956 and U.N. Doc. A/3852, July 15, 1958). New developments started in 1983 at the
Non-Aligned Summit Meeting (NAM) when the Summit passed a resolution requesting the
U.N. Secretary General to undertake a comprehensive study on Antarctica. (Non-Aligned
Summit documents: NAC/CONF 7/INF 11 para. 11 and NAC/COMF 7/Final Documents,
para. 122 of the Economic Declaration, p. 89). Following the NAM resolution the Antarctic
issues have been extensively debated in the United Nations in 1983 and 1984. (U.N. Doc. A/
38/646, Dec. 12, 1983; U.N. Doc. A/38/439/ Rev. 1, Oct. 10, 1983; U.N. Doc. A/C-138/PV.42,
Dec. 29, 1983; U.N. Doc. A/C.1/38/PV.45, Jan. 7, 1984; U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (Part I) Oct. 31,
1984; U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (Part II) Nov. 9, 1984; U.N. Doc. A/C.1/39/PV.50, Nov. 30, 1984;
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/39/PV.52, Nov. 30, 1984; U.N. Doc. A/C.1/39/PV.53, Nov. 30, 1984; and
U.N. First Committee resolutions, 38 U.N. GAOR, item 140 and 39 U.N. GAOR, item 152.
8. On resource potential of Antarctica see generally, B. MITCHELL, FROZEN STAKES
(1983); ANTARCTIC POLITICS AND MARINE RESOURCES: CRITICAL CHOICES FOR THE 1980's (L.M.
Alexander & L.C. Hanson, eds. 1984).
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Antarctica.' The wide range of legal issues discussed in this chapter will
be of particular interest to international lawyers. While maintaining the
earlier economy of expression, however, this chapter fails to relate the
details of claims involved in the three nations conflict between Argentina,
Chile, and Great Britain in the Antarctic Peninsula. Perhaps it would
have been easier to follow the discussion of territorial claims (at pp. 11318) and the conflict with Britain (at pp. 119-26) if the author had explained the relationships of the Falkland Islands dispute (Argentina and
Great Britain) and the Beagle dispute (Argentina and Chile) with the
Antarctic claims. 10
Chapter four also deals with the United States' policy towards Antarctica. This section is very well researched, very informative, and articulate in its presentation of the haphazard nature of the United States'
Antarctic policy (at pp. 126-33)."' This section will particularly interest
those who wish to explore the mysteries of the U.S. Antarctic policy.
Before publication of this book, very few authors had made even passing
reference to the details given to this section (p. 129).
Chapter five, dealing with the Antarctic treaty, is concise and mainly
narrative of the development of the Antarctic treaty system." The discussion of provisions of the treaty (at pp. 147-52) is probably too brief to be
of interest to international lawyers, though it can provide an overview of
the treaty to the new reader."3
Chapter six, entitled "Outside Interest," discusses primarily the
moves for internationalization of Antarctica. In this chapter the author
traces developments from the period after World War II until 1981 (at
pp. 164-70). This portion may be of special interest to those readers who
have considered the moves for internationalization of non-sovereign areas
to have come only from the third world (at pp. 164-5)."4 The author then
relates the issue of internationalization of Antarctica with the law of the
sea and space law concerns.1 5 The portion dealing with the law of the sea
discusses the impact of the law of the sea on Antarctic affairs and draws
an anaology between the two. The following part elaborates upon the
analogy between the law of outer space and the law of Antarctica. Once

9. For an Eastern Bloc view see generally, J. MACHOWSKI, THE STATUS OF ANTARCTICA
IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 74-79 (1977).
10. For a detailed discussion , see, R. PERL, THE FALKLAND ISLAND DISPUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (1983).
11. For details on the United States' Antarctic policy see generally: B.M. Plott,
The.Development of United States' Antarctic Policy (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis).
Plott's thesis was the first major work to discuss the United States' Antarctic policy.
12. For details of development of the Antarctic Treaty system, see generally AUBURN,
supra, note 2 at 147-83.
13. For detailed discussion of the Antarctic Treaty provisions, see id. at 84-146.
14. For yet another view, see J. MACHOWSKI, supra, note 9, at 76.
15. For detailed discussion of the ocean regime, the outer space and moon regime and
Antarctica see generally, J. KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES (1973); P. JEssUtP & H.
TAUBENFELD, CONTROLS FOR OUTER SPACE AND ANTARCTIC ANALOGY (1959).
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again, the discussion is probably too brief for international lawyers and
too complicated for a beginner. The environmental issues and the interests of environmental organizations are also discussed in the latter part of
this chapter.
The next chapter is devoted to the discussion of the living resource
convention and the minerals regime. The author has provided a thorough
survey and assessment of the living resource convention and also of the
developments leading to the minerals negotiation. This chapter attempts
to highlight the forces behind developing pressures on the treaty
system.16
The last chapter, entitled "A Commons in Trust,"is the author's prescription for solving the current dilemma. While the author prefers the
regime controlled by the treaty powers, he concedes that the mounting
pressures from the third world will warrant accommodation of the third
world interests, due primarily to the fact that it is unlikely that the rest
of the world will agree to the present treaty system." Quigg suggests
some modifications, such as allocation of two seats to the third world
countries on a rotation basis. He argues that such an adjustment might
persuade the third world to settle the issue. Many scholars would find
such an argument to be illusory, or based upon wishful thinking.18 Quigg
seems to overlook the real issue here (after having discussed it earlier),
that the majority of third world nations are interested in resource sharing
or in sharing the economic benefits accrued from resource exploitation. In
this regard, a system which gives the third world countries two seats on a
rotation basis does not provide them what they desire.19 The third world
contention is that either everyone should share the booty, or conversely,
no one should be able to exploit it.
In sum, the book proves to be quite useful to lawyers in that it contains a wealth of information and opinions. But the problem it presents
seems to be too complicated even for the concerned governments. Therefore, it is not surprising that the book does not offer a precise solution.
Nonetheless, the book is highly useful and recommended reading for a
student of Antarctic affairs.
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